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Since the 1990s, ethnic divisions have replaced the cold war as the world’s most 
important source of violent conflict (Lijphart 2002). According to Fearon and Laitin 
(2003), a conservative estimate of the total dead between 1945 and 1999 is 16.2 million, 
five times the interstate toll, as a direct result of about 127 civil wars that each killed at 
least 1,000. The problem of ethnic tensions is so widespread and serious that it has 
presented a major impediment to further democratization in this century and has possibly 
caused a third reverse wave of democratization (Lijphart 2002).  
Are ethnic tensions and conflicts inevitable in heterogeneous states? Which 
governmental institutions (parliamentary or presidential) and electoral systems (PR or 
SMD) create the best framework for addressing ethnic conflict? Is there any 
one-size-fits-all institutional solution to ethnic conflict? This dissertation aims at 
answering these urgent but under-explored questions, especially the last two about the 
effects of institutional arrangements. This dissertation will hold out institutional 
prescriptions that meet the needs of specific divided societies through a large-N 
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Chapter 1: The Overlooked Interactive Effects 
of Contexts and Political Institutions 
 
Since the 1990s, ethnic divisions have replaced the cold war as the world’s most 
serious source of violent conflict (Lijphart 2002). “Communal conflict has devastated 
Yugoslavia and threatens the stability of most of the successor republics of the Soviet 
Union. The most protracted conflicts of the century are being fought over ethnonational 
issues in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia…. Virtually every country in Western 
Europe is beset by growing public antagonism toward immigrant groups of Third World 
origin” (Gurr 1993: 314). According to Fearon and Laitin (2003), a conservative estimate 
of the total dead between 1945 and 1999 is 16.2 million, five times the interstate toll, as a 
direct result of about 127 civil wars that each killed at least 1,000.1 The problem of 
ethnic tensions is so widespread and serious that it has presented a major impediment to 
further democratization in this century and has possibly caused a third reverse wave of 
democratization (Lijphart 2002).  
Are ethnic tensions and conflicts inevitable in heterogeneous states? Which 
governmental institutions (parliamentary or non-parliamentary) and electoral systems 
(proportional or non-proportional) create the best framework for addressing ethnic 
conflict? Is there any one-size-fits-all institutional solution to ethnic conflict? This 
dissertation aims at answering these urgent but under-explored questions, especially the 
last two about the effects of institutional arrangements. Many scholars would blame 
mostly the inability of constitutional designers to deal with ethnic conflicts if these 
conflicts have really caused a third reverse wave of democratization (Lijphart 2002). This 
                                                 
1 Although Fearon and Laitin (2003) refute the direct effect of ethnic diversity on civil war, they 
acknowledge that ethnic diversity may have indirect impact. 
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dissertation will hold out institutional prescriptions that best meet the needs of specific 
ethnic societies. 
In the following sections, I first examine the individual effects of the number and 
spatial distribution of ethnic groups, government structures, and electoral systems on the 
severity of ethnic conflict.2 I then provide preliminary evidence about the importance of 
the interaction between these factors, and introduce briefly the theories of this dissertation. 
I conclude this chapter with the sections on research methods and the plan of this 
dissertation. 
Before proceeding to the next section, it should be noted that the subjects of this 
research include both violent and nonviolent ethnic conflicts that pit ethnic minorities 
against states during 1985-2003.3 I argue in Chapter 3 that institutions should have 
similar but stronger effects on violent conflicts than on nonviolent conflicts. For the 
purpose of concentrated discussion, only the link between institutions and violent 
conflicts is examined in this chapter. The Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset that I will 
analyze in this dissertation includes ethnic groups that collectively suffer, or benefit, from 
systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a state, and/ or make claims 
on behalf of and undertake political action to defend and promote their collective interest. 
In Chapter 4, I will detail the scholarly definitions of ethnicity. 
 
1.1 The Impact of Ethnic Diversity 
Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, many more scholars 
                                                 
2 I do not investigate the links between these independent variables and the occurrence of ethnic confict in 
this chapter, because these explanatory variables have similar effects on the occurrence and severity of 
ethnic conflict. Chapter 7 will present both these estimates in a multiple regression context. 




have traced rebellion, which can quickly undermine democracy (Fish and Brooks 2004), 
to ethnic nationalism (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Empirical evidence about the detrimental 
impact of serious ethnic divisions is abundant. For example, Horowitz (1993) observes 
that democracy has developed furthest in some East European countries which have 
fewest severe ethnic cleavages (Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland) and 
progressed more gradually or not at all in others which are deeply divided (Slovakia, 
Bulgaria, Romania, and of course the former Yugoslavia). Fish and Brooks (2004) 
indicate that the course of regime change and the performance of democracy in Asia and 
Latin America are smoother and better in more homogeneous states. Other scholars have 
different views, however. For example, Horowitz (1985) and several others claim that the 
link between ethnic fractionalization and severe ethnic conflict is nonlinear, with less 
violence for highly homogeneous and highly heterogeneous countries. Put differently, the 
most severe ethnic conflicts occur in countries in which there exists a substantial minority 
group facing an ethnic majority. 
Does the presence of two major ethnic groups or that of more than two groups lead 
to more severe ethnic conflict?4 With an 8-point scale, “anti-regime rebellion” from the 
MAR dataset is generally regarded as an interval-scale variable. Given this classification, 
a mean comparison can be done. According to the test result displayed in Table 1.1, 
typical countries with multiple ethnic groups experienced more severe anti-regime 
rebellion during 1985-2003 than typical countries that have only two ethnic groups. The 
average conflict level of more diverse countries was almost twice that of less diverse 
countries (rebellion=0.92 and 0.50, respectively). This difference is significant at the 95%  
                                                 
4 I have used the ethnic fractionalization index of Alesina and his colleagues (2002) to divide countries into 
two categories to represent more and less diverse countries, respectively, i.e. countries having multiple 
groups and countries having only two groups. Specifically, the effective number of ethnic groups equals 
two when a fractionalization score is smaller or equal to 0.61. Please refer to Chapter 4 for details. 
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Table 1.1: The Average Levels and the Ranges of Rebellion  















Multiple Groups  68 0.92 1.57 0.00 0.00 1.00 7.00 
Two Groups 104 0.50 1.22 0.00 0.00 0.20 5.84 
Mean Comparison: H0: Multiple<=Two  t=1.98  p=0.02 
Source of the rebellion data: Minorities at Risk dataset 1985-2003. 
Notes: Minority groups in divided democracies constitute the unit of analysis. I classify 
countries as democracies if they receive a Polity IV score of at least 6. Rebellion is an 
8-point-scale variable, with 0 indicating no conflict, and higher values representing more 
serious conflict. Min. and Max. are the abbreviations for minimum and maximum, 
respectively. 
 
confidence level (p=0.02). The variable of rebellion does not have a normal distribution, 
however. This distribution suggests that comparing medians, instead of comparing means, 
may be more appropriate. Both the comparisons will be presented in the following tables. 
Readers can decide which results to focus on. 
While the mean comparison shows that more diverse societies experienced more 
severe conflict than less diverse societies on average, the median comparison indicates 
that the typical states of both categories never experienced ethnic conflict. Regardless, 
severe conflict happened in some of both types of states, as the maximum level of 
rebellion shows. Why were some divided societies associated with a lower risk of more 
intense rebellion and others with a higher risk, regardless of the degrees of ethnic 
diversity of these societies? This dissertation provides contextual and institutional 
explanations. More diverse societies do not necessarily mean more or less severe conflict. 
Furthermore, within both types of societies, there are variations in terms of the severity of 
ethnic conflict. The combined impact of the spatial distribution of ethnic groups,  
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Table 1.2: The Average Levels and the Ranges of Rebellion  















Concentrated Groups 119 0.91 1.58 0.00 0.00 1.00 7.00 
Dispersed Groups  53 0.13 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.18 
Mean Comparison: H0: Concentrated<=Dispersed  t=3.52  p=0.00 
 
government structures, and electoral systems helps explain these variations both within 
and between societies with different effective numbers of ethnic groups. 
 
1.2 The Impact of Ethnic Spatial Distributions 
Spatially dispersed ethnic groups are generally believed to be less combative than 
spatially concentrated ethnic groups (Gurr 1993; Byman 1997; Ayres and Saideman 2000; 
Saideman and Ayres 2001; Toft 2003). Dispersed groups have no legitimacy, motivation, 
or capability to claim control of the land they currently occupy, so such groups are 
essentially more peaceful. Table 1.2 provides supportive empirical evidence.  
According to Table 1.2, the average rebellion level of concentrated groups was seven 
times that of dispersed groups (rebellion=0.91 and 0.13, respectively). The difference is 
significant at the 99% confidence level (p=0.00). Although the median comparison 
indicates that neither of the groups experienced any ethnic violence on average, some 
concentrated groups were engaged in a lot more severe rebellion than dispersed groups as 
the maximum level of rebellion shows (rebellion=7 and 2.18, respectively). The smaller 
variation and the lower intensity of dispersed groups’ conflict activities should result from 
such groups’ inherent tendency to coexist with other ethnic groups more peacefully. But 
what factors explain why some concentrated groups fought severely against their states 
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while others did not? This dissertation argues that the combined effects of government 
structures and electoral systems provide the answer. 
 
1.3 The Impact of Government Structures 
Many scholars agree that conflicts are by no means intractable and institutions play 
important mitigating roles (e.g. Horowitz 1985; Reynolds 2002). However, there have 
been many debates about which governmental institutions (presidential, parliamentary, 
and semipresidential) and electoral systems (proportional and non-proportional) create 
the best framework for addressing ethnic conflict. The most criticized problems 
associated with presidential systems include their tendency to foster zero-sum 
competition, to encourage a winner-take-all outcome, and to promote deadlock between 
the executive and the legislative branches (Linz 1994; Lijphart 1994, 1999, and 2002). 
Influenced by these views of Lijphart and Linz, some scholars and countries consider 
parliamentary systems better levers of conflict management in divided societies than 
presidential systems. Many important academic and political figures in Taiwan, for 
example, have been advocating adopting a parliamentary system.5 Among the 70 states 
in my dataset, about 27 countries had parliamentary systems during the entire 1985-2003 
period. 
In contrast, some scholars and countries have paid attention to the potential pitfalls 
of parliamentary systems. For example, Shugart and Carey (1992) indicate that 
parliamentary-one-party-cabinet systems can generate more enduring and 
unchallengeable winners if the same party continuously wins parliamentary elections. 
                                                 
5 They have had this preference, although some individuals did not explicitly relate their penchant for 
parliamentary systems to Taiwan’s ethnic problem. 
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Although these two scholars do not discuss the effects of government structures to 
address the question of conflict management in divided societies,6 their notion implies 
one merit of presidential systems on this question, i.e. checks and balances between the 
executive and the legislative branches, which are separately and popularly elected. Such 
checks and balances hold to some extent even when the same party (and the same ethnic 
group) wins elections of both the branches (Saideman et al. 2002). Understanding that 
both the chief executive and the legislative assembly of presidential systems have a fixed 
and independent electoral mandate, which makes it possible that control of parliament by 
a single ethnic group would not be sufficient to exclude the rest, Nigeria chose this 
system in 1978 (Horowitz 2002).  
The effect of semi-presidential systems has been under-explored in the discipline. I 
argue in Chapter 3 that such systems have an impact similar to that of presidential 
systems. I therefore use the term “presidential systems” in this dissertation to denote both 
presidential and semi-presidential systems. Among the 70 states in my dataset, about 40 
countries used presidential systems during the entirety of 1985-2003. What do we make 
of these divergent views about the impact of government structures and the different 
choices among ethnically divided societies? There are more divided societies in my 
dataset using presidential systems, but are such systems more propitious in conflict 
management?  
The mean comparison reported in Table 1.3 shows that on average, presidential 
systems outperformed parliamentary systems in reducing the intensity of rebellion during 
1985-2003. Specifically, the average conflict level in parliamentary systems was almost  
 
                                                 
6 Most literature on governmental structures does not address this question. Lijphart’s and Linz’s works are 
exceptions (Belmont et al. 2002). 
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Table 1.3: The Average Levels and the Ranges of Rebellion  















Parliamentary 68 0.91 1.60 0.00 0.00 1.00 7.00 
Presidential 98 0.50 1.21 0.00 0.00 0.40 5.80 
Mean Comparison: H0: Parliamentary<=Presidential  t=1.89  p=0.03 
 
twice that in presidential systems (rebellion=0.91 and 0.50, respectively). The difference  
is significant at the 95% confidence level (p=0.03). 
The median comparison indicates that parliamentary systems did not differ 
significantly from presidential systems in managing ethnic conflict, however. 
The interquartile range (IQR), i.e. the difference between the first and the third quartiles, 
shows that the intensity of ethnic violence had wider variations among parliamentary than 
among presidential systems (IQR=1.0 and 0.4, respectively). Put differently, the levels of 
ethnic conflict were more different among parliamentary than among presidential systems. 
Furthermore, some parliamentary systems experienced the most intense ethnic violence, 
i.e. rebellion=7, but the most serious rebellion happened in presidential systems is also 
quite intense, i.e. rebellion=5.8. These facts suggest that some parliamentary systems 
were indeed less propitious, but others may be preferable to presidential systems. This 
dissertation introduces both institutional and contextual conditions that explain when 
specific government structures are conducive to peaceful ethnic relations and when they 
are not. 
 
1.4 The Impact of Electoral Systems 
There have also been numerous debates about how successfully different electoral  
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Table 1.4: The Average Levels and the Ranges of Rebellion  















SMD 76 0.96 1.67 0.00 0.00 1.20 7.00 
PR 73 0.46 1.14 0.00 0.00 0.37 5.84 
Mean Comparison: H0: SMD<=PR  t=2.14  p=0.02 
 
systems manage ethnic conflict. Proportional representation (PR) systems generally have  
higher proportionality of votes to seats and hence are widely believed to better facilitate  
minority representation and minority support for the political system (Lijphart 2002; 
Norris 2002). Other scholars like better preferential electoral systems, such as Alternative 
Vote (AV) and Single Transferable (STV) systems (Horowitz 1991), in the belief that they 
promote rival elites’ incentives to compromise. Only three countries in my dataset used 
these electoral systems during 1985-2003, suggesting that only a few divided societies 
appreciated such systems. But do PR systems better handle ethnic tensions than non-PR 
systems? 
Table 1.4 provides supportive evidence if we compare the mean levels of rebellion in 
countries using PR and single-member district (SMD) systems. In this dissertation, the 
terms “non-PR systems” and “SMD systems” will be used interchangeably. The average 
rebellion level in countries using non-PR systems was more than twice that in countries 
using PR systems (rebellion=0.96 and 0.46, respectively). The difference is significant at 
the 95 confidence level (p=0.02). The median comparison indicates no difference 
between the two systems’ performance, however, meaning that the typical states using 
both systems did not experience any ethnic conflict. 
Furthermore, countries having SMD systems displayed more variations than those  
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Table 1.5: Mean Levels of Rebellion by the Numbers and Spatial Distributions  













1 Concentrated Two Parliamentary PR 1.18 (7) 
2 Concentrated Two Presidential PR 0.40 (19) 
3 Concentrated Two Parliamentary SMD 1.13 (4) 
4 Concentrated Two Presidential SMD 0.91 (21) 
5 Concentrated Multiple Parliamentary PR 0.25 (4) 
6 Concentrated Multiple Presidential PR 0.74 (15) 
7 Concentrated Multiple Parliamentary SMD 2.42 (16) 
8 Concentrated Multiple Presidential SMD 0.40 (14) 
9 Dispersed Two Parliamentary PR 0.00 (5) 
10 Dispersed Two Presidential PR 0.09 (12) 
11 Dispersed Two Parliamentary SMD 0.22 (11) 
12 Dispersed Two Presidential SMD 0.02 (5) 
13 Dispersed Multiple Parliamentary PR 0.03 (3) 
14 Dispersed Multiple Presidential PR 0.00 (2) 
15 Dispersed Multiple Parliamentary SMD 0.54 (5) 
Note: Minority groups in divided democracies constitute the unit of analysis. I use 
Alesina and his associates’ index of ethnic fractionalization to derive the effective 
numbers of ethnic groups. Numbers of cases are in parentheses.  
 
having PR systems in terms of the intensity of ethnic violence (IQR=1.2 & 0.37, 
respectively). Moreover, although some countries using SMD systems experienced the  
most intense ethnic violence, i.e. rebellion=7, some states adopting PR systems also  
experienced quite severe ethnic conflict, i.e. rebellion=5.84. These two facts suggest that 
sometimes, but not all the time, PR systems outperformed SMD systems. This 
dissertation stresses the need to examine under which conditions PR systems become 
preferable. 
                                                 
7 “Spatial distributions” is a group-level variable. All the others are state-level variables. 
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The most important lesson learned from this discussion is that the effects of the 
number and spatial distribution of ethnic groups, governmental structures, and electoral 
systems display a wide range of variations. This empirical pattern is in accordance with 
the expectation of this dissertation: Only after we take all the other three factors seriously 
can the impact of any of these four variables be accurately understood. 
 
1.5 The Interactive Effects of the Contexts and Political Institutions 
This section provides preliminary evidence about the importance of the interaction 
between the institutional and contextual factors. Table 1.5 presents the mean levels of 
rebellion by the number and spatial distribution of ethnic groups, government structures, 
and electoral systems. Because all these variables have two categories, there are 16 
possible combinations. One combination does not have any observation, so only 15 
combinations are displayed in Table 1.5. 
The mean comparison reported in Table 1.1 with regard to the effect of the number 
of ethnic groups shows that typical states having multiple groups experienced more 
severe ethnic conflict than typical states having only two groups. Table 1.5 does not 
provide similar findings. Controlling for the spatial distribution of ethnic groups, it is 
found that only one type of country with multiple groups— i.e. those using 
parliamentary-SMD systems (Types 7 & 15)— experienced more intense rebellion on 
average than countries having two groups. The result of Table 1.1 is obviously biased by 
this single type of country. All the other more diverse countries had more harmonious 
ethnic relations than less diverse countries. Furthermore, if government structures and 
electoral systems are also held constant, no consistent pattern about the effect of group 
numbers exists, as the comparisons between Type 1 vs. Type 5 and Type 2 vs. Type 6 
 12 
 
indicate. These mixed patterns result from the fact that different institutions favor 
minorities’ policy influence in different contexts. For example, the existence of multiple 
groups in parliamentary-PR systems favors the formation of a coalition cabinet, which 
better ensures for all the ethnic groups in a state a certain sense of security, be they a 
member of the coalition or not.8 It is thus not surprising to find that, in cases involving a 
concentrated ethnic group living in parliamentary-PR systems, rebellion is less intense in 
countries having more than two ethnic groups (Type 5) than in those with only two 
groups (Type 1). This example demonstrates well the need to take the interactive effects 
of the contextual and institutional factors seriously in order to better understand the 
impact of ethnic diversity on ethnic conflict.  
In respect of the effect of the spatial distribution of ethnic groups, Table 1.2 shows 
that the average rebellion level of concentrated groups is seven times higher than that of 
dispersed groups. The higher combative motivation and fighting capability of 
concentrated groups have been generally proved by Table 1.5 as well. There were 
exceptions, however. For example, typical concentrated groups in Types 2, 5, and 8 were 
equally or less combative than dispersed groups in Type 15 between 1985 and 2003. I 
argue in Chapter 3 that the institutions of Types 2, 5, and 8 provided the concentrated 
groups in question the highest sum of probabilities to influence policy-making, so these 
groups became less combative. After taking the combined effects of the institutional and 
contextual factors into consideration, these three types were not exceptions anymore. 
Similar points can be made about the effects of government structures and electoral 
systems. Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 indicate that presidential and PR systems better prevent 
severe ethnic conflict. Table 1.5 provides a more complicated picture. For example, 
                                                 
8 Please refer to Chapter 3 for details. 
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parliamentary systems performed quite differently in Types 1and 5, in accordance with 
the expectation of this dissertation that appropriate government structures are ultimately 
contextual and rest on the nuances of the number of ethnic groups in a country. PR 
systems also had different performance in, say, Types 1, 2, and 5, suggesting the 
interaction between electoral systems, government structures and the numbers of ethnic 
groups makes a difference. Furthermore, a common but untested view suggests that the 
combination of parliamentary and proportional representation (PR) systems best manages 
ethnic conflict. This view does not stand up to the preliminary empirical investigation. 
Holding the number and the spatial distribution of ethnic groups constant, this 
institutional combination guarantees the least severe ethnic conflict in some but not other 
contexts during 1985-2003. In the remaining chapters, I will discuss which institutions 
best meet the needs of specific divided societies, and provide more systematic empirical 
evidence. 
To explain how the interactions between the institutions and the contexts in question 
affect ethnic conflicts, Chapter 3 introduces the theories of this dissertation. The theories 
about the effects of political institutions and ethnic diversity place the sum of 
probabilities for ethnic minorities to influence policy-making at the center of a general 
explanation of why some ethnic conflicts are more severe than others.9 
Appropriate institutional configurations are those that maximize such probabilities in 
a specific context. For example, for concentrated minority groups facing only one 
opposition group, ceteris paribus, presidential-PR systems outperform other institutions in 
                                                 
9 Violent conflicts are costly, but there are several obstacles to a rational settlement of disputes short of 
violence (Toft 2003), such as (1) private information obstacles (parties to a dispute tend to conceal their 
true aims and goals, as well as the costs and risks they are willing to take to reach their goals); (2) a 
commitment problem (ethnic minorities often find it difficult to trust stronger groups’ commitment to an 




providing them more influences in policy making. Fairer PR systems help reduce the 
likelihood of conflict engaged in by such groups while presidential systems help prevent 
dominant groups from gaining total control of power, and, hence, reduce the conflict 
propensity of dominated groups in question. I will discuss the effects of institutional 
configurations in other types of contexts in Chapter 3. It should be noted that although the 
units of analysis in this dissertation are ethnic groups within a democratic state for a 
given year, my findings provide implications for the institutional engineering of 
ethnically divided societies. According to my theory, institutions either do not matter for 
dispersed groups’ conflict propensities (since such groups are essentially more peaceful) 
or have similar effects on both concentrated and dispersed groups’ tendency toward 
conflict. Divided societies can thus design institutions based on only the needs of 
concentrated ethnic groups, regardless of whether institutions influence dispersed groups’ 
conflict propensities. 
Whether states with two groups or with more than two groups experience more 
intense conflicts is determined by whether minority groups of these societies have been 
largely prevented from having influence in policy-making in a specific institutional 
arrangement. The aforementioned comparison between Type 1 and Type 5 provides a 
good example of this theory. In Chapter 3, I will discuss the effects of group numbers on 
ethnic conflict when different institutions are in use. 
To investigate the impact of ethnic groups’ spatial distributions on ethnic conflict 
requires controlling for the effects of political systems. Ethnic diversity does not matter in 
this investigation, and one example explains why. When parliamentary-PR systems are 
used, concentrated groups are likely to be associated with a higher probability of violent 
conflict than dispersed groups. This likelihood remains unchanged even when these 
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concentrated and dispersed groups live in more diverse and less and less diverse countries, 
respectively. More diverse countries better promote ethnic power sharing than less 
diverse countries when parliamentary-PR systems are used, as aforementioned. An 
uneven distribution of power between dominant and minority groups is more likely to 
persist in both types of societies, however. Given this condition, capable concentrated 
groups living in more empowering countries are still more likely to fight for fairer 
treatments than less capable dispersed groups living in less empowering countries. In sum, 
given a certain political system, capable concentrated groups are more likely to rebel and 
intensely clash with states than dispersed groups regardless of how many ethnic others 
these groups face. 
 
1.6 Research Methods 
In this dissertation, I will perform statistical analysis to test my interactive 
hypotheses. Because one central theme of this dissertation is about the combined effects 
of government structures and electoral systems given certain contexts, my study focuses 
only on democracies in the assumption that political institutions function differently in 
democracies and non-democracies. The Minorities at Risk dataset, which provide this 
dissertation the dependent and some control variables, classified 172 ethnic groups in 70 
democratic states during 1985-2003. The number of observations may vary from model 
to model because of different model specifications and the exclusion of some cases from 
analysis for robustness check. The MAR dataset has several desirable features (Toft 
2003), such as its inclusion of both the presence and absence of violent and nonviolent 
political activity and its specification of several levels of group conflict against states. 
The second feature is especially advantageous to this dissertation because that allows me 
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to study both the occurrence and severity of ethnic conflicts. I will do so in Chapter 7. 
A key methodological contribution of this dissertation is to do large-N, quantitative 
analysis as appropriately as possible. Large-N studies help provide generalizable 
knowledge, and are desirable given that in a regression context, the small number of 
observations in some types of societies will not constitute a particular concern.10 Large-N 
studies have rarely been done to investigate the link between political institutions and 
ethnic conflicts, however. Worse is the fact that existing quantitative studies usually do 
not let their theories direct their model specifications, as I discuss in the end of Chapter 2. 
Another methodological contribution of this research is to take very seriously the 
problems associated with any time-series cross-section analysis. I explain in Chapter 4 
why a between-effects model serves as a better model than the dominant Beck and Katz’s 
approach for any study using the MAR dataset to investigate the sources of anti-regime 
ethnic conflicts (especially of violent rebellion). I also introduce a new model, a 
zero-inflated ordered probit (ZIOP) model, to deal with the problem of too many groups 
experiencing no conflicts in the MAR dataset. When analyzing datasets having such data 
structures and having an essentially ordinal scale variable, a ZIOP model better achieves 
unbiased and consistent estimates. 
 
1.7 Plan of this Dissertation 
 The commonly acknowledged sources of ethnic conflict are critically reviewed in 
Chapter 2. I then discuss how previous research evaluated the effects of government 
structures and electoral systems. I indicate that there are only a few gnenralizable 
analyses, which omit the very crucial interactive term of the two institutions in question 
                                                 
10 Please refer to Appendix C for the number of observations in each type of society (i.e. Types 1-15). 
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and, hence, make their findings highly dubious. I bring in the insights learned from 
contextual studies of groups’ settlement patterns and group numbers to highlight the 
importance of the contexts when designing institutions to ameliorate ethnic conflict in 
specific ethnically divided societies. This chapter ends with a section on the frequently 
encountered methodological issues when modeling interactive effects and analyzing 
time-series cross-section datasets, together with an examination about how existing 
literature dealt with these problems. 
 In Chapter 3, I first discuss the implication of the theory of the ethnic security 
dilemma, in comparison with that of Lijphart’s and Tsebelis’ models of consensus 
democracy and veto player, respectively, about which types of institutions better solve the 
detrimental consequences resulting from the predicament. Building on the implication of 
the theory of the ethnic security dilemma, I rank each combination of government 
structures and electoral systems in order of their levels of power sharing. I then discuss 
how the number and spatial distribution of ethnic groups influence a system’s effect on 
ethnic conflict. I explain whether types of ethnic conflict constitute a factor in the 
desirability of institutional configurations. I then discuss how institutional configurations 
in turn affect the effects of the two contextual factors. Hypotheses are derived from these 
discussions. 
 In Chapter 4, I first briefly discuss appropriate statistical models based on the data 
structure of this dissertation and on the results of panel unit roots tests, followed by a 
section explaining how I measure the effective numbers and spatial distributions of ethnic 
groups as well as how I encode government structures and electoral systems. I will then 
introduce control variables and specify my empirical models. 
 Multivariate statistical tests (with other relevant variables incorporated) of my 
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hypotheses are laid out in Chapters 5-7. Chapter 5 presents the findings about the effects 
of government structures and electoral systems. In this chapter, I do a variety of 
sensitivity tests to ensure the validity of my findings, such as testing whether there is 
endogeneity between political systems and conflict levels; whether dividing government 
structures into three categories leads to different findings about the link between political 
systems and ethnic conflict, and whether excluding homogenous societies from analysis 
changes my conclusions. Chapter 6 presents the coefficients of ethnic diversity and group 
distributions. Chapter 7 uses a new model, i.e. the zero-inflated ordered probit model to 
reexamine whether my theory stands up to empirical investigation when using different 
models. This purely methodological chapter is designed to highlight the advantages of 
this new method for any ordinal-scale dataset that has a probability mass at the single 
value of 0. 
 The basic argument about the centrality of the probability of power sharing in a 
specific ethnic context in explaining ethnic conflicts receives strong support from all the 
models employed in this dissertation, i.e. between-effects, hierarchical, and ZIOP 
models.11 Generally, presidential-PR systems provide a better preventive framework for 
addressing ethnic conflict for countries with two groups. Parliamentary-PR systems 
perform better than parliamentary-SMD systems, but not better than any other 
institutional configurations, in countries with multiple groups. These findings challenge 
the conventional wisdom that parliamentary-PR systems best handle ethnic relations. 
Even when such systems better handle ethnic relations, they outperform only one 
institutional configuration. Put differently, the only institutional configuration that 
                                                 
11 There are a few unexpected findings, but they do not challenge the basic argument of this theory. I will 
detail the reasons in Chapters 5 and 7. 
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countries with multiple groups need to avoid is a parliamentary-SMD system. 
 My tests also show that ethnic diversity and group distributions, controlling for their 
interactions with government structure and electoral systems, must be part of any 
explanation of ethnic conflicts. Controlling for the institutional factors and other relevant 
variables, spatially concentrated groups indeed have a higher conflict propensity than 
dispersed groups, especially when looking at the ZIOP estimates. The basic argument 
about the effect of ethnic diversity— that given a certain institutional configuration, 
whether more or less diverse societies experience more intense conflict is decided by 
which types of societies using these institutions better promote their minority groups’ 
influence in policy making—also receives some empirical evidence.12 
 Chapter 8 begins by summarizing the basic arguments, findings, and methodological 
contributions of this dissertation. I then discuss the limitations and the theoretical and 
policy implications of this dissertation. Theoretically, my dissertation implies that 
spatially concentrated groups which have a majority population in the region they reside 
are not predestined to be combative, as the theory of indivisible territory suggests (Toft 
2003). Political systems affect whether ethnic groups have an incentive to fight against 
their regimes. I also argue, for example, that the interactive effects of government 
structures and electoral systems have been seriously overlooked to the extent that the 
importance of government structures has been widely and mistakenly forgotten or 
questioned,13 that parliamentary systems or their combinations with PR systems do not 
serve as the one-size-fits-all solutions to ethnic conflict as many scholars and constitution 
designers believe, and that a lower number of veto players does not necessarily lead to a 
                                                 
12 There are also a few unexpected findings. I will detail possible reasons in Chapters 6-7. 
13 Depending on research questions, the interactive effects in question may involve the impact of other 
variables, such as the contextual factors of this dissertation. 
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lower level of power sharing; the interactive models I use in this dissertation better detect 
this fact than a veto player model. On the policy side, I provide a set of solutions that fit 
the needs of specific divided societies, and warn that societies with both difficult 
situations of ethnic tensions and economic decline will be less likely to consolidate their 






















Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 In the first part of this chapter, I critically review the commonly acknowledged 
sources of ethnic conflict. I then discuss how previous research evaluates the (combined) 
effects of government structures and electoral systems. I also bring in the insights learned 
from contextual studies of groups’ settlement patterns and group numbers to highlight the 
importance of the contexts when designing institutions to ameliorate ethnic conflict in 
specific ethnically divided societies. This chapter ends with a section on the frequently 
encountered methodological issues when modeling interactive effects and analyzing 
time-series cross-section (TSCS) data sets, together with an examination about how 
existing literature dealt with these problems. 
 There are five approaches to the subject of ethnic violence, i.e. material-based, 
nonmaterial-based, elite manipulation, territory (as well as reputation building), and 
institutions.14 Each of these approaches captures some important dynamic of ethnic 
conflict. While material and nonmaterial explanations provide one-sided stories about 
ethnic conflict, theories stressing the importance of elite manipulation, territory, and 
institutions generally acknowledge the importance of both values. I discuss these 
approaches, one by one, in the following sections. 
 
2.1 Material-Based Approaches 
The first approach focuses on the effect of economic modernization, but the 
dominant paradigm within this approach has undergone a revolutionary change (Horowitz 
1985; Newman 1991; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Inspired by the writings of Marx (1978) 
                                                 




and Durkheim (1933),15 modernization used to be believed as a powerful force, which 
makes primordial collective conscience no longer relevant to the integration and survival 
of a society (Newman 1991). Individuals become loyal to the state rather than to their 
ethnic groups. This paradigm soon loses its validity, however, as continued ethnic 
conflicts across the world in both rich and poor regions exhibit the resilience of ethnic 
identity in every level of economic development. 
While some wait for further economic growth to eventually fulfill the strong 
influence that they once believed it had, others search for a fundamental paradigm shift to 
the extent that the real empirical pattern of ethnic violence can be explained. Connor 
(1973) and Smith (1981), for example, argue that modernization invigorates ethnic 
divisions by increasing the interaction between groups which rapidly find that they 
compete for the same economic and socio-political resources. When groups perceive a 
decline in political or economic conditions after a period of development, they may 
mobilize to compete and even fight against one another. This theory is hard, if not 
impossible, to falsify because it is hard to measure individuals’ perceptions about the 
relative decline or improvement in their standard of living and aggregate these 
evaluations across groups (Toft 2003). Even when some proxy variables are constructed, 
such as the economic differentials index in the Minorities at Risk dataset, time-series 
cross-national studies find no more severity of ethnic violence from groups experiencing 
more economic inequalities (Saideman et al. 2002). 
Other scholars emphasize that modernization itself constitutes only a necessary 
condition (or neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition) for ethnic political activity 
                                                 
15 Marx asserts that both ethnic nationalism and religion are mere components of the superstructure created 
by the dominant economic and political classes. In his later publication, Durkheim became less confident 




and that the actual development of conflict depends on other conditions, such as the 
balance of resources available to the various ethnic groups and especially their elites 
within a state (Rothschild 1981; Tiryakian and Rogowski 1985).16 The difference in their 
views about what causes ethnic political activity notwithstanding, most of these scholars 
seeking a new paradigm within the modernization theory tend to oversimplify actors’ 
motives as driven solely or mainly by economic concerns. They overemphasize the 
importance of resource competition as the cause of ethnic conflict at the expense of 
ethnic dimensions, and fail to take account of how elites mobilize mass support and why 
masses follow (Horowitz 1985).17 
 
2.2 Nonmaterial-Based Approaches  
If elites pursue a policy that deflects mass antagonisms onto other ethnic groups, 
such a policy must have roots in mass attitude, anxiety and ambition in order to succeed, 
says Donald Horowitz (1985). Horowitz is a serious critic of the “bloodless” theories, 
which use economic or class interests to explain bloody ethnic conflict, and is a famous 
advocate of the importance of the psychological dynamic of ethnicity. For him, the cause 
of ethnic conflict lies mainly in ethnic groups’ struggle for relative group legitimacy and 
worth, which, he argues, means a lot to the self-esteem of group members. Horowitz 
downgrades the impact of economic interests on ethnic violence because of what he 
                                                 
16 Many works on civil wars (which may include ethnic wars, but not exclusively) also stress the 
importance of “opportunity” (Eisinger 1973; Tilly 1978; Fearon and Laitin 2003), whose main determinant 
is the resources of finance and recruits for rebels. These factors’ theoretical interpretation is not necessarily 
economic, however. For example, Fearon and Laitin’s interpretation is more Hobbesian: “Where states are 
relatively weak and capricious, both fears and opportunities encourage the rise of would-be rulers who 
supply a rough local justice while arrogating the power to ‘tax’ for themselves and, often, for a larger 
cause.” 
17 Even though some recognized the importance of ethnic ideologies, they are considered simply resources 
to be mobilized at the command of manipulative elites. Another material-based argument comes from the 
international relations literature, which focuses on a territory’s intrinsic value (Toft 2003). This type of 
argument suffers from the same shortcomings as the modernization-related theories. 
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observed in his in-depth comparative case studies. For example, ethnic divisions of labor 
usually mitigate rather than facilitate competition and conflict between groups. When 
economically privileged “middleman” minorities have been attacked, the reasons have 
often been political. Job competition is also rarely a prominent factor in major urban 
ethnic strife. Moreover, secessionists have frequently been willing to lose from the 
realization of their separatist goal. This empirical evidence supports Horowitz’s view that 
“a bloody phenomenon cannot be explained by a bloodless theory” (Horowitz 1985: 140). 
His emphasis on relative group worth and legitimacy clearly brings the dimension of 
ethnicity back in as one major source of ethnic conflict and explains well why masses get 
motivated to engage in ethnic conflict. 
 Many other scholars across disciplines also pay attention to the ethnic component of 
inter-group conflict. They focus on the role of ascriptive features, history, and cultural 
heritage of groups in forming group identity and on the importance of group worth, 
ancient hatreds, fear, and other motivations in explaining ethnic conflict (Shils 1957; 
Geertz 1973; Isaacs 1975; Jervis 1978; Glaser 1992, 1997; Posen 1993; Rose 2000; 
Petersen 2002). They often ignore other important determinants of inter-group conflict, 
except for nonmaterial-based factors. Many of their explanations follow this logic: 
because ethnic groups ‘naturally’ want independence to protect their identity and 
well-being, they fight (Toft 2003). As a result, these scholars cannot explain why some 
but not other ethnic groups engage in fighting. They cannot contribute to our 
understanding about why groups cooperate, either. Finally, cross-national statistical 
studies also find no more occurrence, severity, or casualties of ethnic violence in 
countries with higher ethnic diversity (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier et al. 2004; Lacina 
2004). In such countries, presumably we will be more likely to see ancient hatreds, fear, 
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and more serious competition for group worth among groups. These findings suggest that 
there may be some important omitted factors. 
 
2.3 The Role of Elite Manipulation 
 While material-based and nonmaterial-based theories emphasize the effects of 
essentially structural factors on ethnic violence, some of them acknowledge the important 
role played by elites. After all, these factors cannot work themselves out, but must work 
through or be politicized by individuals and groups (Gourevitch 1979; Gagnon 1994). 
 Some of these studies emphasize material and others stress nonmaterial incentives 
that elites use to rally mass support. For example, Lake and Rothchild (1996) argue that 
ethnic conflict is most often caused by collective fears for safety of the future upon which 
ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs polarize a society. Gourevitch (1979) asserts 
that where economic growth and political leadership take place in different regions in a 
state,18 elites in the region with ethnic potential are likely to develop strong, politically 
relevant nationalism. This stream of research emphasizes that ethnic conflict is caused by 
the oratorical skills of manipulative leaders, who often enjoy privileged access to the state 
media, which makes the detrimental impact of their propagandistic manipulations of 
public opinion even stronger (Snyder and Ballentine 1996). 
 This type of argument, however, presents a similar problem as typical elite-based 
theories. While elite approaches provide a micro-foundation as to how structural factors 
work to affect ethnic violence, they cannot stand on their own as a sufficient explanation 
in that elite behavior is embedded in and constrained by history, structure, and culture. In 
                                                 
18 Gourevitch refers to economic growth and political leadership as that which constructs and maintains an 
industrial economy and strong central institutions common to the whole country, and that which formulates 
common policies in key areas, respectively. 
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addition, these approaches overpredict violence and cannot explain why some elites 
succeed and others fail; they mistakenly describe nationalism as serving merely for the 
interests of elites and the masses as simply passive victims of the elites’ rhetoric; and they 
afford elites too strong effects and fail to account for cases where elites are able to arouse 
a passive nation to violence but are unable to stop the wars (Toft 2003). Last but not least, 
elite-manipulation approaches generally ignore how institutions shape elites’ incentives to 
play the ethnic card; elites may be capable but unwilling (or less willing) to do that when 
institutions guarantee them a reasonable share of power. 
 
2.4 The Importance of Territory 
For those discontented with the one-sided material- and nonmaterial-based as well as 
the elite-based approaches, some assert that, as both a material and nonmaterial resource, 
territory informs the motives of disputing actors and explains why some ethnic conflicts 
turn out to be violent and others nonviolent (Toft 2003).19 If a state needs to build 
reputation that it would not allow the independence of a separatist group in order to 
prevent future challengers,20 and if, at the same time, an ethnic group in question sees 
their interests and occupying territory as indivisible, then violent confrontation between 
the two actors erupts. Given that the subjects of Toft’s research include ethnic groups not 
only from democracies but also from autocracies, the important question, i.e. whether 
democracies respond to minority demands for sovereignty and self-determination 
                                                 
19 This type of argument differs from those focusing only on the material values of a territory and, hence, 
better explains why some actors are willing to risk death, imprisonment, or mass exile to fight for a 
worthless land. 
20 Toft (2003) and Walter (2006) argue that when there exist multiple (geographically concentrated) ethnic 
groups in a state and when one of the groups demands sovereignty, the state would need to build reputation 
of not allowing that to deter future challengers. 
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differently from autocracies, is left unanswered and warrants more discussions here.21 
Toft argues that when groups have legitimacy and capabilities (determined mostly 
by their geographic settlement patterns and their population size) to control their territory, 
they will see their interests as indivisible and demand sovereignty. Even if they do that, 
however, it is usually hard to gauge whether secessionists really demand independence or 
seek other goals behind the mask of their self-determination movements (Gurr 1993), 
especially when they live in a democratic state. An examination of the MAR data set, 
whose units of analyses are ethnic groups within a country for a given year, provides 
some clues. First, for up to 81.33% of group-years under democracies during the time 
period of 1985-2003, the independence issue is either less salient or non-existent. 22 
Second, in terms of the salience of this issue for each group, independence had been a 
significant concern for only about 27% of the groups. Moreover, the extent to which a 
group cares about independence changes over time for most of the groups and in the same 
direction toward becoming low or not at all. These empirical patterns suggest two points. 
First, for groups who have legitimacy and capabilities to control their territory, most of 
them during most of the time do not demand sovereignty. Secessionists constitute 
minorities among all the ethnic groups living under democracies probably because 
democracies better accommodate their interests. Second, even if groups seek 
self-determination, their pursuance is not constant and dwindles in terms of its strength 
over time. Self-determination movements, in other words, may not be the end but rather 
are means of achieving other goals, such as competing for more power-sharing. Adopting 
appropriate democratic institutions to better serve and accommodate the needs and 
                                                 
21 There are more weaknesses in the analysis of Toft (2003). Please refer to the following section of this 
chapter for details. 
22 The estimate should be much different when looking at group-years under autocracies. 
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interests of ethnic groups is thus very crucial to peaceful ethnic relations. 
Walter reaches the same conclusion about the effect of regime types in his 2006 
American Journal of Political Science article that establishes the relation between 
reputation building and government accommodation. Violent conflict between a state and 
a separatist group in a democracy is found to be less likely in his large-N quantitative 
analysis, because democracies are more tolerant and more sensitive to the rights of 
individuals seeking self-determination. Walter, however, does not delve deeply enough 
into the impact of institutional variations on violence within democracies. Specifically, he 
does not investigate which combinations of government structures and electoral systems 
better take care of both the economic and symbolic interests of individuals and groups. 
 
2.5 Institutional Approaches 
 Like Toft and Walter, institutionalists do not take sides between material-based and 
nonmaterial-based explanations because of the frequent conjunction between material and 
nonmaterial factors. Appropriate institutions not only facilitate the protection and 
advancement of group interests, but also provide a sense of empowerment and security. 
This explains why Horowitz, while excessively putting emphasis on psychological factors 
and the wellsprings of mass motivations, acknowledges the importance and viability of 
managing ethnic conflict by adopting the right institutions to constrain elites’ incentives 
to fight. Unlike almost all the aforementioned approaches,23 which are essentially 
structural and, hence, stress factors that are immutable or hardly changeable at least in a 
short period of time,24 the institutional approach is less predestined in the sense that 
                                                 
23 The elite-based approach is the only exception. 
24 These factors include, for example, economic development, relative deprivation, group worth, 
geographic settlement patterns, and ethnic profiles. 
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institutional reforms, still hard though, are relatively more likely,25 ceteris paribus. While 
a variety of causes relate to the occurrences and/or severity of violence and no scholars 
argue that their chosen approaches provide the best and the most exhaustive explanations, 
the institutional approach is not inherently better than the others, either. This approach, 
however, contributes to a complementary understanding about the multi-faceted 
phenomena of ethnic violence. This section critically reviews the existing research on the 
effects of the two important institutions of consensus democracy,26 i.e. government 
structures and electoral systems,27 followed by a section on how these effects are 
influenced by contextual factors. 
 
2.5.1 The Theories of Consociational and Consensus Democracy 
 Comparativists have provided several institutional analyses and prescriptions for 
better managing ethnic conflict. Lijphart’s studies (1977, 1999, and 2002) on this topic 
are probably the most well-known and most comprehensive in the sense that he discusses 
the effects of a variety of institutional factors. Lijphart argues that consensus (or 
consociational) democracies better handle ethnic tensions because of their sharing, 
dispersing, and restraining power in a range of ways, which is compatible with the needs 
of (deeply) divided societies. Although quite similar, consociational democracy still 
differs significantly from consensus democracy (Lijphart 1984 and 1999). 
For Lijphart, to qualify a polity as consociational democracy, four characteristics of 
elite cooperation, namely a grand coalition, proportionality, mutual veto, and segmental 
                                                 
25 This is especially the case for lower-level institutions, such as electoral systems. 
26 Why some but not other institutions are adopted in the first place is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
Future work should try to provide answers. 
27 Government structures are not explicitly listed but closely related to the two institutional devises of 
consensus democracy, i.e. executive power sharing in broad coalition cabinets, and executive-legislative 
balance of power. Please see the following discussion for more details. 
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autonomy, must all be present in deeply divided societies. It, however, is very hard to 
gauge how ethnically divided a society is and to determine what the prevalent political 
decision mode in a country is.28 Even those countries which are classified as 
consociational democracies by Lijphart’s “impressionistic method” usually turn out to be 
controversial because of their lack of one or more defining features (Steiner 1981; 
Andeweg 2000; Horowitz 2002).29 Examples are abundant, such as those deficient in a 
grand coalition, including Lebanon, Malaysia, the Netherlands, and Surinam, as well as 
Switzerland, whose Federal Council is arguably not a real grand coalition and which is 
actually not a deeply divided society and, hence, conceptually cannot be called a 
consociational democracy. Finally, some scholars claim that consociationalism is not a 
theory but a mere tautology in that consociational democracy is defined by the problem 
(the presence of a deeply divided society) and its solution (elite cooperation) (Andeweg 
2000). 
Given that not all the countries dealt with in this dissertation are deeply divided 
societies, which are an indispensable element in the definition of consociational 
democracy and for which consociational democracy is the stronger medicine (Lijphart 
1989), and given that the definitional features of consensus democracy are more 
institutionally oriented than those of consociational democracy (Andeweg 2000),30 I will 
discuss the approach of consensus democracy in more detail.31 
                                                 
28 Some scholars thus propose to change the units of analysis from decision making in entire countries to 
decision making about individual issues (Steiner 1981). Aggregated decision mode is, however, 
indispensable if the research of interest is to “establish links between typical decision-making patterns of 
national political systems, the degree of pluralism of their societies…, and so on” (Lijphart 1981). 
29 This method means that making an expert judgment based on one’s reading and interpretation of 
literature. 
30 In contrast to the institutional definitions of consensus democracy, consociational democracy has more 
behavioral oriented definitions. For example, in consociational democracy, proportionality is not limited to 
the electoral system. It also constitutes the principle when elites distribute public office and resources. 
31 For more details on the critiques of consociationalism, such as the alleged problems of giving autonomy 
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Among the ten institutional devices in a typical consensus democracy, the ones 
relevant to this paper are executive power sharing in broad coalition cabinets, the 
executive-legislative balance of power, multiparty systems, and PR systems, which 
cluster around an executive-legislative dimension.32 Through cross-national analyses, 
Lijphart (1999) finds that consensus democracy outperforms majoritarian democracy in 
managing political violence. Using Lijphart’s consensus-majority index of democracies, 
Anderson and Guillory (1997) also find that consensus democracy displays higher levels 
of satisfaction with democracy among minority groups, which arguably implies a lower 
likelihood of ethnic conflict. However, focusing on such a composite index, these three 
authors leave the specific effect of each institutional component of consensus democracy 
unexplored. It is doubtful that all the institutions of consensus democracy are conducive 
to ethnic conflict management. 
 
2.5.2 Debates on Electoral Systems 
The most well known critic is probably the incentives school represented by 
Horowitz (2002).33 He argues that by maximizing incentives for accommodative 
behavior, preferential electoral systems (e.g. Alternative Vote (AV) systems) better ensure 
                                                                                                                                                 
to ethnic groups and the alleged less convincing conditions for consociationalism, as well as Lijphart’s 
responses to these criticisms, see Andeweg (2000), Lijphart (1985 and 2002), and Steiner (1981). 
32 Also in this dimension but not the focus of this project is interest group pluralism. Given that the factor 
loading of this institutional device is not particularly high and given that the correlation between variables 
within each dimension is strong, excluding interest group pluralism from this analysis should not do much 
harm. Other institutional devices of consensus democracy which cluster around the other dimension of 
federal-unitary systems include: bicameralism, central bank independence, constitutional rigidity, 
federalism, and judicial review. Among these five institutions, federalism’s factor loading of 0.86 is the 
highest which means that federalism better coincides with the factor than all the other institutions. This fact, 
together with the lack of data of all the other institutions, should justify excluding these other institutional 
factors from analysis. 
33 It should be noted that Horowitz emphasizes the inappropriateness of identifying him as an opponent of 




the moderation of ethnic politics than PR systems.34 This is because the mere need under 
PR systems to form a coalition will not lead to compromise. The incentive to compromise 
is the key to accommodation. Without the incentive to compromise, only coalitions of 
convenience will be formed and they are doomed to dissolve (Horowitz 1991). 
Preferential electoral systems, on the contrary, provide this incentive to compromise. By 
enabling voters to rank candidates in their order of preference and by making the votes 
transferable from the least preferred candidates to others (if no candidates achieve the 
quota of votes required to elect a single candidate), such systems encourage politicians to 
campaign both for first-preference votes from their own community and for 
second-preference votes from other groups. This process will make cross-ethnic appeals 
more important, accommodative behavior more inevitable, and pre-electoral coalitions 
more likely.35 
In response, Lijphart argues that the logic and the practical effect of Horowitz’s 
vote-pooling systems do not differ significantly from those of majoritarian systems. In 
addition, politicians’ or parties’ desire to coalesce under PR systems in order to gain and 
stay in power does imply the need to compromise (Riker 1962; Lijphart 2002). 
Furthermore, there are only a few countries using AV or Single Transferable (STV) 
systems, another preferential vote system.36 Some of which, such as Fiji, Lebanon and 
Malaysia, were democracies for only a few years or have never been democracies since 
                                                 
34 Please refer to Reilly (2002) for more discussion on the effects of preferential electoral systems. 
35 Horowitz (2002) also argues that by acknowledging the plasticity of group identities, the incentives 
approach can help preserve multipolarity and prevent the emergence of more severe conflict. This argument 
contradicts, to some extent, his other comment in the same article about how rare multipolarity is, in the 
sense that if bipolarity is the norm, as also suggested in Posner (2004), then it is generally irrelevant to talk 
about which electoral systems better preserve multipolarity. 
36 According to Reilly and Reynolds (1999), only three and two democracies used (or have used) AV and 
STV systems, respectively. Australia (an established democracy), Fiji since 1997 (a transitional democracy), 
and Papua New Guinea during 1964 and1975 (an established democracy) are the three countries adopting 
an AV system, while Estonia in 1990 (a transitional democracy) and Northern Ireland in 1973 (a failed 
democracy) are the two states employing a STV system. 
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1940s according to the Polity IV dataset, a fact that will make many researchers exclude 
these countries from their comparative studies of electoral systems or other institutions.37 
Because only a few democracies used or have used preferential vote systems, their effects 
are hard to be evaluated in large-N studies. It is therefore difficult to empirically resolve 
the debate between Horowitz and Lijphart. Regardless, the bottom line is that Lijphart’s 
composite consensus-majority index of democracies does not tell us what the specific 
effect of PR systems is, vis-à-vis non-PR systems. 
 
2.5.3 Debates on Government Structures 
The debate between presidentialism and parliamentarism provides another reason to 
doubt that all the institutions of consensus democracy reduce ethnic conflict. Advocates 
of parliamentarism, such as Lijphart (1994, 1999, and 2002) and Linz (1994), argue that 
presidentialism is less desirable because a presidential election introduces a strong 
element of zero-sum game, and a winner-take-all outcome. Losers have to wait for the 
expiration of fixed presidential terms without any access to executive power (since it is 
less likely that the presidential systems will have coalition governments even when there 
is no single-party majority in a parliament). However, it is noteworthy that Lijphart’s 
consensus-majority index of democracies shows that he considers both presidentialism 
and parliamentarism to have their own advantages. While presidentialism is scored higher 
with respect to executive-legislative balance of power, parliamentarism is ranked higher 
with respect to executive power sharing in broad coalition cabinets.38 This suggests that 
                                                 
37 Students of comparative institutional studies usually focus on only democracies with the assumption that 
electoral systems and other institutions will function differently in non-democracies (Anderson and 
Guillory 1997; Power and Gasiorowski 1997; Cheibub 2002; Cheibub et al. 2004; Samuels and Hellwig 
2007). 
38 In presidential democracies, a grand coalition is not unlikely but more difficult to form, as the presence 
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Liphart’s preference for parliamentarism is inconsistent with his composite index of 
democracies. 
Other scholars argue for the advantages of presidentialism (Shugart and Carey 1992). 
They claim that separation of powers deprives presidentialism of the possibility of 
becoming as majoritarian as parliamentary-one-party-cabinet systems. 
Parliamentary-one-party-cabinet systems can also generate even more enduring and 
unchallengeable winners if the same party continuously wins parliamentary elections 
under the condition of no term limits. However, Lijphart and his associates (1993) 
challenge this view. They argue that the concentration of executive power in one person 
(such as in presidential systems) is even more majoritarian than concentration of power in 
one party (such as in parliamentary systems). This counterargument is not legitimate 
because, for ethnic groups having no access to executive power, it should not matter 
whether the executive power is concentrated in one or several hands, if they are drawn 
from their rival ethnic group. Regardless, the debate between presidentialism and 
parliamentarism suggests that neither of the two sides is completely right. As Gunther and 
Mughan (1993: 288 and 291) conclude, “majoritarian behavior is at least intermittently 
possible in separation of powers systems, especially when electoral rules in such systems 
are strongly majoritarian,” and “parliamentary systems of government give rise to very 
different conflict management styles, ranging from adversarial majoritarianism found in 
Britain to the consociational consensualism characteristic of Belgium…. Its interaction 
with national electoral laws contributes powerfully to it.” Presidential systems should 
have some advantages over parliamentary systems if the latter go together with non-PR 
systems. But when parliamentary and PR systems coexist, parliamentary systems are 
                                                                                                                                                 
of only a few examples in Cyprus as well as Colombian during 1958-74 suggests (Lijphart 2002). 
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probably more propitious than presidential systems. 
Lijphart and his associates (1993) report that semi-presidential systems outperform 
their presidential and parliamentary counterparts in managing ethnic conflict.39 One 
possible reason may be due to the arbitral character of political executives in 
semi-presidential countries. They never test this hypothesis, however, and because their 
analyses are based on only three cases of semi-presidential systems, they are inconclusive. 
The effect of semi-presidential systems on ethnic conflict has been generally overlooked, 
and it remains unclear both theoretically and empirically whether semi-presidential 
systems are really preferable to other types of governments in promoting civil relations 
between ethnic groups regardless of which electoral systems are used. If they do, this 
implies that not all the components of consensus democracy need to go together to 
produce better outcomes, as O’Leary (2002) asserts.40 In sum, the validity of Lijphart’s 
conclusion that PR and parliamentary systems and their combinations are superior 
requires further theoretical justification and rigorous, empirical tests. 
 
2.5.4 Few Generalizable Analyses and a Crucial Omitted Variable:  
The Interactive Term of the Two Institutions 
Several attempts to investigate the importance of specific components of consensus 
                                                 
39 Semi-presidential systems are those in which the government must respond to a legislative assembly and 
to an elected president, who possesses quite considerable powers (Duverger 1980). Unlike in presidential 
and parliamentary systems, who controls executive power is unclear in semi-presidential systems, because 
both a president and a parliament have some control over it. Furthermore, unlike in presidential systems, 
coalition cabinets are likely in semi-presidential systems when there is no single-party majority. Please refer 
to Bahro (1997), Bahro et al. (1998), Elgie (1999), and Fish (2003) for comparisons between 
presidentialism, semi-presidentialism, and parliamentarism, and for discussions on semi-presidentialism in 
Western Europe and Postcommunist region. 
40 O’Leary claims that with all the other consociational institutions, Northern Ireland will be better off if it 
adopts one non-consociational institution, i.e. a STV system. STV is superior because the relevant ethnic 
communities of Northern Ireland are internally democratic, rather than sociologically and politically 
monolithic. This ensures that STV will be able to encourage cross-ethnic vote pooling and benefit 
hardliners willing to become less hardline. 
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democracy exist, with many more studies focusing on electoral systems at the expense of 
government structures (Reilly and Reynolds 1999; Horowitz 2002; Reilly 2002). Of these 
attempts, however, only a few provide large-N generalizable analyses (Cohen 1997, 
Saideman et al. 2002). In accordance with Lijphart’s theory of consensus democracy, 
Cohen (1997) and Saideman et al. (2002) find that PR systems tend to prohibit or reduce 
ethnic conflict. Gunther and Mughan (1993) and Saideman et al. (2002) find no 
consistent pattern linking either presidential or parliamentary institutions to effective 
conflict management.41 These consistent findings about the effects of electoral systems 
and government structures are impressive. However, these studies exhibit problems of 
model misspecification because they neglect the important interactive effects of 
government structures and electoral systems. Moreover, a close examination of the data 
set of Saideman and his colleagues reveal that they actually make a data-processing error 
that turns the originally significant variable of government structures into insignificant.42 
It is, therefore, still too early to argue conclusively against any important role played by 
government structures. 
The importance of the interactive effects of government structures and electoral 
systems has been implied by the previous discussion of the debate between 
                                                 
41 Saideman et al. (2004) find that “parliamentary democracies may be more susceptible to rebellion 
because of their endogenous electoral calendar.” This finding is contrary to the common view that 
presidential systems are inferior. However, the authors also mention that “further work is required to 
determine whether it is the uncertainty of the election calendar or other features of parliamentarism and 
presidentialism that drive these results.” Given that the authors ignore the interactive effects of government 
structures and electoral systems, this finding may be due to model misspecification. 
42 Specifically, Saideman and his associates make a mistake when creating the lag of the dependent 
variable. There are 264 groups on their time-series cross-sectional data set and the total number of 
observations for the dependent variable is 3590. It should therefore be expected that the total number of 
observations for the lagged variable is about 3326. The number is, however, 3589, based on their data set, a 
lot higher than expected and only one less than that of observations for the dependent variable. The source 
of this inaccuracy comes from the way the authors generate the lagged dependent variable, i.e. instead of a 
missing value, the value of the last observation for the former group on the data structure is encoded as the 
lag of the first observation for the group in question. For estimates after correcting their error, please refer 
to Table1 of this chapter. 
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presidentialism and parliamentarism. In fact, when discussing the effects of government 
structures on ethnic conflict, most scholars mention that their effects depend on which 
electoral systems are adopted. 43 It is striking, therefore, that there are no analyses 
investigating the interactive effects of all the possible combinations of government 
structures and electoral systems on ethnic conflict.44 
The need to discuss the combined effects of government structures and electoral 
systems on ethnic conflict is straightforward. If government structures determine the 
power relationship between executive and legislative branches which have impact on 
ethnic conflict, parliamentary electoral systems influence how many and what types 
(national or regional concerned, moderate or extreme) of representatives and parties will 
get elected (Duverger 1963; Lijphart 1994; Ames 2001).45 This in turn affects the 
inter-branch power relationship and ethnic conflict. For example, Parliamentary-non-PR 
systems tend to produce a monopoly of power for one party (one group) in both branches, 
which in turn results in executive dominance, power concentration, and, consequently, 
more feelings of insecurity felt by ethnic groups and more ethnic conflict. If 
Parliamentary systems are combined with PR systems, then multiparty systems and 
                                                 
43 To better understand the effects of political institutions on regime survival, Cheibub and Limongi (2002) 
also suggest that the combined effects of government structures and electoral systems should be explored. It 
is well known that the combined effects are considered crucial determinants for regime stability in Latin 
America (Mainwaring 1990 and 1993). No effects of the “difficult combinations of presidential-PR 
systems” are found in the third world, however (Power and Gasiorowski 1997), and some scholars insist 
that the independent effects of government structures on regime survival matter equally as the interactive 
effects (Samuels and Eaton 2002). Regardless of this unsettled debate, for ethnic conflict, many scholars 
agree that it is the interactive effects of governmental and electoral systems that matters. 
44 Lijphart (1996) discusses the joint effects of government structures and electoral systems and points out 
that a parliamentary-PR system is the best combination. He, however, does not control for any relevant 
variables, and examines only the links between institutions and women’s representation (a challengeable 
indicator of minority representation), not the relationship between institutions and ethnic conflict. He also 
unjustifiably excludes semi-presidential and presidential-PR systems from his analyses. 
45 Although presidential electoral systems also have effects on ethnic conflict (Horowitz 2002), the 
variations of these systems remain very small across countries (Shugart and Carey 1992). It is, therefore, 
hard to test their effects. 
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coalition cabinets are more likely, as the 1996 and 1999 elections under the new electoral 
system (which is closer to PR than to non-PR systems) in New Zealand clearly illustrated. 
Such party systems and cabinets lead to more power sharing, more balanced executive 
and legislative power relations, and, hence, more peaceful ethnic relations (Lijphart 1999). 
In sum, it is important to examine the combined, instead of individual, effects of 
government structures and electoral systems on ethnic conflict. 
 
2.6 The Importance of Contextual Factors 
Appropriate institutional configurations are ultimately contextual (Reilly and 
Reynolds 1999). Reilly and Reynolds list a variety of contextual factors that will decide 
which electoral system, PR or AV, is better. These factors include the nature of group 
identity, the intensity of conflict, and the spatial distribution of conflictual groups. While 
the merits of electoral systems have multiple dimensions, such as proportionality and 
cross-ethnic vote pooling, I examine only the proportionality dimension because there are 
so few countries using preferential electoral systems and, hence, not enough cases for 
comparison. For the choice between PR and non-PR systems, I assume that only the 
spatial distribution of ethnic groups matter for the following reasons: 
(1) The nature of group identity, according to Reilly and Reynolds, will decide 
whether PR or AV is more desirable. If ethnic allegiances are primordial, then PR systems 
which better recognize and accommodate interests based on ascriptive communal traits 
should be chosen, and vice versa. However, few scholars in comparative politics would 
admit to holding a completely primordialist view of ethnicity.46 In practice, almost every 
politicized ethnic conflict shows claims from a combination of both primordial 
                                                 
46 Please refer to Lin, Wu, and Lee (2006). 
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associations and instrumentalized adaptations (Kandeh 1992; Reilly and Reynolds 1999). 
Given these mixed causes of ethnic identity and conflict, it is hard to say whether PR or 
AV (or non-PR) is more desirable. 
(2) The intensity of conflict also matters for choosing between PR and AV systems. 
When ethnic conflict is so intense that there is no possibility of cross-ethnic vote pooling, 
PR systems should be used. This factor is not as important in the comparison between PR 
and non-PR as in the evaluation between PR and AV, because only a few non-PR systems 
are AV systems. 
I do think that the possibility of ethnic conflict, given certain geographic distribution 
of ethnic groups, bears on the choice between PR and non-PR. According to the existing 
literature (Gurr 1993; Byman 1997; Ayres and Saideman 2000; Saideman and Ayres 2001; 
Toft 2003), the spatial distribution of ethnic groups determines the possibility of ethnic 
conflict. Geographically concentrated ethnic groups are more likely to be legitimate and 
capable irredentist or secessionist and, hence, more likely to engage in conflict. There is 
one caveat – i.e. urbanites, unlike other concentrated groups, are usually new immigrants 
from their homelands. They neither have a strong attachment to the lands they currently 
occupy nor have high legitimacy to claim the right to control the lands (Toft 2003). In a 
crisis situation, they also tend to run away because their homelands are elsewhere and 
their employment skills tend to be transportable (Chin and Kaiser 1996; Toft 2003). With 
low legitimacy and no motivation to fight for the lands they reside, spatially concentrated 
urbanites, though capable because of their spatial concentration, would not risk their lives 
to engage in conflict. In sum, when ethnic groups are concentrated and when they are also 
not urbanities, they will be more likely to fight to compete for power. A fairer PR system 
is hence required to reduce such groups’ senses of powerlessness and propensities for 
 40 
 
conflict. For dispersed ethnic groups, there are competing notions about which types of 
electoral systems better serve their needs. I will discuss this topic in Chapter 3. 
Because existing literature has focused on electoral systems at the expense of 
government structures, no conventional wisdom tells us whether contextual factors also 
influence the choice of government structures. Logically, the choice should be greatly 
mediated by the number of ethnic groups. I will elaborate on this point in the next 
chapter. 
 
2.7 Methodological Review 
In this section, I examine how existing literature dealt with the most frequently 
encountered methodological challenges when modeling interactive effects and analyzing 
TSCS data, the two topics relevant to the research design of this dissertation. 
 
2.7.1 Modeling Interactive Effects 
The rule of thumb in dealing with interactive effects is to model them according to a 
theoretical work. As Friedrich (1982) notes, however, the technique of adding the 
interactive terms of the variables of interest has been criticized for generating unreliable 
and even meaningless results that are hard to interpret. The only correct strategy is still to 
derive and specify models from theoretical works because of two reasons. First, the 
estimates of models with interactive terms are just hard, but not impossible, to interpret. 
Second, dropping important interactive terms in order to avoid meaningless estimates and 
collinearity induced by such variables will cause even worse problems of model 
misspecification and biased estimates.47 Unfortunately, many scholars have proposed 
                                                 
47 The presence of collinearity usually prevents precise estimation and results in insignificant t ratios, 
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interactive hypotheses but not modeled them as such, or have become confused about 
how to interpret their results (Kam and Franzese 2005). 
In interactive models, unlike in the simple linear-additive regression, the coefficient 
of a variable and the effect of a unit increase in that variable on the dependent variable 
are different. This simple fact notwithstanding, many scholars do not understand the 
distinction. Some vague and misleading terms are thus used, such as “main effect” and 
“interactive effect,” “direct effect” and “indirect effect,” and “independent effect” and 
“total effect” for the estimates of the two independent variables in question in the first 
case and of their interactive term in the second (Kam and Franzese 2005). To interpret 
correctly the coefficients of interactive models is to remember that interactive terms 
always have “multiple effects, neither any single, constant effect nor a main effect and an 
interactive effect, but multiple, different effects depending on the levels of the other 
variable(s) with which it interacts” (Kam and Franzese 2005: 18). This understanding is 
not new (Friedrich 1982; Gujarati 1995; Braumoeller 2004), but has been generally 
unappreciated. Many scholars continue to interpret the coefficients of the two 
independent variables in question. Braumoelloer (2004) makes clear the consequence of 
this unfortunate practice: When a statistical equation includes a multiplicative term in an 
attempt to model interactive effects, the statistical significance of the lower-order 
estimates is largely irrelevant for the usual purposes of hypothesis testing.  
Worse yet, many scholars use wrong models and reach baseless conclusions. Two 
types of wrong models are of most frequent use. Some researchers omit the interactive 
term from their empirical model and mistakenly interpret their test results as supportive 
                                                                                                                                                 
making researchers unable to reject the null hypothesis when in fact it is false. Dropping collinear variables 
to get rid of the problem generally cannot serve as a remedial measure, either, in that this practice would 
lead to an even worse consequence, i.e. biased estimates (Gujarati 1995). 
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of their interactive hypothesis. For example, as aforementioned, Toft (2003: 30) argues 
that “if both a state and an ethnic group represent their interests as indivisible, then the 
chance of reaching a settlement short of war is unlikely,” and that “if either or both a state 
and an ethnic group represent their interests as divisible, then the chance of reach a 
settlement short of war is likely.” These hypotheses clearly illustrate the needs of 
incorporating in the model the interactive term of how a state and an ethnic group 
represent their interests, but Toft disregards this necessity. Without deriving an empirical 
model from her theoretical work, Toft groundlessly concludes that the statistical analysis 
supports her theory.48 Numerous examples that show a disconnection between theories 
and empirical models exist in institutional studies (Kam and Franzese 2005). 
Other scholars arbitrarily encode different institutional configurations. From the 
perspective that theoretical works should direct the specification of empirical models,49 
the first type of empirical model deviates from a theoretical work more seriously than the 
second type. The second type of model is also not superior, however. One example 
explains the reason. In establishing that majoritarian variants of democracy are more 
resistant to economic contraction than pluralist ones, Bernhard and his associates (2001) 
classify the institutional configurations of government structures and party systems into 
five types in a continuum from the most to the least majoritarian institutional 
combinations: majoritarian, quasi-majoritarian, mixed, quasi-pluralist, and pluralist 
systems, with 1 representing majoritarian and 5 indicating pluralist systems. This 
                                                 
48 Even without this problem of model misspecification, Toft’s additive model does not support her theory, 
either. The coefficient associated with the variable of whether a state represent its interest as indivisible, 
though positively related to the level of ethnic conflict as expected, is statistically insignificant. 
49 This is the spirit of EITM, which stands for Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models. Recognizing 
that theories too often proliferate without appropriate testing, and empirical work too frequently applies 
vague and oversimplified theory and that gaps between theory and empirical method seriously harm 
scientific progress, the Political Science Program of the National Science Foundation has supported annual 
summer institutes on EITM since 2002. 
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parametric coding scale, while saving more degrees of freedom because of substituting a 
single variable for potentially many interactive terms, is quite arbitrary. It remains unclear 
what justifies that a unit increase in this variable of institutional configurations leads to 
the same amount of change in the values of the dependent variable regardless of the place 
of the change. Lijphart’s 1996 study on the link between minority representation and the 
combined effects of government structures and electoral systems also uses this approach 
and, hence, suffers from the same methodological problem. 
In sum, although the only correct strategy is to incorporate multiplicative terms in 
empirical models when there are interactive effects between variables, much existing 
literature either excludes interactive terms from analysis or uses an arbitrarily constructed 
single variable as a substitute. The difficulty in interpreting the test results and the 
concern about the potential presence of collinearity in models having interactive terms do 
not justify such alternative practices, as more and more scholars acknowledge. I will 
follow the correct strategy to test my interactive hypotheses. 
 
2.7.2 Analyzing Time-Series Cross-Section Data 
 There are many challenges when analyzing TSCS data, including autocorrelation, 
panel heteroskedasticity, and unit heterogeneity (Wilson et al. 2007). Ever since1995, 
when Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz (B&K) wrote a paper entitled “What to do (and 
not to do) with time-series, cross-section data” in the American Political Science Review, 
the tremendous rate at which scholars have adopted their prescriptions has not been 
paralleled by other work in the discipline. This state of the discipline, however, has 
produced many inconsistent and non-robust estimates because many scholars have used 




The B & K approach requires three steps: First, pool the data from different 
countries (or from states or other units of analysis) into one data set and apply OLS. 
Second, deal with the problem of autocorrelation by adding a lagged dependent variable 
to the model. Third, calculate panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) to adjust for 
heteroskedasticity. Many scholars have so willingly and eagerly followed Beck and 
Katz’s advice that “they have been blind to theory, data characteristics, a variety of 
specification issues, alternative models, appropriate diagnostics, and long-established 
pitfalls of regression analysis” (Wilson et al. 2007). Students of ethnic politics have made 
no exceptions. 
 Two studies on ethnic politics are especially important for the discussion here. Like 
this dissertation, these studies use the Minority at Risk data set to establish relations 
between political institutions and ethnic conflict. One is entitled “Proportional versus 
majoritarian ethnic conflict management in democracies,” written by Cohen (1997). The 
other is on “Democratization, political institutions, and ethnic conflict,” authored by 
Saideman and his associates in 2002. Both scholars overlook the possibilities of unit 
heterogeneity and alternative dynamic specifications. Furthermore, Cohen assumes in his 
article a certain type of data generating processes of the dependent variable, i.e. a 
trend-stationary process, which may or may not be true. Saideman and his colleagues 
follow the B & K method, but substitute Prais-Winsten regression for OLS without 
testing for the presence of unit roots. I should briefly discuss these problems, especially 
on and starting from the issue of stationarity. 
                                                 
50 Beck and Katz (1996) are careful enough to suggest testing for serial independence of the error terms 
after estimation using their approach, but few scholars note and follow this advice. 
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  It is well known that when time series data is nonstationary, there is no meaningful 
relationship between the variables of interest even if we get significant estimates. This 
fact necessitates testing for unit roots before doing any time series analysis. Neither 
Cohen nor Saideman and his co-authors follow this procedure. Cohen simply assumes 
that the data of ethnic conflict is stationary and exhibits a deterministic trend, and then 
uses a variable of years as a simple means to combat serial autocorrelation. Saideman and 
his colleagues follow almost exactly the B & K method in the belief that controlling for 
the lagged dependent variable would purge the dependent variable of serial 
autocorrelation. This may not be the case. Worse yet, “with lagged dependent variables, it 
is well known that OLS estimators are inconsistent in the presence of serial correlation in 
errors” (Maddala 1999: 60). Using the same dependent variable and data set as Cohen 
and Saideman et al. enables me to falsify Cohen’s assumption that his dependent variable 
does not have a unit-root problem, and to reject the use of the B & K method in analyzing 
the Minorities at Risk data.51 
 Do methods matter? To illustrate how methods make a difference, I replicate part of 
Saideman and his associates’ analysis and try a different method, using the data set the 
authors kindly provide.52 In the replication, I assume that their dependent variable is 
nonstationary,53 and use a “more conservative” between effects model to analyze the 
data.54 As aforementioned, Saideman and his colleagues made a mistake in the way they 
created the lagged dependent variable. I have corrected the error, so the data I used to 
                                                 
51 Studies on ethnic politics using Minority at Risk data set are booming. Please refer to 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/resources.asp#pubs for a list of publications using MAR data. 
52 My focus on the Saideman et al. dataset is not because their analysis is especially problematic. Instead, 
my focus is because of these authors’ gracious offer of their data. 
53 This assumption is proved to be true based on the test results of unit roots. Please refer to Chapter 4 for 
details. 
54 I discuss in Chapter 4 the most frequently used alternative models for time-series cross-section analysis. 
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replicate their analysis and the results I obtained are not completely the same as theirs. 
Regardless of this fact, what is important is whether performing different types of 
regressions results in divergent conclusions about the independent variables’ effects. 
The estimation results are summarized in Model 1 and Model 2 of Table 2.1. 
According to Model 1 which performs Prais-Winsten regression with PCSE, the lagged 
dependent variable, regime duration, electoral systems, government structures, GDP per 
capita, change in GDP per capita, and group concentration significantly affect the level of 
ethnic violence. Performing between effects regression to analyze the same data set leads 
to the acceptance of the null hypotheses that regime duration and change in GDP per 
capita do not affect the level of violent conflict. These two factors were significant in the 
previous analysis, however. This comparison clearly confirms that methods matter and it 
is imperative to test for the presence of unit roots before doing any analysis. 
Stationarity is not the only methodological issue in TSCS studies. The other two 
issues that are briefly discussed here include unit heterogeneity and alternative dynamic 
specifications. Unit heterogeneity, which the B & K method simply assumes away, means 
that countries differ in ways not captured by observed independent variables. Mere 
variations in the mean levels of independent variables and in the intercepts across units of 
analysis can result in very different parameter estimates when analyzing pooled data 
(Singer and Willett 2003, Wilson et al. 2007). Remedial measures include doing fixed,  
between, or random effects analysis.55 Wilson and his associates (2007) perform fixed 
                                                 
55 For the advantages and disadvantages of these models, please refer to Frees 2004 and Wilson et al. 2007. 
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Table 2.1: Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analyses of Rebellion 









Variable b SE b SE 
Lag of dependent variable .60*** .09   
Enduring regime .14** .07 .39 .30 
First election -.06 .20 .50 1.44 
Electoral system -.14*** .05 -.29*** .11 
Parliamentary .22* .13 .51* .26 
Federal system .01 .09 .05 .26 
GDP per capita -.00*** .00 -.00** .00 
Change in GDP per capita .01** .00 .05 .05 
Cultural differences index -.02 .04 .05 .11 
Economic differences index -.00 .04 -.01 .08 
Political differences index .04 .04 .06 .10 
Group concentration .12** .05 .34*** .10 
Constant .41 .26 .54 .58 
Rho .47  
R-squared .46 .24 
n of observations 1198 1258 




effects analysis on the data of Saideman et al. (2002) and find an even stronger effect of 
regime type, but an opposite effect of regime duration. These authors’ findings confirm 
the importance of taking unit heterogeneity seriously when analyzing TSCS data. 
Alternative dynamic specifications also matter. Beck and Katz (1996) advise testing 
the appropriateness of more general dynamic models. Few scholars have paid attention to 
that advice and most scholars stick to the B & K’s 1995 prescriptions. Alternative 
dynamic models include, to name a few, models with lagged independent variables, 
models with both lagged independent and dependent variables, and first difference 
models. Given that all these models capture the same contemporaneous effects of 
independent variables on dependent variables, and all the dynamic specifications seem 
equally plausible, it is better to do robustness checks by performing different models. 
Wilson and his colleagues do this on many published works, including Saideman et al. 
(2002), and conclude that many findings of these works are highly dependent on the 
method used to obtain them. 
This discussion should have provided a simple lesson, i.e. any careful study using 
TSCS data should take very seriously the problems of autocorrelation, unit heterogeneity 
and alternative dynamics. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
My dissertation aims at overcoming all the theoretical and methodological 
shortcomings of the existing literature discussed in this chapter, and contributes to a more 
correct and better understanding of the relations between institutions, contexts, and ethnic 




Chapter 3: Theories and Hypotheses 
In this chapter, I first discuss the implication of the theory of the ethnic security 
dilemma, in comparison with that of Lijphart’s and Tsebelis’ models of consensus 
democracy and veto player, respectively, about which types of institutions better solve the 
detrimental consequences resulting from the predicament. Building on the implication of 
the theory of the ethnic security dilemma, I rank each combination of government 
structures and electoral systems in order of their levels of power sharing. I then discuss 
how the number and spatial distribution of ethnic groups influence a system’s effect on 
ethnic conflict; whether types of ethnic conflict constitute a factor in the desirability of 
institutional configurations; and how institutional configurations in turn affect the effects 
of the two contextual factors. Hypotheses are derived from these discussions. 
 
3.1 The Ethnic Security Dilemma and Political Institutions 
The ethnic security dilemma refers to competition for control of the government 
between ethnic groups. Ethnic groups compete for control because government is the 
greatest potential threat to any group inside a country, and ethnic groups fear that other 
groups who control the government will use state resources to act against them. This fear 
is mutually reinforcing and destructive: one group’s attempt to control the government 
will strengthen others’ fears and these other groups will respond with similar actions, and 
eventually every group is worse off because of irrational conflict. This security dilemma 
thesis suggests that “ethnic groups will be more secure if they have access to decision 
makers, if they can block harmful government policies, and if they can veto potentially 
damaging decisions” (Saideman et al. 2002: 107). Put differently, the theory of the ethnic 
security dilemma implies that ethnic groups will feel more secure and trustful and not 
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engage in more serious conflict in more-empowerment systems as indicated by those 
providing ethnic groups more power sharing, i.e. higher probabilities to influence 
policy-making.56 
One caveat exists in this implication about the link between the degrees of power 
sharing and the levels of ethnic conflict. Arguably, ethnic majorities would prefer 
exclusive control over power. In polities with multiple ethnic groups, every group is a 
minority and desires more power sharing among groups. In polities with a numerically 
dominant group or with a proportionally disadvantaged but politically advantaged group, 
only dominated groups prefer power sharing, however. This dissertation focuses on how 
institutions influence dominated groups’ conflicting behavior, so power sharing 
constitutes universal goods for every group discussed in this research. I will hereafter use 
the terms “ethnic groups,” “minorities,” and “dominated groups” interchangeably. 
However, when discussing the effects of the number of ethnic groups in a state, all groups 
count, be they minority or majority ones, and will be included in the calculation of the 
number of ethnic groups. 
The implication of the theory of the ethnic security dilemma that systems 
guaranteeing ethnic groups higher probabilities to affect policy-making better address 
ethnic conflict is largely in accordance with “the empowerment literature” in American 
politics, which argues that empowerment (as indicated by, say, control of the mayor’s 
office) influences black participation by contributing to a more trusting and efficacious 
orientation to politics (Bobo and Gilliam 1990). The implication of the theory of the 
ethnic security dilemma is also supported by the global evidence of ethnopolitical 
                                                 




violence that ethnic conflicts can usually be accommodated by some combination of the 
policies and institutions of power-sharing (Gurr 1993). 
Furthermore, like the model of consensus democracy, the theory of the ethnic 
security dilemma emphasizes the importance of power sharing and dispersion. Unlike the 
model of consensus democracy (Lijphart 1999 and 2002), however, the theory of the 
ethnic security dilemma does not suggest that parliamentary systems are superior to 
presidential systems. Instead, the theory allows us to take the interactive effects of 
government structures, electoral systems and contextual factors more seriously. 
Moreover, in accordance with the veto player model advocated by Tsebelis (1995 
and 2002) and many other scholars, what I derive from the theory of the ethnic security 
dilemma acknowledges the effect of the number of veto players on policy making. 
Generally, the higher the number of veto players, the higher the level of power sharing. 
The number of veto player is, however, an end result of the interaction between 
government structures, electoral systems, and the contextual factor of group numbers. 
While the veto player approach relies on a composite index of the number of veto players, 
the implication of the theory of the ethnic security dilemma allows the attempt of this 
dissertation to unravel the effects of these institutional and contextual factors. 
Furthermore, even when systems have the same number of veto players, such as a 
presidential system with a unified government and a parliamentary system with a 
two-party system, they could produce very different policy outcomes. The major 
characteristics of presidential systems, i.e. separation of power as well as checks and 
balances, make it possible that even with the presence of a unified government, executive 
and legislative branches will check and balance each other (Saideman et al. 2002). This 
possibility never exists in parliamentary systems with a two-party system. Some studies 
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also find that government structures still matter for the levels of the rule of law after 
controlling for the number of veto players (Andrews and Montinola, 2004), suggesting 
that government structures have other institutional distinctions that cannot be fully 
represented by the number of veto players. In sum, the veto player model cannot serve the 
purpose of this research because it relies on a composite index which downplays the 
distinctions between government structures to some extent. 
In conclusion, for the interest of this research project, the theory of the ethnic 
security dilemma is theoretically less parametric than the model of consensus democracy 
and methodologically more useful than the model of veto player. In the following section, 
I rank each combination of government structures and electoral systems in terms of how 
well they solve the ethnic security dilemma. 
 
3.2 The Desirability of Institutional Combinations 
Before doing the ranking, a discussion about the validity of the postulation which 
makes ranking institutions a meaningful endeavor is necessary. What is implied in 
ranking each institutional configuration in order of the level of power sharing and in 
linking that ranking to the severity of ethnic conflict is the assumption that political 
parties or coalitions form along ethnic rather than other lines. In fact, most existing 
quantitative studies about how institutions manage ethnic conflict make this assumption 
implicitly, too (Cohen 1997; Norris 2002; Saideman et al. 2002). The common 
acceptance of this hypothesis suggests its plausibility for many scholars and the absence 
of data which can be used to distinguish ethnically divided countries where political 
parties or coalitions form alone ethnic lines from those where other lines of cleavages 
determine political competition. 
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Furthermore, Bates (1983) provides two explanations as to why the assumption 
holds. First, shared language and culture make it easier for political elites to mobilize 
intragroup rather than across ethnic groups. Second, ethnic and colonial administrative 
boundaries tend to overlap, and modern goods like electricity, schools, and water projects 
tend to benefit people in a particular region. Fearon (1999) offers another explanation. He 
argues that distributive politics on a mass scale favor coalitions based on hardly 
changeable individual characteristics. Changeable characteristics would allow the 
expansion of the winning coalition and, hence, less pork per coalition member. In 
countries where what is on the agenda is about the distribution of pork rather than the 
choice among the types of policy from a continuum (such as policy on abortion), more 
ethnic and less ideological politics can be expected. Fearon eloquently explain why pork 
and ethnic politics tend to go together. Sometimes, issue-based goods and ethnic politics 
are seen to go together as well, however,57 suggesting more prevalence of ethnic politics 
in the world than Fearon expects. 
In sum, in this dissertation I depend on the same postulation that political parties or 
coalitions form along ethnic rather than other cleavages to discuss the effects of 
government structures and electoral systems because of the following reasons: most 
students in the large-N studies of the effects of institutions on ethnic conflict rely on the 
same assumption; many scholars offer plausible explanations about the validity of the 
hypothesis; and there exists no data to date which help distinguish countries where 
political parties or coalitions form alone ethnic lines from those where other lines of 
cleavages determine political competition.58 Empirically, I will test whether this 
                                                 
57 One example is Taiwan where the issue of independence versus unification dominates the orientation of 
party competition between ethnic groups. 
58 Other distinctions, such as whether a state experiences a change in the line of party competition, cannot 
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assumption influences the estimates of the variables of interest in Chapter 5, however. 
My paper identifies six possible combinations of government structures (presidential, 
semi-presidential, and parliamentary) and electoral systems (PR and SMD),59 which 
promote different levels of power sharing, a topic to which I now turn. 
A combination of parliamentary and PR systems, which exists in many western 
European countries, provides the highest level of power sharing among all the 
institutional configurations, especially when grand coalitions or at least oversized 
coalitions are formed. A PR system permits proportional representation of each group and 
tends to produce multiparty systems, a major hypothesis “made famous by Duverger 
(1963) which has remained remarkably intact after decades of empirical testing” (Moser 
1999: 359).60 Given the existence of multiparty systems, a parliamentary system, which 
is characterized by fusion of power (Samuels 2002, Stepan and Skach 1993), further 
makes possible the formation of a coalition government as well as executive and 
legislative power sharing. It is estimated that among countries which do not have 
majority parties in their parliaments, a very likely condition when PR systems are in use, 
almost 72% of their cabinets have more than one party as cabinet members. Among them, 
                                                                                                                                                 
be made, either, due to lack of data. 
59 Although some scholars doubt the adequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary 
distinction (Siaroff 2003), most scholars think that the distinction is legitimate and an important 
determinant for democratic stability, representation, and accountability (Samuels 2002 and 2004; Samuels 
and Shugart 2003). Furthermore, Siaroff’s research exhibits serious methodological problems, which makes 
his conclusion dubious to a certain extent, because he relies on only dichotomous measurements of 
proactive presidential powers. Many presidents have reactive power, however. Moreover, presidential 
powers arguably should be a continuous variable. 
60 Through case studies of Postcommunist states, Moser finds that “plurality and majoritarian elections can 
produce very fragmented party systems, suggesting that the reach of Duverger’s laws may be limited” 
(Moser 1999: 360) However, it is still unclear how far the reach is limited. Here I follow Duverger’s law in 
discussing the effects of electoral systems, but will take into account the impact of the number and spatial 
distribution of ethnic groups in the later section. It should suffice to mention a supposition underlying 
Duverger’s Law: “Duverger’s Law holds only if the social cleavage structure is not characterized by 
geographically concentrated minorities who might form the basis of a successful, albeit localized, third 
party” (Cox 1997: 24-25). This supposition explains why, for example, Canada has simple plurality 
elections but a long-standing multiparty system. 
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however, about six-tenth are either minority coalitions or minimal winning coalitions 
(Lijphart 1999), suggesting that parliamentary-PR arrangements do not always promote 
power sharing between all the groups in a state. Regardless, this institutional 
configuration does guarantee power sharing between many groups and quite often (in 
four out of ten cabinets) between almost all the groups in a polity. This combination thus 
outperforms any other configurations. 
The combination of presidential and SMD systems offers the second highest level of 
power sharing among all the systems. In addition to mostly concentrated executive power 
in a presidency, this combination is less likely to provide legislative power sharing 
because of the adoption of SMD systems, which tend to produce two party systems 
(Duverger 1963), and, consequently, a single party majority in a parliament. However, 
there is one important merit of this institutional combination, i.e. complete separation of 
executive and legislative powers. When different parties win presidential and legislative 
elections, they check and balance each other. The policy output will be close to the social 
median. Even when one party wins both presidential and legislative elections, separation 
of power prohibits one party’s total control of executive and legislative power without 
any checks and balances (Saideman et al. 2002). 
The combination of semi-presidential and SMD systems also ranks second. 
Legislative power sharing is less likely because of SMD arrangements. As for executive 
power, when a majority party and a president’s party coincide, one party controls both 
branches’ power. The characteristic of dual executive in semi-presidential systems and its 
effect on executive power sharing become less meaningful for rival groups. When a 
president’s party does not control a majority in parliament, the rival party controls both 
legislative and most executive powers, with at most “reserve domains” such as foreign 
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and defense policy left to a president (Shugart and Carey 1992). Regardless, this 
combination provides no legislative power sharing and its executive power sharing is at 
best limited. Furthermore, compared to presidential systems, semi-presidential systems 
have only incomplete checks and balances because their presidents usually possess the 
power of dissolving parliaments. Because of this presidential power, which is often 
constrained to a certain extent (Shugart and Carey 1992; Shugart 1996), the total 
independence of origin and survival, and consequently, the complete checks and balances 
between branches, disappears.61 While the negative effect of this presidential power is 
likely to be canceled out when conditions do not favor the dissolution of a parliament for 
a president, an ambitious president would always grasp or even create an opportunity to 
dissolve an unfriendly parliament in order to maximize the odds of his (or his party’s) 
re-election. In sum, although this combination is inferior to presidential-SMD systems in 
one aspect (incomplete checks and balances), it is superior in another aspect (more 
executive power sharing), and consequently, the two combinations display a similar level 
of power sharing. 
Semi-presidential-PR systems come third in the ranking and exist mostly in Eastern 
European countries. As aforementioned, a critical feature of semi-presidential systems, 
dual executives, indicates that executive power is always shared by a president and a 
premier (and their respective groups) to a certain extent. However, while a PR system 
tends to produce multiparty systems, coalition cabinets,62 and divided governments 
(because it is less likely that a president’s party would win a majority of seats under a PR 
system), and is therefore conducive to executive and legislative power sharing among 
                                                 
61 This is why Lijphart and his associates (1993) regard semi-presidential systems as systems of 
semi-separation of powers. 
62 In comparison with presidential systems, allowing the formation of coalition cabinets is a characteristic 
of semi-presidential systems, as aforementioned. 
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ethnic groups, it also increases the possibility of a president’s (and his group’s) 
dominance of power vis-à-vis a premier and a parliament. The reason why there is 
possibly an unbalanced power relationship is that a fragmented parliament motivates and 
helps a semi-president compete with and act against it for more control of executive 
power. Facing such a weak, fragmented parliament, ambitious semi-presidents become 
dominant as shown in many semi-presidential systems, such as Weimar Germany, Poland, 
Russia, and Taiwan (Wu 1998; Lee 2001). Furthermore, this combination does not 
provide completely mutual independence between branches in that a president in 
semi-presidential systems can dissolve a parliament, with different constraints across 
countries. A parliament’s dependence on a president’s confidence is likely to cause 
incomplete checks and balances between branches, making an already dominant president 
even more overwhelming. In sum, the high levels of executive and legislative power 
sharing as well as some checks and balances this institutional combination seems to 
provide should not be taken at face value. A dominant president vis-à-vis a fragmented 
parliament makes these favorable conditions almost meaningless. 
Together with semi-presidential-PR, presidential-PR systems rank third. Many Latin 
American and Sub-Saharan ethnic groups live under this system. Some scholars show 
that the performance of presidential-PR systems with regard to managing ethnic 
cleavages is quite positive (Lijphart et al. 1993), although these systems have been 
criticized for their difficulty in dealing with economic problems (Bernhard et al. 2001). 
Considering Lijphart’s disregard for the fact that many Latin American countries have 
only socially, instead of politically, relevant ethnic groups (Fearon 2007), his finding that 
presidential-PR systems manage ethnic cleavages quite well becomes questionable. It 
may not be the political institutions that explain peaceful ethnic relations in Latin  
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Figure 3.1: Levels of power sharing of political institutions* 
Lowest                  Highest  
 
PAR-SMD PRE-PR PRE-SMD PAR-PR 
* PAR and PRE stand for the categories of parliamentary and presidential systems, 
respectively. The term “presidential systems” has been used in this dissertation to denote 
both presidential and semi-presidential systems, as mentioned in Chapter 1. 
 
America. Instead, the almost no occurrence of violent ethnic conflict in the continent 
superficially makes political institutions seem to be the reason. Although a 
presidential-PR system has legislative power sharing because of its PR characteristics and 
complete checks and balances because of its presidential structures (Shugart and Carey 
1992; Saideman 2002), its president can easily dominate because of a fragmented 
parliament s/he faces. In sum, like semi-presidential-PR systems, presidential-PR systems 
hamper meaningful power sharing and reduce the sum of the probabilities for ethnic 
groups to influence policy-making because of presidents’ dominance over fragmented and, 
hence, feeble parliaments. 
The most unfortunate system from the perspectives employed here is the 
Westminster model of democracy which consists of parliamentary and SMD systems. 
Many western European, Asian, and Northern African ethnic groups live under this 
system. This system is well-known for its majoritarian tendency (Mainwaring and 
Shugart 1997), which results from the fact that SMD systems tend to produce a single 
party majorities. This single party majority then controls both executive and legislative 
powers without any checks and balances, because of the core characteristic of 
parliamentary systems, the fusion of power. Undoubtedly, this most majoritarian 
combination is least likely to reduce ethnic conflict. Figure 3.1 summarizes the levels of 
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power sharing of every combination of government structures and electoral systems in a 
spectrum. 
 
3.3 Taking the Number and Spatial Distributions of Ethnic Groups Seriously 
This discussion does not suggest that all divided societies should choose 
parliamentary-PR systems which provide the highest level of power sharing. We should 
bear in mind that the theory of the ethnic security dilemma is all about enhancing the 
perceptions of security held by ethnic groups in order to avoid their mutually reinforcing, 
irrational competition and conflict. To limit the feeling of threat requires institutions 
which best meet the needs of a specific divided society. 
There are two important considerations about the structure of a divided society: the 
number and spatial distribution of its ethnic groups (Reilly and Reynolds 1999). It would 
be unwise to adopt a parliamentary system when there are only two major ethnic groups. 
When only two major rival groups exist in a state, it will be very unlikely that they will 
form a coalition. This is true even if a PR system is in use and a multiparty system 
emerges because the original bipolar structure of a society still persists. Without a 
coalition government, a parliamentary system does not promote power sharing 
(Mainwaring and Shugart 1997), and consequently, security and peace. 
Furthermore, when ethnic groups are concentrated and hence more likely to engage 
in conflict (Gurr 1993; Byman 1997; Ayres and Saideman 2000; Saideman and Ayres 
2001; Toft 2003), a fairer PR system, which helps prevent grievances and ethnic conflict, 
is required. Some may doubt the effect of a PR system for concentrated groups, however, 
since their geographic concentration may bring more seats when a SMD system is used. 




First, if a minority group is concentrated totally in one region together with other 
groups, they will tend to prefer a PR system to obtain more proportional seat shares and 
to avoid unfair bonus seats awarded to other bigger groups within the region, be they 
minority or majority groups. Among the groups which are covered in this dissertation and 
have the record of their regional populations, almost a half of them concentrating totally 
in one region live with other ethnic groups and do not control a majority of the population 
in the region. Among these groups, about 76% of them are so small that they have smaller 
than 26% of the region populations. Second, even for the other half groups which 
constitute a majority of the population in the region in which they reside, they may not 
desire a SMD system. On the one hand, some of these groups make up such an 
overwhelming majority of the region population that a SMD system does not differ much 
from a PR system. On the other hand, these regional majority groups may at least 
consider a PR system fair because of the proportionality it promotes or even prefer a PR 
system when the region they inhabit is only a part of an election district in which they 
lose their majority advantage. Third, if a group not only concentrates some of its 
members in one region, but also has (more) others spreading out in other parts of a state, 
then a SMD system would help the group win extra seats in the region where they have a 
population advantage, but hurt their elections in other regions where they do not enjoy the 
lead. About one-third of concentrated minority groups fit into this category. Overall, a 
SMD system may do more harm than good for these groups’ election gains. Because of 
these reasons, a PR system will generally be more desirable for most concentrated groups 
as many scholars believe. 
In this dissertation, I assume that every concentrated group prefers a PR system 
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regardless of the fact that for some of them who are concentrated completely in one 
region and enjoy a majority of the region’s population, a SMD system may be equally, if 
not more, advantageous. While this disregard is due to the absence of data about the true 
preference of this type of group, it will make the estimate of the effects of PR systems 
more conservative. Put differently, the assumption that many scholars and I make about 
the preference of concentrated groups for PR systems when in fact some of them are 
indifferent between PR and SMD systems will help me more easily falsify, not verify, my 
hypotheses. The rate of rejecting the null hypothesis that PR systems make no difference 
when the hypothesis is true will be highly decreased. 
Most major hypotheses can be drawn based on the two principles that a presidential 
and a PR system works for societies with two groups and for groups with concentrated 
geographic distributions, respectively. For a concentrated group facing only a rival group 
in a state, presidential-PR systems work best to provide them a sense of security and 
prevent them from showing on the battlefield.  
For concentrated groups, only when they coexist with multiple rival groups in their 
country, a condition that makes inter-group cooperation and coalition cabinets becomes 
required in order to reach a majority status in a parliament, do parliamentary-PR systems 
possibly serve as one of the best institutional devices. The other preferable arrangement is 
a presidential-SMD system. This combination seems to violate the aforementioned two 
principles that a presidential and a PR system works for societies with two groups and for 
groups with concentrated geographic distributions, respectively. However, 
parliamentary-PR systems do not always promote power sharing between all the groups 
in a state. For states having more than two groups (and, hence, no majority groups), 
presidential-SMD systems ensure that the parties of their presidents will almost always 
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not control the majority status of their parliaments and have to face divided governments. 
Checks and balances between all the groups constitute the norm of politics in these 
systems, which thus represent an equally, if not more, attractive institutional 
configuration as parliamentary-PR systems. 
Two possibilities exist when ethnic groups have dispersed distributions. Some 
scholars argue that when countries have highly intermixed patterns of ethnic settlement, 
even single-member districts are likely to be ethnically heterogeneous (Reilly and 
Reynolds 1999). This feature will encourage most, if not all, candidates to move to more 
moderate positions in order to win majority support, or will promote the development of 
multiethnic parties. Put differently, a SMD system is likely to marginalize ethnic division 
and ameliorate interethnic antagonisms in such patterns of ethnic distributions (Reilly and 
Reynolds 1999). 
These patterns of ethnic settlement hardly exist in the real world, however. Few, if 
any, countries have only ethnic groups which are spread out, a condition that makes 
ethnic settlement to be highly intermixed. Concentrated groups are less likely to accept a 
SMD arrangement. Even if they do, their concentrated distributions would very possibly 
provide their candidates enough votes for winning elections in quite a few districts. If so, 
this resource would discourage some candidates to become more moderate in order to 
attract other groups’ votes. If the candidates of concentrated groups continue appealing to 
their own members and the identity of concentrated groups keeps politicized, it is 
impractical to expect that the elites of dispersed groups would not do the same and their 
members would give up their identity altogether. This grim picture remains even when 




Table 3.1: Number and Spatial Distribution of Ethnic Groups, 
and Appropriate Institutions 
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PRE -PR Dispersed 








* Types in gray areas represent appropriate institutions for a specific context. The gray 
color for spatially dispersed groups is lighter because the effects of institutions for these 
subjects may be insignificant. 
※
 There are no observations of Type 16 in the data set of this dissertation. 
 
Another condition makes countries have highly intermixed ethnic settlement. If most 
groups in a state are spread out and only a few are concentrated, then SMD systems may 
benefit the ethnic relations of the state in question. However, no related empirical 
evidence exists. Saideman and his colleagues (2002) even find that  
concentrated and dispersed groups alike engage in less intense conflict when PR 
systems are in use. In sum, one possibility when ethnic groups are spread out is that what 
better meets the needs of concentrated groups also better serves the interests of dispersed 
groups. 
On the other hand, other scholar’s recent work implies no effects of institutions 
when ethnic groups are spread out and therefore less motivated and capable of engaging 
in ethnic conflict (Gurr 1993; Byman 1997; Ayres and Saideman 2000; Saideman and 
Ayres 2001; Toft 2003). The other possibility, when ethnic groups are spatially dispersed, 
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is that institutions do not make a difference. I will test these two competing notions in my 
paper. 
 Table 3.1 presents what I just discussed and also the 16 possible combinations of the 
institutional and contextual factors. Up to this point, I have not touched upon whether 
specific types of ethnic conflict require different preventive institutional frameworks as 
some scholars assert. This is the topic to which I now turn. 
 
3.4 The Types of Ethnic Conflict 
 Ethnic conflict can be manifested violently or peacefully. Many scholars believe that 
institutions with a higher level of power sharing help ameliorate ethnic violence, but they 
have different views about the effects of institutions on nonviolent ethnic conflict. 
Furthermore, these opposite arguments suffer from either seeming inconsistency of their 
internal logic or lack of appropriate hypothesis testing, making both of the arguments less 
convincing. 
For example, Cohen (1997) argues that under proportional arrangements, conflict is 
likely to take more frequent but nonviolent forms due to the institutional means available 
and accessible to dissatisfied minorities. He, however, hypothesizes that the greater the 
degree of electoral PR in the system, the higher the degree of low-level ethnic conflict. 
There is an obvious gap between his argument and hypothesis. While he claims that 
proportional arrangements are likely to relate to more frequent nonviolent ethnic conflict, 
he tests the link between the level of nonviolent ethnic conflict and institutional 
arrangements. To test his theory, Cohen should not depend on the nonviolent protest 
variable of the Minorities at Risk dataset which is essentially about the intensity, not the 
frequency, of the variable in question. Consequently, his interpretation of the results that 
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electoral PR generates neither increases nor decreases in the incidence of low-level ethnic 
conflict is simply wrong. The empirical finding that nonviolent conflict is neither more 
nor less serious when proportional institutions are used is left unexplained theoretically. 
Contrary to Cohen’s argument that a PR system leads to more frequent nonviolent 
conflict, Saideman et al. (2004) claim that less and smaller protest by groups should be 
seen in states where a PR electoral system is employed. Under such a system minorities 
will generally have a better chance to achieve representation, and thus get their demands 
heard, without mobilizing in the streets. They, however, also assert that “protests are 
relatively short-term events…. We should expect more and bigger protests when 
circumstances aggravate a group’s sense of grievance and when conditions are most 
favorable to mass mobilization.” As aforementioned, while likely, institutional reforms 
rarely take place. Given this fact, it remains unclear how relatively stable institutions 
explain the fluctuating pattern of protests within a state based on the seemingly 
contradictory logic of Saideman and his associates. To solve the puzzle, I would argue 
that while relatively stable institutions may not explain such fluctuating phenomenon as 
protests within a polity, they can explain the average cross-sectional differences. 
Although the level of protests may change over time within a state, it is more likely for 
some political systems to experience bigger protests than other systems on average. 
In terms of the frequency of protest, both the arguments of Cohen and Saideman and 
his associates seem plausible. In terms of reducing the intensity of conflict, however, 
there is no reason to expect that whether conflict is violent or nonviolent will make a 
difference.63 Some systems better address a group’s sense of grievance and, hence, better 
                                                 
63 It should be noted that, when the effects of government structures are concerned, Saideman and his 
associates in fact think that different forms of governments, indicated by whether election calendar is fixed 
or not, become more attractive depending on whether nonviolent protest or violent rebellion is in question. 
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prevent the escalation of ethnic conflict, regardless of whether ethnic groups manifest that 
violently or nonviolently. Put differently, the argument of Saideman and his colleagues 
makes more sense that bigger protests should be expected when circumstances, such as 
the use of disproportional SMD systems, aggravate a group’s sense of grievance. 
When its impact on democracy is concerned, however, nonviolent protest differs 
from violent conflict significantly. A democracy requires constant input from its society 
to sustain its functioning and survival. Nonviolent protest also serves as a major means 
people need and use to make their voice heard in a democracy. It is thus not coincidental 
that most democracies protect individuals’ right to legally and nonviolently protest, 
regardless of whether they are presidential, semi-presidential, or parliamentary 
democracies as well as whether they use PR or SMD systems. Because of this common 
protection in democracies and the positive side of protest, while it can be expected that 
some institutions better reduce the level of nonviolent conflict than others, the difference 
of the effects should be less substantial. 
Violent conflict, on the other hand, contributes nothing good to the functioning of a 
democracy. Democracies generally do not allow such conflict to take place, regardless of 
which government structures and electoral systems they use. People in democracies 
usually do not ask for more rights or fairer treatments by engaging in violent conflict, 
either. These facts imply that there exist no counteracting forces that change or offset the 
differences between the effects of institutions on ethnic violence. In sum, I expect to find 
similar empirical patterns about the link between institutions and ethnic conflict, be it 
violent or nonviolent. The relation between nonviolent conflict and institutions will 
                                                                                                                                                 
Their thoughts do not hold up in their testing results, however. Instead, the estimate of election calendar 
show that presidential systems, indicated by fixed calendar, better reduce both violent and nonviolent ethnic 
conflict, although the effect on nonviolent protest is insignificant. 
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Table 3.2: The Best Institutional Design  
for a Spatially Concentrated group Facing Only One Rival Group 
 Facing One Rival Group 
Type 1: PAR-PR Type 2: PRE-PR (Best) 
Concentrated Groups
Type 3: PAR-SMD Type 4: PRE-SMD 
* Types in gray areas represent appropriate institutions for a specific context. 
 
generally be weaker, however. 
 
3.5 The Impact of Political Institutions 
 Based on Table 3.1 as well as the similarities and differences between violent and 
nonviolent ethnic conflict, I derive several hypotheses about the effects of institutions. To 
discuss these hypotheses more effectively, I replicate and divide Table 3.1 into three 
sub-tables, Tables 3.2-3.4.  
 
3.5.1 Concentrated Groups Facing One Rival Group 
As Table 3.2 shows, for concentrated minority groups facing only one opposition 
group, ceteris paribus, presidential-PR systems outperform other institutions in providing 
them more influence in policy making. Fairer PR systems help reduce the likelihood of 
conflict engaged in by such groups while presidential systems help prohibit the 
possibility of dominant groups’ total control of power and reduce the propensity of 
dominated groups in question to fight. This argument applies to both violent and 
nonviolent ethnic conflict, but more so to the former case. 
Hypothesis 1a: In cases involving a concentrated minority group facing only one 
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opposition group, ceteris paribus, the expected level of violent rebellion is less 
intense in countries with presidential and PR systems than in countries with most, 
if not all, of the other institutional configurations. 
Or equivalently, I expect to find most, if not all, of the following research 














where Reb is the abbreviation for “rebellion,” and cx represent the sample means of 
the control variables of this dissertation. 
Hypothesis 1b: In cases involving a concentrated minority group facing only one 
opposition group, ceteris paribus, the expected level of nonviolent ethnic conflict 
is less intense in countries with presidential and PR systems than in countries with 
some of the other institutional configurations. 
















3.5.2 Concentrated Groups Facing Multiple Rival Groups 
As Table 3.3 shows, for concentrated minority groups facing multiple rival groups, 
ceteris paribus, parliamentary-PR and presidential-SMD systems better alleviate ethnic 
conflict. These institutional configurations ensure that the groups in question will be less 
likely to engage in conflict because more groups either share both executive and 
legislative powers or check and balance one another. Accordingly, they lack or reduce 
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Table 3.3: The Best Institutional Design 
for a Spatially Concentrated group Facing Multiple Rival Groups 
 Facing Multiple Rival Groups 
Type 5: PAR-PR (Best) Type 6: PRE-PR Concentrated 
Groups Type 7: PAR-SMD Type 8: PRE-SMD (Best) 
* Types in gray areas represent appropriate institutions for a specific context. 
 
incentives to engage in conflict. This notion applies to both violent and nonviolent ethnic 
conflict, but more so to violent conflict. 
Hypothesis 2a: In cases involving a concentrated minority group facing multiple 
rival groups, ceteris paribus, the expected level of violent ethnic conflict is less 
intense in countries with parliamentary-PR or with presidential-SMD systems 
than in countries with the other institutional configurations. 
Or equivalently, I expect to find most, if not all, of the following research 


















Hypothesis 2b: In cases involving a concentrated minority group facing    
multiple rival groups, ceteris paribus, the expected level of nonviolent ethnic 
conflict is less intense in countries with parliamentary-PR or with  
 presidential-SMD systems than in countries with the other institutional 
configurations. 




Table 3.4: The Best Institutional Design 
for Spatially Dispersed Groups 
 Two Groups Multiple Groups 
Type 9: 
PAR-PR 












Type 16 (Best) ※: 
PRE-SMD  
* Types in gray areas represent appropriate institutions for a specific context. 
※
 There are no observations of Type 16 in the data set of this dissertation, so I cannot test 




















3.5.3 Dispersed Groups 
As Table 3.4 shows, there are two possibilities for spatially dispersed ethnic groups. 
First, what works best for concentrated groups also works best for dispersed groups, 
holding the number of rival groups they face and all the other relevant variables constant. 
Second, no particular institutions better furnish dispersed minorities with a sense of 
security, ceteris paribus. Dispersed minorities have neither legitimacy nor capability to 
fight for their rights; such groups are essentially more peaceful and institutional design is 
simply irrelevant to them. These opposite arguments lead to the following competing 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesisnull 3a: In cases involving a spatially dispersed minority group facing only 
one opposition group, ceteris paribus, the expected level of violent conflict is 
neither less nor more intense in any countries. 
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Hypothesisalternative 3a: In cases involving a spatially dispersed minority group facing 
only one opposition group, ceteris paribus, the expected level of violent conflict is 
less intense in countries with presidential and PR systems than in countries with 
most, if not all, of the other institutional configurations. 
















   

















Hypothesisnull 3b: In cases involving a spatially dispersed minority group facing only 
one opposition group, ceteris paribus, the expected level of nonviolent conflict is 
neither less nor more intense in any countries. 
Hypothesisalternative 3b: In cases involving a spatially dispersed minority group facing 
only one opposition group, ceteris paribus, the expected level of nonviolent 
conflict is less intense in countries with presidential and PR systems than in 
countries with some of the other institutional configurations. 


































Hypothesisnull 4a: In cases involving a spatially dispersed minority group facing 
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multiple rival groups, ceteris paribus, the expected level of violent conflict is 
neither less nor more intense in any countries. 
Hypothesisalternative 4a: In cases involving a spatially dispersed minority group 
facing multiple rival groups, ceteris paribus, the expected level of violent conflict 
is less intense in countries with parliamentary-PR than in countries with 
presidential-PR or parliamentary-SMD systems. 






















Hypothesisnull 4b: In cases involving a spatially dispersed minority group facing 
multiple rival groups, ceteris paribus, the expected level of nonviolent conflict is 
neither less nor more intense in any countries. 
Hypothesisalternative 4b: In cases involving a spatially dispersed minority group   
facing multiple rival groups, ceteris paribus, the expected level of nonviolent 
conflict is less intense in countries with parliamentary-PR than in countries with 
presidential-PR or parliamentary-SMD systems. 























Up to this point, all the discussion focuses on the effects of institutions, including 
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how they are influenced by the number and spatial distribution of ethnic groups as well as 
whether different types of ethnic conflict require divergent preventive institutions. If the 
number and spatial distribution of ethnic groups affect institutions’ effects on ethnic 
conflict, then institutional configurations also influence how the two contextual factors 
affect ethnic conflict. This symmetry is the defining feature of any interactive effects. In 
the following section, I discuss this other side of the story. 
 Before moving to the next section, it should be noted that while institutions have 
more effects on violent than on nonviolent conflict intensity, all groups covered in this 
study are big enough to engage in either type of clashes when they see fit, regardless of 
how many rival groups they face.64 Furthermore, concentrated groups have higher 
legitimacy and capability to fight for power both violently and peacefully than their 
dispersed counterparts. The type of ethnic conflict is therefore irrelevant when discussing 
the effects of the number and spatial distribution of ethnic groups. 
 
3.6 The Other Side of the Story: the Effects of the Two Contextual Factors 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, cross-national studies have found no more 
occurrences or severity of ethnic violence in more diverse countries (Fearon and Laitin 
2003; Collier et al. 2004; Lacina 2004). While some scholars quickly conclude that ethnic 
diversity does not matter, others argue that only when we consider other factors which 
influence the effects of ethnic fractionalization does the impact in question become clear. 
I take this latter viewpoint. 
When it comes to the effect of the spatial distributions of ethnic groups, dispersed 
                                                 
64 All the groups studied in this dissertation have nontrivial populations that can be mobilized and 
organized to engage in insurgency or protest. In fact, under right conditions, all successful insurgency needs 
are only small numbers of rebels (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Please refer to the next chapter for details about 
the populations of the groups covered in this dissertation. 
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groups are believed to be more peaceful than concentrated groups. When living in a state 
with inappropriate institutional arrangements, dispersed groups can become more 
combative, however. To unravel the impact of such a contextual factor also requires 
taking institutions more seriously. 
In this section, I will first discuss how the number of ethnic groups influences ethnic 
conflict, given certain government structures, electoral systems, and spatial distributions 
of ethnic groups. I will then link the spatial distributions of ethnic groups to ethnic 
conflict, controlling for the interactions between this contextual factor and the two 
institutional variables.  
 
3.6.1 The Impact of Ethnic Diversity 
3.6.1.1 Concentrated Groups under Parliamentary-PR Systems 
 One main argument in this dissertation is that only with the presence of more than 
two ethnic groups do parliamentary systems possibly contribute to power sharing because 
such ethnic profiles make the formation of a coalition cabinet more likely. For the 
members of a coalition, they share both executive and legislative powers. For those 
outside a coalition, they influence policy-making by initiating a no-confidence vote or 
simply by threatening to do so when they see divisions and quarrels within the coalition. 
Since a coalition cabinet tends to be less stable, its members generally take more 
seriously the needs and preferences of the parties outside a coalition. Conversely, the 
presence of only two groups in a parliamentary-PR system usually leads to a one-party 
(or one-group) majority cabinet, which the other major ethnic group finds very hard to 
challenge. In sum, since the existence of multiple groups in parliamentary-PR systems 
favors the formation of a coalition cabinet, which better ensures for all the ethnic groups 
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in a state a certain sense of security, be they a member of the coalition or not, I expect to 
find Hypothesis 5a and Hypothesis 5b to be true. 
Hypothesis 5a: In cases involving a concentrated ethnic group living in 
parliamentary-PR systems, ceteris paribus, the expected level of violent conflict is 
less intense in countries having more than two ethnic groups than in those with 
only two groups. 
Hypothesis 5b: In cases involving a concentrated ethnic group living in 
parliamentary-PR systems, ceteris paribus, the expected level of nonviolent 
conflict is less intense in countries having more than two ethnic groups than in 
those with only two groups. 










3.6.1.2 Dispersed Groups under Parliamentary-PR Systems 
 The same logic in contrasting Type 1 with Type 5 applies to the comparison here and 
provides the alternative hypotheses 6a and 6b. Dispersed groups are also believed to be 
less motivated and less capable of engaging in conflict, however, regardless of how many 
rival groups they face. This competing notion offers the following null hypotheses. 
Hypothesisnull 6a: In cases involving a dispersed ethnic group living in 
parliamentary-PR systems, ceteris paribus, the expected level of violent conflict is 
similar regardless of how many rival groups the ethnic group in question faces. 
Hypothesisalternative 6a: In cases involving a dispersed ethnic group living in 
parliamentary-PR systems, ceteris paribus, the expected level of violent conflict is 
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less intense in countries having more than two ethnic groups than in those with 
only two groups. 
Hypothesisnull 6b: In cases involving a dispersed ethnic group living in 
parliamentary-PR systems, ceteris paribus, the expected level of nonviolent 
conflict is similar regardless of how many rival groups the ethnic group in 
question faces. 
Hypothesisalternative 6b: In cases involving a dispersed ethnic group living in 
parliamentary-PR systems, ceteris paribus, the expected level of nonviolent 
conflict is less intense in countries having more than two ethnic groups than in 
those with only two groups. 






















 Since I follow the same logic to derive hypotheses for dispersed groups, I will not 
repeat the reasoning hereafter. For the comparisons of dispersed groups, one hypothesis is 
always identical to that for concentrated groups, controlling for government structures 
and electoral systems. The other hypothesis always recognizes the feature of dispersed 
groups that no factors enhance or decrease such groups’ motivation and capability to 
compete for power. 
 
3.6.1.3 Concentrated Groups under Presidential-PR Systems 
 One major undesirable feature of presidential-PR systems lies in the possibility that 
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these institutional configurations may produce a fragmented parliament which makes a 
president dominate more easily and makes the dominated fight more intensely. This 
unwelcome likelihood tends to exist in states with more than two ethnic groups, which 
help generate multipartism and a fragmented parliament in the presence of PR systems. 
When states have only two major ethnic groups, using a PR system generally does not 
lead to these problems. Put differently, for a concentrated group in presidential-PR 
systems, only when they face only one rival ethnic group will they have more say in 
policy-making, feel more secure, and find no need to engage in more intense violent or 
nonviolent conflict. 
Hypothesis 7a: In cases involving a concentrated ethnic group living in 
presidential-PR systems, ceteris paribus, the expected level of violent conflict is 
less intense in countries having two major ethnic groups than in those with more 
than two groups. 
Hypothesis 7b: In cases involving a concentrated ethnic group living in 
presidential-PR systems, ceteris paribus, the expected level of nonviolent conflict 
is less intense in countries having two major ethnic groups than in those with 
more than two groups. 










3.6.1.4 Dispersed Groups under Presidential-PR Systems 
Hypothesisalternative 8a: In cases involving a dispersed ethnic group living in 
presidential-PR systems, ceteris paribus, the expected level of violent conflict is 
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less intense in countries having two major ethnic groups than in those with more 
than two groups. 
Hypothesisnull 8a: In cases involving a dispersed ethnic group living in 
presidential-PR systems, ceteris paribus, the expected level of violent conflict is 
similar regardless of how many rival groups the ethnic group in question faces. 
Hypothesisalternative 8b: In cases involving a dispersed ethnic group living in 
presidential-PR systems, ceteris paribus, the expected level of nonviolent conflict 
is less intense in countries having two major ethnic groups than in those with 
more than two groups. 
Hypothesisnull 8b: In cases involving a dispersed ethnic group living in 
presidential-PR systems, ceteris paribus, the expected level of nonviolent conflict 
is similar regardless of how many rival groups the ethnic group in question faces. 























3.6.1.5 Concentrated Groups under Parliamentary-SMD Systems 
 For states having more than two ethnic groups, parliamentary-SMD systems tend to 
favor groups joining coalition cabinets at the expense of those who do not. Because of the 
use of SMD systems and the presence of more than two groups, moderate multiparty 
systems are more likely to emerge than extreme multiparty systems. Fewer groups will be 
needed for the formation and survival of a majority coalition. This fact is conducive to a 
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more stable coalition cabinet. Consequently, those outside a coalition cabinet will find 
more serious difficulties in competing for power and, hence, feel more insecure and fight 
more intensely. Under the same parliamentary-SMD systems, a state having only two 
major groups should display a similar level of ethnic conflict. This combination of 
parliamentary-SMD systems and two ethnic groups favors a very stable 
single-party-majority (or single-group-majority) cabinet, which is hardly defeated by the 
other group. This discussion leads to Hypothesis 9a and Hypothesis 9b. 
Hypothesis 9a: In cases involving a concentrated ethnic group living in 
parliamentary-SMD systems, ceteris paribus, the expected level of violent conflict 
is similar regardless of how many rival groups the ethnic group in question faces. 
Hypothesis 9b: In cases involving a concentrated ethnic group living in 
parliamentary-SMD systems, ceteris paribus, the expected level of nonviolent 
conflict is similar regardless of how many rival groups the ethnic group in 
question faces. 










3.6.1.6 Dispersed Groups under Parliamentary-SMD Systems 
 There are only null hypotheses for the comparison between Type 11 and Type 15 
because the number of rival groups does not influence how strongly dispersed groups feel 
insecure, just like their concentrated counterparts living in the same political systems. 
Hypothesis 10a: In cases involving a dispersed ethnic group living in 
parliamentary-SMD systems, ceteris paribus, the expected level of violent conflict 
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is similar regardless of how many rival groups the ethnic group in question faces. 
Hypothesis 10b: In cases involving a dispersed ethnic group living in 
parliamentary-SMD systems, ceteris paribus, the expected level of nonviolent 
conflict is similar regardless of how many rival groups the ethnic group in 
question faces. 










3.6.1.7 Concentrated Groups under Presidential-SMD Systems 
 For a state having more than two ethnic groups and using a presidential-SMD 
system, the group or the party of its president will almost always not control a legislative 
majority. As aforementioned, the combination of SMD systems and multiple groups tends 
to favor the formation of moderate multiparty systems. No groups or parties would win a 
majority of seats, so a president almost always faces a divided government, and checks 
and balances between groups almost always exist. Conversely, for a state having only two 
major ethnic groups in the same institutional arrangements, the group and the party of its 
president is likely to exclusively control both executive and legislative powers, making 
the dominated group powerless. 
Hypothesis 11a: In cases involving a concentrated ethnic group living in 
presidential-SMD systems, ceteris paribus, the expected level of violent conflict is 
less intense in countries having more than two ethnic groups than in those with 
only two groups. 
Hypothesis 11b: In cases involving a concentrated ethnic group living in 
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presidential-SMD systems, ceteris paribus, the expected level of nonviolent 
conflict is less intense in countries having more than two ethnic groups than in 
those with only two groups. 










3.6.1.8 Dispersed Groups under Presidential-SMD Systems 
 Because there are no observations of Type 16 in the data set of this dissertation, I 
cannot examine the difference between Type 12 and Type 16. 
 
3.6.2 The Impact of Ethnic Spatial Distributions 
Dispersed groups are well-known for their lower propensities to fight against their 
states and rival groups because of their lower legitimacy and capabilities to do so. I agree 
with this notion, but disagree to take that in its loose form. The notion holds up only after 
controlling for government structures and electoral systems. The other contextual factor, 
i.e. the number of ethnic groups, does not matter. No matter how many rival groups exist, 
dispersed groups are generally more peaceful than concentrated groups, holding the 
combinations of government structures and electoral systems constant. Even if the 
interaction between group numbers and political systems provides concentrated groups 
more influences in policy making, such groups are still more likely to engage in conflict 
than dispersed groups. This possibility tends to exist because an uneven distribution of 
powers between dominant and minority groups is more likely to persist. Given this 
condition, capable concentrated groups living in more empowering countries are still 
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more likely to fight for fairer treatments than less capable dispersed groups living in less 
empowering countries. In sum, controlling for the institutional configurations of 
government structures and electoral systems, concentrated groups are more likely to fight 
more intensely than dispersed groups, regardless of how many rival groups these two 
groups face respectively. This conclusion constitutes Hypothesis 12a and Hypothesis 12b. 
Hypothesis 12a: Given specific government structures and electoral systems and 
regardless of the number of ethnic groups, ceteris paribus, concentrated groups’ 
expected level of violent conflict is less intense than dispersed groups’. 
Hypothesis 12b: Given specific government structures and electoral systems and 
regardless of the number of ethnic groups, ceteris paribus, concentrated groups’ 
expected level of nonviolent conflict is less intense than dispersed groups’. 
Or equivalently, I expect to find the following research hypotheses to be true. 
 


































where Types 9 and 13 on the one hand and Types 1 and 5 on the other hand include cases 
involving dispersed and concentrated groups, respectively. Groups of Types 1 and 9 on 







































where Types 10 and 14 on the one hand and Types 2 and 6 on the other hand include 
cases involving dispersed and concentrated groups, respectively. Groups of Types 2 and 
10 on the one hand and of Types 6 and 14 on the other hand face one and multiple rival 
groups, respectively. 
 


































where Types 11 and 15 on the one hand and Types 3 and 7 on the other hand include 
cases involving dispersed and concentrated groups, respectively. Groups of Types 3 and 

























where the Type 12 on the one hand and Types 4 and 8 on the other hand include cases 
involving dispersed and concentrated groups, respectively. Groups of Types 4 and 12 on 
the one hand and of the Type 8 on the other hand face one and multiple rival groups, 
respectively. 
Before testing these hypotheses, I should explain my research design, such as 

















Chapter 4: Research Design and Measurement 
 I take the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset from 1985 to 2003 as my starting point 
and reorganize it for Time-Series Cross-Sectional (TSCS) analysis. In this dataset, 
minorities at risk are groups that collectively suffer, or benefit, from systematic 
discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a state, and/or are the focus of political 
mobilization and action in defense or promotion of their self-defined interests (Gurr 
1993). The dataset includes minority groups in every country that meet the additional 
criteria about population size.65 The units of analysis in this dissertation are ethnic 
groups within a democratic state for a given year. By democratic states, I mean every 
country which receives a Polity IV score of at least 6. 
As aforementioned, the TSCS data used in this paper introduce several well-known 
challenges including those arising with cross-sectional analysis and those accompanying 
time-series studies. The nested structure of my TSCS data also violates the assumption 
that observations are independent within groups and states. Ignoring this fact of unit 
heterogeneity will sometimes lead to the inflation of the Type I error rate (Raudenbush 
and Bryk 2002 ) and make the rejection of a null hypothesis easier. Furthermore, while 
the problem of ethnic tensions is widespread across countries, among the minority groups 
at risk, many of them did not engage in any violent ethnic conflict during most of the 
time period between 1985 and 2003. Zero violent conflicts occur in 1586 (76.47%) of the 
2074 observations in the MAR dataset. Such a probability mass at a single value suggests 
biased and inconsistent ordinary least squares estimates (Grier et al. 1994). In sum, how 
to deal with all these problems constitutes a daunting task for any studies which analyze 
                                                 
65 To be included in the dataset, minorities at risk must reside in countries with a population in 1985 greater 
than 1,000,000 and in 1990 numbered at least 100,000 or, if fewer, exceeded 1 percent of the population of 
at least one country in which they resided. 
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Table 4.1: Frequency of Ethnic Conflict in Democracies, 1985-2003 
Nonviolent 
Protest 
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  2.70 





  32 
 
 
  1.54 
   Protracted 
civil war 
 
  15 
 
  0.72 
Total 2,078 100 Total 2,074 100 
 
ethnic conflict using the MAR dataset. 
In this chapter, I will first briefly discuss appropriate statistical models for the 
data structure of this dissertation, followed by a section explaining how I measure the 
effective numbers and spatial distributions of ethnic groups as well as how I encode 
government structures and electoral systems. I will then introduce control variables and 
specify my empirical models. Before starting to discuss statistical models, I should 
describe my dependent variable to facilitate the following discussions. 
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The MAR dataset provides my dependent variables, violent rebellion and nonviolent 
protest against states. The measurement of these two variables should be appropriate 
because the MAR dataset encodes only those conflicts that involve ethnic group-based 
activity. Rebellion and protest are measured by 8- and 6-point scales, respectively, with 0 
indicating no conflict and higher values representing more intense form of conflict. There 
is a single score for each ethnic group in each year.66 Table 4.1 displays the distribution 
of my dependent variables in democracies during the period from 1985-2003. Obviously, 
nonviolent protest happens more frequently and does not suffer from the same problem of 
having a probability mass at the value of 0 as violent rebellion. 
 
4.1 Statistical Models 
This section discusses appropriate statistical models for the data structures of my 
dependent variables. As mentioned earlier, though not systematically, standard static 
models of analyzing TSCS data include (Kittel et al. 2005; Wilson et al. 2007): 1) 
performing a fixed effects model to remove all the unobserved country- and time-specific 
effects, 2) performing a between effects model to get rid of the panel structure, and 3) 
performing a random effects model which is a weighted average of the within and 
between estimators and using the Hausman test to choose between fixed and random 
effects models. Standard dynamic analyses of TSCS data usually involve the following 
procedures: 1) conducting panel unit root tests to ensure that the data is stationary to 
avoid spurious estimates; 2) applying a model with a lagged dependent variable and panel 
corrected standard errors in case of stationarity, and then testing for robustness with  
 
                                                 
66 The values coded are based on the highest observed level of protest and rebellion in the given period and 
are not cumulative. 
 88 
 
Table 4.2: Panel Unit Roots Tests 
Anti-Regime Rebellion: Levels 
Fisher 2χ  d.f. P 
constant (augmented Dickey-Fuller test) 
constant (Phillips-Perron test) 
constant, trend (augmented Dickey-Fuller test) 













Anti-Regime Rebellion: Changes 
Fisher 2χ  d.f. p 
constant (augmented Dickey-Fuller test) 
constant (Phillips-Perron test) 
constant, trend (augmented Dickey-Fuller test) 













Note: Fisher ( λP ) test does not require a balanced panel, so all the cases are included. 
This table presents the results of Fisher tests (Maddala and Wu 1999) augmented by 1 lag 
under the null hypothesis that all series are non-stationary against the alternative that at 
least one series in the panel is stationary. The conclusions do not change when the tests 
are augmented by 0, 2, or 3 lags. 
 
respect to different dynamic specifications. Otherwise, deal with nonstationary data by 
taking first differences and investigate short-term relations between the variables of 
interest instead. 
Estimating a fixed effects model in this dissertation is inherently difficult since the 
variables of interest, i.e. the institutional and contextual factors, are almost fixed over 
time and hence cannot be included in such a model. Because of this reason, I cannot 
conduct the Hausman test to determine the appropriateness of a random effects model. 
This discussion concludes that a between effects model is the most conservative and one 
appropriate approach for this research (Kittel et al. 2005; Wilson et al. 2007). The fact 




Table 4.3 Panel Unit Roots Tests 
Anti-Regime Protest: Levels 
Fisher 2χ  d.f. P 
constant (augmented Dickey-Fuller test) 
constant (Phillips-Perron test) 
constant, trend (augmented Dickey-Fuller test) 













Note: Fisher ( λP ) test does not require a balanced panel, so all the cases are included. 
This table presents the results of Fisher tests (Maddala and Wu 1999) augmented by 1 lag 
under the null hypothesis that all series are non-stationary against the alternative that at 
least one series in the panel is stationary. The conclusions do not change when the tests 
are augmented by 0, 2, or 3 lags. 
 
significantly over time for most groups further justifies the choice of a between effects 
model for this variable. 
 It is still possible to account for all unobserved country- and time-specific effects in 
a dynamic model, however. Panel unit root tests need to be done before proceeding to use 
a dynamic model with a lagged dependent variable, panel corrected standard errors, and 
all the country- and time- specific effects. Table 4.2 presents the results of Fisher ( λP ) 
tests for panel unit roots for violent ethnic conflict.67 The upper panel refers to the levels. 
These tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity, so the rebellion data is not 
stationary. The lower panel refers to changes, i.e. the first difference of the dependence 
variable. Stationarity condition holds after taking the first difference. Table 4.3 displays 
the results of Fisher ( λP ) tests for panel unit roots for nonviolent ethnic conflict. There is 
only a panel referring to the levels because these tests reject the null hypothesis of 
nonstationarity. The protest variable is stationary. 
Based on these test results, I can apply the widely used Beck and Katz approach to 
                                                 
67 For the discussion of this test and its comparison with other methods of unit root tests, please refer to 
Maddala and Wu (1999). 
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analyze nonviolent protest (Beck and Katz 1996). A post-estimation of any remaining 
autocorrelation is required to ensure that the problem has been totally tackled by the 
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable, however. If not, then a between effects model 
probably still outperform the Beck and Katz approach in the sense that the latter does not 
offer consistent estimates of parameters in the presence of serial correlation (Maddala 
1999). 
For violent rebellion, the finding of nonstationarity leaves this paper an undesirable 
consequence that may meet the needs of other studies: dealing with nonstationarity by 
taking the first difference and losing the chance of investigating the long-term relations 
between the variables of interest. I will not follow suit. The primary variables of interest 
in this dissertation are institutions and contexts which rarely change over time. Taking the 
first difference of almost time-invariant variables does not make sense since doing so 
essentially transforms those variables into vectors with mostly values of 0 and makes 
their effects hard to be estimated. I have therefore decided to emphasize the 
cross-sectional dimension of the rebellion variable and stick to a between effects model. 
Since the panel structure of my original dataset disappears, the data structure turns into 
one with only two levels. Ethnic groups and states in which ethnic groups nested 
constitute the first and the second levels, respectively. I will perform a hierarchical linear 
model on this new data structure to avoid the inflation of the Type I error rate. 
Getting rid of its panel structure when data has persistent memory does not serve as 
the only or the best solution when the dependent and independent variables of interest 
change very slowly over time. As shown in Table 4.1, given the prevalence of no violent 
conflict, one potential source of data persistence, it is not surprising that there remain 
many zeros (60.47%) in the dependent variable, after removing its time-series structure. 
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Running a between effects model under this situation does not help generate consistent 
and unbiased coefficient estimates. Fortunately, the unique data structure of violent ethnic 
conflict not only causes the problem of data persistence, but also provides another way 
out. In Chapter 7, I will introduce a zero-inflated ordered probit model (ZIOP), which 
better analyzes ordinal scale data having a probability mass at the single value of 0 
(Harris and Zhao 2004).68 This model has never been used in any political science 
research, and helps unravel the different probabilities of each level of ethnic conflict in 
different political systems and contexts. 
In sum, the Beck and Katz approach will be applied to analyze the stationary 
nonviolent ethnic conflict. However, if the problem of serial correlation remains, a 
between-effects model will replace the Beck and Katz approach. I will also perform a 
hierarchical model as a sensitivity test to avoid the Type I error. For nonstationary violent 
ethnic conflict, I will perform a ZIOP model to deal with the problem of excessive zero 
observations, in addition to a between effects model and a hierarchical model. 
 Complete model specifications will be displayed after discussing the data 
measurement of this dissertation, a topic to which I now turn. 
 
4.2 Data Measurement 
The dependent variables have been described in the beginning of this chapter. In this 
section, I first discuss how I encode and measure the key variables of this research, 
including government structures, electoral systems, as well as the effective numbers and 
                                                 
68 Both rebellion and protest are better considered ordinal scale variables because theoretically, we do not 
have a reason to expect that the magnitude of the difference between two consecutive values of these ethnic 
conflict variables has exact numerical meaning in the sense that one such difference can be compared with 
another. I assume that these variables have an interval scale, and perform between-effects and hierarchical 
models in Chapters 5-6 because past studies made the same assumption and because I want to test whether 
different assumptions make a difference. Only the rebellion data will be re-analyzed in Chapter 7, however. 
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spatial distributions of ethnic groups. Appendix 2 displays the data of these variables for 
each group and country studied in this dissertation. I then discuss other variables for 
which I control to estimate the impact of these variables of interest. 
 
4.2.1 Government Structures69 
 For government structures, I construct a variable of Parliamentary with 1 and 0 
indicating parliamentary and presidential (including both presidential and 
semi-presidential) systems, respectively. Before doing so, I need to classify states as 
presidential, parliamentary, or semi-presidential systems, however. This section first 
discusses the defining features of presidential systems and then those of parliamentary as 
well as semi-presidential regimes. 
Most scholars emphasize similar points in distinguishing presidential from 
parliamentary systems. Presidential systems are usually defined as ones of mutual 
independence (Stepan and Skach 1993): 
 
1. The executive is headed by a popularly elected president (either directly or 
indirectly by a non-parliamentary body) who serves as the “chief executive”; 
2. Both the chief executive and the legislative assembly have a fixed electoral 
mandate from which they derive their legitimacy. 
 
 What scholars mean when they refer to the “president” or to the “chief executive” 
differs, however. Lijphart (1992 and 1999) and Sartori (1997) refer to the term as the 
head of government and the head of state, respectively. Sartori’s definition is arguably 
                                                 
69 I construct this variable based on my reading of various sources, including Cheibub (2004), CIA 
Factbook, Elgie (1999, 2007), Europa World, Hellwig and Samuels (2007), Moestrup (2006), Shugart 
(2005), Siaroff (2003), Wu (2006), and the online Constitution Finder: http://confinder.richmond.edu. 
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more general than Lijphart, in the sense that, for Sartori, as long as the executive 
authority flows from a president down, the presence of a separate head of government 
will not disqualify a state for a presidential system. Put differently, for Sartori, both the 
scenarios meet the criteria of presidentialism that a popularly elected president is at the 
same time the head of state as well as the head of government, and that a popularly 
elected president is only the head of state with a separate head of government responsible 
to him.70 Aligned with Sartori, Shugart (2005: 2) includes as another feature of 
presidentialism that “the president names and directs the cabinet and has some 
constitutionally granted lawmaking authority.” This additional feature makes possible the 
presence of a separate head of government and makes clear that the cabinet and the prime 
minister derive their authority from the president. In sum, Sartori’s and Shugart’s 
definitions of presidentialism are not only reasonable, but also more general and, hence, 
more useful when classifying systems in that constitutions across the world are quite 
complicated. Following narrower definitions would leave quite a few systems in gray 
areas out of analyses, lose valuable observations, and make some comparative studies 
hard, if not unlikely at all, to do. 
 Parliamentary systems, on the other hand, used to be defined by mutual dependence 
both in terms of the origin and survival of the executive and legislative branches (Stepan 
and Skach 1993): 
 
1. The chief executive power arises out of the legislative assembly and can fall if it 
receives a vote of no confidence; 
2. The chief executive has the power to dissolve the legislature and call for elections. 
                                                 
70 Other scholars have similarly narrow definitions of presidentialism as Lijphart. For example, Varney 
(1992) and Elgie (1998) consider a state a presidential system only when the president becomes both the 
head of state and the head of government. 
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 More and more scholars realize that while dissolution is logically impossible in the 
basic characteristics of presidentialism, it does not constitute a logical requirement for the 
defining features of parliamentarism to hold (Shugart 2005, Wu 2006). In other words, 
for many scholars, the condition that the chief executive power arises out of the 
legislative assembly and can fall if it receives a vote of no confidence defines the sole 
characteristic of parliamentarism (Sartori 1997). Based on this single feature, all the 
democratic monarchies are found to have a parliamentary system (Wu 2006). There is no 
discussion about whether there possibly exists a president in parliamentary systems in the 
definition. Arguably, all scholars would agree that the president must be indirectly elected 
by a parliamentary body for the system in question to be parliamentary (Elgie 1998, 
Siaroff 2003, Wu 2006). Otherwise, the presences of a president who is elected directly or 
indirectly by a non-parliamentary body, together with that of a prime minister who is 
accountable to the legislature, would violate what defines parliamentarism: the single 
chain of legitimacy, command, and responsibility that flows from the parliament to the 
government (Wu 2006). As long as its president is indirectly elected by a parliamentary 
body, the system is parliamentary, be the president strong or weak in terms of the power 
he possesses (Wu 2006).71 In sum, two scenarios ensure parliamentarism of a system. 
One is the presence of democratic monarchies. The other is the combination of a 
president, elected indirectly by a parliamentary body, and a separate head of government. 
                                                 
71 Empirically, most presidents in parliamentary systems enjoy very little formal power. Guyana may be 
one of the most exceptional cases in that its president possesses quite considerable powers. For some 
scholars, whether a president is strong or weak influences whether a system can be labeled as a 
parliamentary system. For example, in Durverger’s first definition of semi-presidentialism in 1970, he 
indicated that a semi-president has certain powers which exceed those of a head of state in a normal 
parliamentary regime. This implies the importance of a ceremonial head of state for the definitional features 
of parliamentarism to hold. Probably because of the same reason, some scholars categorize Guyana as a 
presidential system or one close to that (Siaroff 2003; Moestrup 2006). Given that the Guyana’s successful 
presidential candidate is the nominee of the party with the largest number of votes in the legislative 
elections and can fall with the cabinet if the cabinet receives a vote of no confidence (see clause 106 (2) of 
the consitution), it is more reasonable to consider Guyana a parliamentary system. 
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 General consensus exists among scholars about which countries belong to 
presidential and parliamentary categories. Some ambiguous cases remain, however, such 
as Belarus during 1991-1994, Indonesia during 1999-2003, Switzerland, Taiwan during 
1992-1996, and Yugoslavia during 2001-2002. I code Belarus and Yugoslavia during their 
respective periods as parliamentary systems and Indonesia, Switzerland, and Taiwan 
during the particular years as presidential systems because of the following reasons. 
 Although Indonesia’s and Taiwan’s presidents used to be elected by a legislative 
body, there was no binding vote of no confidence in their then constitutions, the defining 
feature of parliamentarism. Furthermore, even before Indonesia’s new constitution was 
adopted in 2001 and 2002, the ministers acted simply as the president’s assistants and 
were appointed and dismissed by him. These countries during their respective time 
periods are thus coded as presidential systems. However, since some scholars consider 
Taiwan a parliamentary system, I will do a sensitivity test to examine whether coding 
Taiwan’s government structure differently change the estimates. 
 Switzerland provides another unique mixed system. While its chief executive 
originates from assembly majority, its survival does not depend on the legislature’s 
confidence. Executive-legislative relations in Switzerland are, however, closer to those in 
presidential than in parliamentary systems (Lijphart 1984), a fact that explains why some 
scholars consider Switzerland presidential. I will first code it as a presidential system and 
test whether excluding it from analysis leads to different findings. 
Belarus during 1991-1994 satisfied the defining characteristic of parliamentarism. 
Specifically, the Supreme Soviet, Belarus’ then legislature, could elect and use a vote of 
no confidence to dismiss the head of state (Stanislav Shushkevich) and the head of 
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government (Vyachaslaw Kyebich).72 I thus coded it as a parliamentary system although 
it did not adopt its constitution until 1994 and only 10% of the deputies of the Supreme 
Soviet were members of the opposition.  
While the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during 2001 and 2002 had a popularly and 
directly elected president, Vojislav Koštunica, he held only little formal power and would 
soon become irrelevant, given the then ongoing process of reorganizing the federal state. 
Empirically, a typical chief executive in presidential systems possesses strong formal 
power (Siaroff 2003). I thus classify Yugoslavia during 2001 and 2002 as parliamentary, 
but at the same time test whether I will reach different conclusions if the state is coded as 
a presidential system. 
 In contrast to presidentialism and parliamentarism, the definitions of 
semi-presidentialism arouse a lot more confusion and fierce debate. Duverger (1980), 
who coined the term, defines semi-presidentialism as a system in which: 
 
 1. A president is elected by universal suffrage; 
 2. The president has considerable constitutional authority; 
3. There exists also a prime minister and cabinet, subject to the confidence of the 
assembly majority. 
 
 The first and especially the second definitional features of semi-presidentialism have 
been widely discussed and criticized. As far as the first definition is concerned, universal 
suffrage implies a direct election for some scholars. The fact that Duverger deemed 
Finland a semi-presidential system before its president was directly elected suggests that 
both direct elections and indirect ones by a non-parliamentary body satisfy the first 
                                                 
72 Shushkevich was ousted by a vote of no confidence which Kyebich survived in 1994. 
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element of Duverger’s definition of semi-presidentialism. Sartori (1997) also agrees with 
this interpretation. 
That a semi-president must possess quite considerable powers generates more 
serious perplexity. Duverger never expands on what he means by “quite considerable 
powers.” Some scholars thus object to regard semi-presidentialism as a valid category of 
government structures since it embraces countries with both very strong and very weak 
presidents. Others seek to provide “quite considerable powers” a more precise meaning. 
For example, Shugart (2005: 12) argues that if a president does not have the initiative for 
selecting a prime minister, then the only reason that the president is still considered 
possessing quite considerable power is that s/he has at least one of the following powers: 
“dissolution (as in Niger), a veto (as in Bulgaria and Ukraine 2005, as well as Niger), or 
the right to appoint a prime minister if the assembly majority deadlocks (Madagascar).” 
Wu (2006) emphasizes different powers from Shugart. For Wu, quite considerable powers 
should include at least one of the following: the presidential powers to appoint the prime 
minister without the consent of the parliament, to actively dissolve the parliament, and to 
issue ordinances stipulated by the constitution. 
Neither of these responses provides a perfect solution (Elgie 1999). The former 
response ignores the fact that even presidential and parliamentary systems have diverse 
political practices, though to a much less extent. The latter response causes a “subjectivity 
problem” since different scholars may end up providing different lists of 
semi-presidential systems. These facts explain why Elgie and several other scholars 
propose ignoring whether the president has quite considerable powers as a defining 
feature of semi-presidentialism. For the cases of my sample, the second approach does 
not lead to a serious problem of subjectivity, however. 
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Table 4.4: Lists of semi-presidential systems 
 Elgie Moestrup Siaroff Shugart Wu 
Bulgaria 1991-73 ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ 
Croatia 1990- ◎ ◎ ◎  ◎ 
France 1958- ◎  ◎ ◎ ◎ 
Lithuania 1992-74 ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ 
Macedonia 1991-75 ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ 
Madagascar 1992- ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ 
Mali 1992- ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ 
Moldova 1994-200076 ◎ ◎ ◎  ◎ 
Namibia ◎ ◎  ◎ ◎ 
Niger ◎ ◎  ◎  
Peru 1979- ◎ ◎ ◎  ◎  
Romania 1996- ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ 
Russia 1993- ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ 
Senegal ◎ ◎  ◎  
Slovakia 1999- ◎ ◎ ◎  ◎ 
South Korea ◎ ◎    
Sri Lanka ◎ ◎  ◎ ◎ 
Taiwan 1994- ◎  ◎ ◎ ◎ 
Ukraine 1992- ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ 
Note: The time periods for each state in the first column come from Siaroff (2003). While 
the information is not as clear in most of the other lists, all the 5 lists should refer to quite 
similar years during which each state belongs to the semi-presidential category. 
 
 Table 4.4 presents 5 lists of semi-presidential systems covered in this dissertation. 
                                                 
73 It is unclear why Cheibub et al. (2004) regard Bulgaria as a parliamentary system given that its president 
is independently elected. 
74 Lithuania adopted its constitution in 1992, but I code Lithuania since 1991 as a semi-presidential system 
in the assumption that the process of creating the system has similar effects on ethnic relations. I do the 
same to the cases of Moldova and Russia and to the classifications of electoral systems. I also classify 
Bulgaria since 1990 and Ukraine since 1991 as semi-presidential systems, 1 year earlier than the dates 
shown in Table 4.4 for these two countries. This difference between Siaroff’s and my lists may come from 
the divergent rules that we use to determine whether a case belongs to a democratic regime. 
75 It is again unclear why Cheibub et al. (2004) consider Macedonia a parliamentary system. 




The 8 cases in gray areas represent those on which the five scholars have different  
judgments about whether they are semi-presidential systems. Almost every list includes 
the remaining 11 cases in white areas as semi-presidential systems. While some lists 
exclude France since 1958, Taiwan since 1994,77 and Moldova between 1994 and 2000, 
the reason is simply because they are not in the samples from which these scholars 
constructed their lists. This explains why these three cases are not included in some lists 
yet not in gray areas. Among the lists, only Siaroff (2003) leaves Namibia and Sri Lanka 
out possibly because of his misinterpretation of their constitutions or neglect of some 
provisions.78 Only Elgie (2007) and Moestrup (2006) consider South Korea a 
semi-presidential system, but there is no provision in its constitution for a binding vote of 
no confidence that semipresidentialism requires. Wu may also overlook some provisions 
of the constitutions of Senegal and Niger since the presidents in these two countries have 
quite considerable powers as he defines.79 Siaroff’s list does not have Senegal and Niger, 
either, only because these two countries are not in the samples from which Siaroff 
classified government structures. Only the remaining 3 cases (Croatia, Peru, and Slovakia) 
in gray areas probably result from the different definitions that Shugart and Wu use to 
define “quite considerable powers.”80 In sum, only 3 out of the total 19 countries may 
                                                 
77 Only after 1997 was Taiwan generally regarded as a semi-presidential system because its Legislative 
Yuan could not dissolve cabinets by a vote of no confidence before that year. 
78 According to Siaroff (2003), Namibia has a single popularly elected head of state and government, 
which is not accountable to the legislature. Sri Lanka has a popularly elected head of state and a separate 
head of government, with the latter not accountable to the legislature. Based on the constitutions of these 
two countries, however, both Namibia and Sri Lanka have a prime minister accountable to the legislatue. 
79 According to Shugart (2005) Niger’s president can exercise active dissolution power 1 time per 2 years. 
Senegal’s cabinets can be formed without investiture. 
80 Take Croatia for an example. Although the presidential power to appoint the government has been 
transferred to the legislature since 2000, the president still has the power to issue decrees having the force 
of law and, hence, meet Wu’s criterion for him to be a powerful semi-president. As for Peru, only when 
delegated by the parliament does its president, who has veto power, become competent to enact laws. This 
explains why Peru shows on Shugart’s, but not on Wu’s list. Please refer to Europa World , as well as 
Shugart and Mainwaring (1997) for details. 
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display the subjectivity problem. In this dissertation, I accept both the definitions of 
Shugart and Wu and classify all of the 19 states as semi-presidential systems. 
 In addition to these 19 cases, I also code Israel during 1992-2000 as a 
semi-presidential system. The Basic Law revised in 1992 made Israel the first country to 
directly and popularly elect its prime minister, concurrent with the legislative elections. 
With this change, Israel during 1992-2000 no long belonged to the parliamentary category. 
It was not a presidential system, either, given that its prime minister, i.e. the chief 
executive, and its parliament had mutual dependence in terms of their survival. While 
Israel during the period was also not a “typical” semi-presidential system, given that it 
did not have a popularly elected president and, hence, lacked the defining feature of dual 
executive of semi-presidentialism, some scholars argue that Israel with a directly elected 
prime minister was closest to a president-parliamentary regime (Hazan 1997), a sub-type 
of semi-presidentialism (Shugart and Carey 1992). In the following empirical chapter, I 
compare the differences between including Israel in analyses as a semi-presidential 
system and excluding it from studies in terms of the results of hypothesis testing. 
 
4.2.2 Electoral Systems81 
There is more consensus among scholars about how to classify electoral systems, 
which I divide into two categories: PR and SMD. The SMD category includes all the 
systems not using a proportional formulae to distribute seats, such as plurality and 
majority systems in single-member districts. The PR category includes plurality systems 
in multi-member districts, binominal systems, and PR in multi-member districts.  
                                                 
81 I encode electoral systems using Kostadinova (2002), Massicotte and Blais (1999), Shugart and 
Wattenberg (2001), Shvetsova (1999), the data handbooks of elections in Asia, Europe, Americas, and 
Africa, as well as the IFES election guide at http://www.electionguide.org/. 
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The only major coding problem comes from the complicated mixed electoral 
systems. These systems will be categorized as PR or SMD systems, based on whether 
they “lean” toward majoritarian (i.e., the so-called mixed-member majoritarian or MMM 
systems) or proportional (i.e., the so-called mixed-member proportional or MMP systems) 
in their overall effects (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001).82 
 It should be noted that the three cases in my sample, Australia, Fiji in 1999, and 
Papua New Guinea, use the system of Alternative Vote, which I classify as a SMD system 
in this dissertation. Since some scholars consider the system exceptionally helpful for the 
moderation of ethnic politics, these three cases may boost the beneficial effect of SMD 
systems. I will examine whether excluding these cases from analysis change the impact 
of electoral systems. 
 
4.2.3 Ethnic Diversity 
 For the purpose of this research, I divide the effective numbers of ethnic groups into 
two categories: two groups and more than two groups. Determining the effective number 
of ethnic groups in a state requires answering first the question as to what defines 
ethnicity.  
As mentioned earlier, in comparative politics, few scholars would accept a 
completely primordialist definition of ethnicity.83 Instead, most scholars agree that, in 
                                                 
82 What separates MMM from MMP systems is the presence or absence of a linkage between tiers. If the 
tiers are not linked, then the typical majority boost received by a large party in the nominal tier is not likely 
to be corrected by proportional allocation from the list tier. Thus, the principle behind majoritarian 
systems—giving an advantage to a large party—remains in MMM systems. On the other hand, MMP 
systems prioritize the list-PR tier and PR seats are distributed so as to correct the distortions created by the 
plurality or majority rule. For those parallel systems which incorporate a mechanism of vote linkage, such 
as in Hungary and Italy, the authors consider them as remaining in the category of MMM, because even if a 
party is over-represented in the nominal tier, it is still likely to receive many seats in the list-tier. 
83 Horowitz (1985) is arguably an exception, but many scholars think that his conception of ethnicity works 
reasonably well for the scope of his study, i.e. the severely divided societies of Asia, Africa, and the 
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addition to ascriptive features which define what people think they are, individuals have 
freedom and instrumental reasoning to identify. This implies that individuals can shift 
their identity over time as they see fit. Furthermore, not all ethnic groups are socially or 
politically relevant as independent social or political actors in that they may form broader 
coalitions with other groups or they may simply not participate in politics. Accordingly, 
for many scholars, to come up with a “right list” of ethnic groups requires updated 
knowledge about what people in a polity identify as the most socially or politically 
relevant ethnic groups for different kinds of issues and different loci of competition 
(Posner 2000, 2004; Laitin and Posner 2001; Fearon 2003).84  
Obtaining this knowledge would, in turn, require a randomly drawn sample of 
people and ask them a series of survey questions periodically, such as how they (and 
others) define themselves (Posner 2000; Fearon 2003). 85 Lots of money and resources 
will be necessary if we want to conduct such surveys to come up a single, right list of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Caribbean. 
84 In contrast, constructivists would argue that since ethnic identities are context-bound, it is unlikely to 
code ethnic groups in any time period. The mainstream view remains that while ethnicity may be situational, 
there are rules in each society about how to best divide a country into categories of identities. For many 
scholars, it is thus not a problem to enumerate ethnic groups and create indices of ethnic fractionalization. 
85 In addition to the fact that “politically” relevant ethnic groups are more useful for “political” science 
research, Posner’s lists of politically relevant ethnic groups (abbreviated as PREG) generally better suit the 
needs of the discipline than those of socially relevant ethnic groups, which can be collected using the 
survey questions Fearon suggests. These two lists differ in that Posner (2000) controls for “context,” and 
makes sure that the identity offered in response to the “who are you” question is the same identity that was 
important to the respondent at the time of the political behavior that researchers are using the respondent’s 
answer to explain. Specifically, Posner designs and plays a “prompt dialogue,” which uses “real local 
language” learned from the open-ended interviews in his field research, and then asks respondents to 
respond directly to the content of the dialogue. Posner’s method of defining groups takes lots of time and 
effort and, hence, is quite hard to apply. It is not surprising that even Posner himself uses this method to 
construct only Zambia’s index of ethnic fractionalization to date. Posner (2004) uses another approach to 
collect the list of politically relevant ethnic groups. He conducts a thorough literature search for book, 
academic articles, and news reports that described the appropriate ethnic breakdowns for the ethnic politics 
of each of the countries. While arguably easier to apply, this method of defining groups remains quite 
time-consuming and so far no equivalent data exists outside Africa. Cross-continent analysis is therefore 
unlikely using this PREG index. Furthermore, some also question that Posner (2004) captures only actual 




groups for every country. This kind of research having a broad geographic coverage is to 
date non-existent and hence the dataset of a “right list” of groups for each country is 
presently unavailable. Without better alternatives, most scholars are forced to rely on 
views quite close to primordialism to define ethnic groups and secondary sources to 
assemble a fixed list and the population shares of ethnic groups (Herrera and Kapur 
2005). 
The most frequently cited definition of ethnic groups comes from Anthony Smith 
(1986: chap. 2). For Smith, an ethnic community is  
 
“a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical 
memories, one or more elements of common culture, a link with a homeland and a 
sense of solidarity.” 
 
Other definitions often include a common language or common religion. This type 
of definition is used in the construction of two out of the three indices of ethnic 
fractionalization that I rely on to derive the effective number of ethnic groups in each 
state. The only exception is Fearon’s index. Fearon and Laitin (2000) see problems in 
these standard definitions which suggest the exclusion of groups that are ethnic intuitively, 
such as Jews who speak many different languages, may or may not practice the Jewish 
religion, and do not at all have a common culture, and the inclusion of groups, such as 
professors with a shared culture, which instinct would like to leave out.  
Before explaining how I use the three indices to construct the data of the effective 
number of ethnic groups, I should briefly discuss how the authors of the indices define 




4.2.3.1 Fearon’s Index of Ethnic Fractionalization 
Fearon and Laitin (2000) follow the implicit rules that people use in daily 
conversation to define an “ethnic group.”86 The term refers to a group larger than a 
family for which membership is reckoned primarily by descent and conceptually 
autonomous (in order to rule out cases such as castes or nobility),87 and has a 
conventionally recognized “natural history” as a group.  
To more readily construct a list of ethnic groups by countries, Fearon (2003) uses the 
idea of “radical categories,” and seeks for groups that meet their features as much as 
possible in assembling the list.88 Fearon enumerates the following features of a 
prototypical ethnic group: membership in the group is reckoned primarily by descent by 
both members and non-members; members are conscious of group membership and view 
it as normatively and psychologically important to them; members share some 
distinguishing cultural features, such as common language, religion, and customs; these 
cultural features are held to be valuable by a large majority of members of the group; the 
group has a homeland, or at least “remembers” one; the group has a shared and 
collectively represented history as a group; and the group is potentially “stand alone” in a 
conceptual sense. 
 It is noteworthy that Fearon allows religious groups as long as they meet the first 
two conditions, i.e. membership based on descent and self-consciousness as a group. The 
                                                 
86 In response to the definitional problems resulting from vague everyday meaning of key concepts, some 
scholars argue for stipulating or legislating precise definitions of the concepts in question. Fearon and 
Laitin (2000) disagree. For them, it is important to be able to map the researcher’s concepts onto the 
ordinary language terms in which the hypothesis is originally expressed. Otherwise, it is very hard for 
researchers to give real-world examples of their statistically findings without slipping into ordinary 
language meanings of the variables. 
87 However, for many scholars, such as Chandra (2006), Horowitz (1985), and Young (1976), “we” is 
defined in part by “they.” Ethnicity is thus a comparative concept for many scholars. 
88 Developed by linguists and cognitive scientists, radical categories help people understand the meaning 
of a concept X. Less prototypical categories with fewer characteristics than radical categories may still be 
validly classed as Xs, at lease in some situations (Fearon 2003). 
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majority of the groups on Fearon’s list meet all the conditions quite well, with a few 
exceptions in Asia and Africa where the extent to which conditions of groupness or a 
sense of common identity are met are unclear. 
 
4.2.3.2 Alesina’s Index of Ethnic Fractionalization 
 Compared with the most demanding definition of (prototypical) ethnic groups 
Fearon (2003) provides (at least to my knowledge),89 Alesina et al. (2003) and Annett 
(2001) offer narrower definitions of ethnic groups in that they distinguish between 
multiple dimensions of ethnic differentiation. Alesina and his colleagues gather data on 
ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups (hereafter referred to as “Alesina data ” ). By 
ethnicity, they mean racial for the most part, and for the rest part, linguistic. For those 
countries whose ethnicity data largely reflects languages, such as many Sub-Saharan 
African and some European countries, including Belgium, Luxembourg, and Switzerland, 
these categorizations are in accordance with the judgment of ethnologists and 
anthropologists about the right definition of ethnicity in the countries. 
Although it is unclear how Alesina and his colleagues distinguish between ethnic 
and linguistic groups (Fearon 2003), their broader ethnic index is more context-sensitive 
and better represents the true divisions across countries than their purely linguistic index. 
Furthermore, few ethnic minorities in the world are religious groups and even fewer of 
them have only religious identities. In the MAR dataset, only 20 out of a total of 233 
ethnic groups belong to the category of militant sects.90 Militant sects represent 
communal groups whose political status and activities are centered on the defense of their 
                                                 
89 Because of his restrictive attention to groups comprising more than 1% of the population, Fearon’s data 
on ethnic groups is slightly less disaggregated than Alesina et al. (2003), however. 




religious beliefs. Among the 20 militant sects, only 8 groups define themselves solely or 
mainly by their religious beliefs (Gurr 1993). The statistics suggest that there exist so few 
“pure” religious groups in the world that using the index of religious fractionalization to 
do comparative studies will generally risk using an irrelevant dimension of ethnic 
diversity to account for the political behavior of interest. In sum, for the purpose of 
cross-national research, the Alesina data of ethnic fractionalization will in general be 
more useful than their indices of linguistic and religious fractionalization.91 
 
4.2.3.3 Annett’s Index of Ethnic Fractionalization 
 Annett (2001) collects his list of ethnolinguistic groups by the definition 
conceptually related to the widely used Soviet data on Atlas Narodov Mira.92 Taylor and 
Hudson (1972) summarized the Soviet data as the index of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization (often referred to as ELF).93 The Soviet team used mainly language to 
define groups, but sometimes used race and national origin as well. This common Eastern 
European assumption that language characterizes ethnicity results in a biased list of 
groups in some countries, such as in Latin America, where other cultural criteria mark 
ethnicity. Despite this similar weakness, the Annett data is privileged over the ELF index 
for the ELF data is by now, more than 40 years out-of-date, while the Annett data is 
                                                 
91 One major difference between the Fearon and the Alesina ethnic indices lies in the fact that Fearon 
allows religious groups in some conditions, while Alesina and his associates do not. 
92 Roeder (2001) also develops alternative estimates of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. He calculates the 
ELF in three different ways in his data for 1961 and 1985. Compared with Taylor and Hudson (and 
probably also with Alesina and his colleagues as well as Annett), Roeder is more consistent in deciding 
ethnic breakdowns. His consistent rules may not have that in its favor, that they will be less likely to help us 
find functionally equivalent groups, in that the issues with salience differ across countries. For the 
importance of locating functionally equivalent groups, please refer to the following discussion. This 
dissertation does not discuss Roeder’s indices in detail, given that both Roeder’s estimates and Annett’s 
estimates rely on the old ELF index to some extent and that these two estimates display much similarity 
with only a few exceptions for the sample of this dissertation. 




constructed based on sources that are 20 years more recent. 94 Moreover, the Annett 
index has a larger sample size than the ELF index (150 vs. 119 countries). For research 
doing time-series cross-sectional analyses with 1980s as the starting point of the data, like 
this dissertation, the Annett index arguably constitutes a better choice than the ELF index. 
 
4.2.3.4 Which is Better? 
These new indices of ethnic fractionalization that Fearon, Alesina and his colleagues, 
as well as Annett construct using different lists of ethnic groups have their own strengths 
and weaknesses. Both Alesina’s and Annett’s disaggregated indices outperform Fearon’s 
index in the respect of better capturing the presence of multidimensional ethnic identities 
in each polity. The other side of the coin is that Annett and Alesina and his colleagues 
“leave it up to the researcher to decide which measure she should employ, and they 
provide no guidance about how she should make this decision” (Posner 2004: 852). 
Scholars need to make a decision in this obvious trade-off between a choice that is easy 
but deviates from the social reality that ethnic identities are multidimensional, and a 
choice that is closer to the social reality but provides no guidance about which dimension 
of ethnicity is relevant in a specific state.95 
In terms of defining ethnic groups more clearly and in a way that better 
approximates to the features of socially relevant groups identified by people, Fearon does 
a better job, however. In their measures of ethnic diversity, Alesina and his associates 
focus mostly on race and Annett cares generally about language. Fearon constructs his 
                                                 
94 The Alesina and Fearon indices are also better than the ELF index in this respect of using more recent 
sources. For some, who are concerned about the problem of endogeneity, this may be considered a 
shortcoming. Please refer to the following discussion for more detail. 
95 I do not face this dilemma. As aforementioned, for most cases of my sample, the disaggregated measures 
of ethnic or ethnolinguistic fractionalization that Alesina and his colleagues as well as Annett provide serve 
as a better choice than their indices of religious and/or linguistic fractionalization. 
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data using the definition that better reflects what people in the country consider as the 
most socially relevant ethnic groups (Fearon 2003). He thus provides a better measure of 
social heterogeneity from the perspective of Norris (2002) that the distinctions used to 
differentiate ethnic identities and the salience of ethnic cleavages vary from one society 
to another, and that “for consistent comparison the aim was to identify the functionally 
equivalent groups across nations” (Norris 2002: 223). 
Some researchers may disagree if their objective is simply to assess the effects of 
different social cleavages (Fish and Brooks 2004). Moreover, the difference between 
Fearon’s and the other indices in terms of their capability to find functionally comparable 
groups may not be one in kinds, but rather one in degrees. Two reasons may explain why. 
First, while Alesina and his associates and Annett put different weight on language and 
race, they use both criteria to define ethnicity. As a result, they may collect quite similar 
lists of ethnic groups for quite a few countries.96 Most groups reckoned by race and 
language may be identified by descent as well. If so, there would be no significant 
difference distinguishing Fearon’s list of ethnic groups from others’. Second, all the 
indices suffer from the same potential mismatch between the measure and the mechanism 
of behavior that researchers use their data to investigate. Specifically, all the scholars 
discussed here, including Fearon who encode socially relevant ethnic groups, over-count 
politically irrelevant groups as ethnic. For example, while these scholars consider 
Sub-Saharan Africa considerably fractionalized with the mean values of ethnic 
fractionalization ranging between 0.66 and 0.71, Posner (2004) counts only politically 
relevant groups and gets a much lower mean value for this region of 0.38. 
                                                 




Because of these reasons, it is not surprising to find high correlations and broad 
similarity between these fractionalization indices (Alesina et al. 2002; Fearon 2003).97 
That being said, one should not ignore the differences between these indices without 
doing any robustness check, either. This dissertation will do sensitivity tests using all the 
three aforementioned indices to derive the effective number of ethnic groups, one by one, 
to see whether different indices result in different findings. 
 
4.2.3.5 The Way of Using these Indices 
 While not all the authors of the fractionalization indices make available the data 
about the population shares of each ethnic group on their lists, these indices help derive 
the effective number of ethnic groups. Despite the differences in the merits of each index, 









where sij is the share of group i (i=1…N) in country j. 
The logic behind this expression is to measure the probability that two randomly 
selected individuals from a population belong to different groups. However, the 
expression also conveys a rough idea about the effective number of ethnic groups. When 
there are two equal-sized groups, the fractionalization score is 0.5. Generally speaking, 
the larger the populations of an ethnic majority (or the largest group), the smaller the 
fractionalization score for a country. Fearon’s plots on ethnic structures show clear-cut 
regularity between a fractionalization score smaller than 0.61 and the presence of an 
ethnic majority. Because of this regularity, though unclear about the exact ethnic profiles 
                                                 




for each country, fractionalization indices tell us whether there is a majority group in a 
specific polity. Since the nonexistence of a majority group should correlate highly with 
the presence of more than two groups, I use 0.61 as the cut point to create a variable of 
Fractionalization with 0 and 1 indicating cases with two and more than two groups, 
respectively. 
Before discussing the last key variable, spatial distributions of ethnic groups, I 
should briefly explain why I take ethnicity (or connectedly the number of ethnic groups) 
as exogenous and why I make a change in the Alesina data. 
 
4.2.3.6 Endogeneity of Ethnicity as Social Constructions 
 Many scholars acknowledge ethnic groups as social constructions, which experience 
histories of growth and shrinkage, merge and separation (Laitin and Posner 2001; Herrera 
and Kapur 2005), and claim that, without justification, ethnic distinctions cannot be 
supposed to be fixed and completely exogenous to other theoretically relevant variables 
(Alesina et al. 2002; Fearon 2003). Some thus argue for the use of out-of-date ethnic 
fractionalization indices to get rid of the endogeneity problem. 
While safely exogenous, out-of-date indices have their own problem, i.e. what was 
measured bear little resemblance to the contemporary ethnic landscape whose effects are 
being investigated. Between the choices, endogenous vs. invalid data of ethnic 
fractionalization, it is likely that many scholars will choose the former. 
Furthermore, ethnic differentiation may shift over time, but fractionalization indices 
are generally taken as exogenous in most cross-national studies. In fact, group shares 
have remained considerably stable over time and changes have only a slight impact on 
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the measures (Alesina et al. 2002),98 as proved by Posner’s decade measures of 
fractionalization and my own estimates. 
Posner (2004), who views ethnicity as endogenous, encodes decade values for 
politically relevant ethnic groups in 42 African countries. Among them, 34 countries saw 
no variations in their fractionalization scores during 1960-1990, however. Of the 8 
countries whose fractionalization values did vary during that period of 30 years, only 3 
states experienced changes greater than 15%. I examine the group shares in each country 
on the World Factbook from 1985 to 2003, the time horizon of the main analyses in this 
dissertation, and reach a similar conclusion: ethnic breakdowns and group shares indeed 
display a high level of constancy. Given the shorter time period studied in this 
dissertation, only 19 years, my finding may not be surprising. Some scholars consider 
plausible that group shares stay constant at the 30 year horizon. 
Because of these reasons, it should be justifiable to use the fractionalization indices 
created more recently by Alesina et al. (2003), Annett (2001), as well as Fearon (2003), 
and take them as exogenous in my dissertation analyses. 
 
4.2.3.7 A Minor Modification to the Data of Alesina and his Associates 
These three indices of ethnic fractionalization are used in this dissertation almost 
without changes to avoid the temptation to modify the data in a way that makes them best 
support my theory.99 I revise none but the India’s score on the Alesina data, which 
                                                 
98 Descent-based attributes that define ethnic categories are, on average, difficult to change in the short 
term (Chandra 2006). Although individuals can change between identity categories by combining and 
recombining elements from their set of attributes differently, their choices are constrained. These two 
properties explain why constrained change can be legitimately associated with ethnic identities in the short 
term, why group shares have remained considerably stable over time, and why changes have only a slight 
impact on the measures of ethnic fractionalization. 
99 The temptation exists because there are a variety of plausible ways to divide a population into categories 
of identity (Fearon 2003). 
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counter-intuitively defines India as a highly homogenous state. I do so because of the 
following additional reason. 
While Alesina and his colleagues rely on racial differentiations to calculate India’s 
score of ethnic fractionalization, other scholars reject race as the most relevant dimension 
of India’s ethnic identity. Manor (1996) indicates that the most important ethnic identities 
in India are those based on religion and language. Fearon’s data and the MAR dataset 
support Manor’s view. All the groups but Sikhs on Fearon’s list for India have their own 
languages and are defined as linguistic groups in the CIA World Factbook.100 Among the 
9 minority groups of India on the MAR dataset,101 all except two, the Sikhs and 
Muslims,102 are defined either solely by language or by both language and religion. If 
India’s score of linguistic fractionalization is used, then India becomes a highly 
heterogeneous state. Even if religion represents the most important cleavage in Indian 
society, each of the religions has so many internal differences of practice and doctrine 
that any correct estimate of India’s religious fractionalization should lead to the same 
conclusion as when linguistic breakdowns are used (Manor 1996; Wilkinson 2003).103 I 
thus replace India’s score of ethnic fractionalization with that of linguistic 
fractionalization.104 
                                                 
100 Fearon’s list for India includes groups of Hindi speakers (39.9%), Bengali (8.22%), Telusu (7.8%), 
Marathi (7.38%), Tamil (6.26%), Gujarati (4.81%), Kannada (3.87%), Malayalam (3.59%), Oriya (3.32%), 
Punjabi (2.76%), Sikhs (2%), and Assamese (1.55%). 
101 They include Assamese, Bodos, Kashmiris, Mizos, Muslims, Nagas, Scheduled Tribes, Sikhs, and 
Tripuras. 
102 These two are religious groups according to the CIA World Factbook and Manor (1996). 
103 The internal differences of Hinduism also have their political relevance. Manor (1996) pointed out that 
one of the main impediments that prevent the Hindu party from becoming a parliamentary majority is 
traditional Hinduism, a fact that implies the inadequacy of treating Hinduism as a complete whole and the 
usual underestimation of the true level of religious fractionalization in India. 
104 There have been some quibbles about whether the concept of ethnicity should embrace groups 
differentiated by castes. Even if castes should be remained, India is still an ethnically heterogeneous state. 
For one thing, textbooks usually put the number of castes in contemporary India at between 6,000 and 
10,000 (Wilkinson 2003). For another, the government of India has officially documented castes and 
subcastes to determine those deserving reservation through the census. The government lists consist of 
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4.2.4 Ethnic Spatial Distributions 
The MAR dataset provides this group-specific variable. Group concentration takes 
on four possible values, with 0 = widely dispersed, 1 = primarily urban or minority in one 
region, 2 = majority in one region, others dispersed, and 3 = concentrated in one region. I 
have created a dummy variable of Concentration recoding the original values of 0 and 1 
into 0 as well as 2 and 3 into 1, with 0 and 1 representing dispersed and concentrated 
distributions, respectively. 
 
4.2.5 Control Variables 
In addition to these institutional and contextual variables of interest, I have 
controlled for other relevant factors. There are two dichotomous control variables. Any 
federal system receives a score of 1 on the variable of Federal system (0 otherwise).105 
Although there are diverse views about the effects of federalism (Nordlinger 1972; Gurr 
1993; Bunce 1999; Lijphart 1999; Nancy 2002), the empirical evidence of large-N studies 
suggests that the positive or non-effect view is correct (Cohen 1997, Saideman et al. 
2002).106 I thus expect that this variable will have a negative or zero coefficient in the 
statistical sense. 
A first election is coded as 1 for the year in which a country is having its first 
                                                                                                                                                 
scheduled castes (with 16% of the total population of India), scheduled tribes (7%) and other backward 
classes (32%). Using these figures to calculate India’s fractionalization index still qualify India for a 
ethnically heterogeneous state. 
105 Saideman and his associates (2002) provide me with the data of this variable. I double check the data 
with that on the Forum of Federations at www.forumfed.org, and find no problem. Saideman et al. (2002) 
coded federalism on the basis of whether substate units had substantial decision-making power. 
106 Saideman and his colleagues in fact anticipate different effects of federalism on violent and nonviolent 
ethnic conflict. Specifically, they expect that while “ethnic protest is more likely in systems characterized 
by federalism, ethnic rebellion is less likely in systems characterized by federalism” (Saideman et al. 2002: 
112). These notions seem plausible, but the data they use are about the intensity of conflict and, hence 
cannot help test their hypotheses. Institutions should have similar effects on the intensity of ethnic conflict. 
Please refer to Chapter 3 for details. I therefore hypothesize that federalism reduces the intensity of both 
violent and nonviolent ethnic conflict. 
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election and 0 for all the other years. Since the uncertainty regarding who will rule and 
the feeling of threat felt by ethnic groups are highest in first elections, we should expect a 
positive coefficient from this variable. I have constructed this variable based on Europa 
World, IFES’s Election Guide, Keesing’s Record of World Events, and World Factbook. 
Enduring regime, log GDP per capita, change in GDP per capita, 107 and 
differences indices are the other control factors. Enduring regime is coded as an indicator 
of polity durability based on the number of years since the last regime transition (defined 
by a three point change in the POLITY score) or since 1900 (whichever came last in 
time).108 Since (severe) ethnic conflict is more likely when regimes experience 
transitions, older regimes should reduce ethnic conflict vis-à-vis younger regimes 
(Saideman et al. 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003).  
Rich democracies have more resources as well as better overall financial, 
administrative, police, and military capabilities than poor countries to accommodate the 
demands of ethnic groups and to prevent insurgents from being able to survive and 
prosper. Therefore, richer countries with higher log GDP per capita tend to display lower 
levels of conflict (Saideman et al, 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Furthermore, because 
people are more likely to blame other groups for their distress in periods of economic 
decline, negative change in GDP per capita should lead to higher levels of conflict. 
It is generally argued that more political, economic, and cultural differentials 
between dominant and minority groups mean higher likelihoods of ethnic conflict (Gurr 
1993).109 The MAR dataset provides three differentials indices, The political differentials 
                                                 
107 The World Development Index Online at devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline provides these two 
economic variables. 
108 This variable comes from the Polity IV’s variable “durable.”  
109 Fish and Brooks (2004) provide empirical evidence that diversity does not necessarily hurt democracy, 
contrary to the common view. However, since their dependent variable is not ethnic conflict, it is unknown 
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index measures access to power and to civil service, recruitment, voting rights, etc. and 
ranges from no negative differentials (0) to serious differentials (4). The economic 
differentials index measures differentials in economic status and positions among groups, 
and ranges from a value of -2 for most advantaged groups to 4 for most disadvantaged 
groups. The cultural differentials index focuses on how distinct groups are in terms of 
their differences in ethnicity/nationality, language, religion, and the like, with higher 
values indicating more diversity. 
 Having discussed all the variables of interest and the control factors of this 
dissertation, I can now specify the models. 
 
4.3 Model Specifications 
 There are two types of government structures and electoral systems as well as two 
dichotomous contextual factors, so I should include 15 dummy variables in my model, 
with the constant representing the baseline category. The baseline category is the 
combination with all the four institutional and contextual factors = 0. I include only 14 
dummy variables, however. Because there are no dispersed groups who face multiple 
competitors and live under presidential-SMD systems in my sample (i.e. there are no 
cases with Concentration = 0, Fractionalization = 1, Parliamentary=0, and PR = 0), I 
should exclude the variable of Fractionalization from my model.110 
The following equation with the 14 variables of interest and 8 control factors 
represents the basic model in this dissertation for both violent and nonviolent ethnic 
conflict. 
                                                                                                                                                 
whether the same conclusion that diversity does not mean bad things can be reached. 
110 The facts that there are no observations with Concentration=0, Fractionalization=1, parliamentary=0, 
and PR=0, and that observations with all these four variables=0 represent the baseline category imply that 
the low-order coefficient of fractionalization cannot be estimated. 
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As I concluded in the earlier section, the Beck and Katz approach will be applied to 
analyze the stationary nonviolent ethnic conflict. However, if the problem of serial 
correlation remains, a between-effects model will replace the Beck and Katz approach. I 
will also perform a hierarchical model as a sensitivity test to avoid the Type I error. For 
nonstationary violent ethnic conflict, I will perform a ZIOP model to deal with the 
problem resulted from its excessive zero observations, in addition to a between-effects 
and a hierarchical model.  
When the Beck and Katz approach is used, a lagged dependent variable will be 
added to the right hand side of the above equation. The mean values of the variables of 
the equation become the covariates that I use when I perform a between-effects 
regression. 
 I will also perform the following hierarchical model as a sensitivity test to avoid the 
Type I error potentially caused by a between-effects model which neglects the nested 
structure of my dataset. Given that there are only 70 countries in my sample, I will use 
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The composite hierarchical model of these three equations almost equals the 
between-effects model. The only difference between them lies in the fact that there is a 
random intercept, ij ζ , in the hierarchical model. 
 The zero inflated ordered probit regression is more complicated. This method is new 
for the discipline and is worth a detailed discussion. I will do so and perform such a 
regression in Chapter 7. Before moving to Chapter 5, I should briefly discuss other 
sensitivity tests that I will do in order to ensure the robustness of my findings. 
 
4.4 Robustness Checks 
 I will do some robustness checks in Chapter 5 and some in Chapter 7 to test whether 
                                                 
111 If I have more states in my sample, I will use a model with not only a random intercept but also a 
random slope for the variable of Concentration. 
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there is endogeneity between political systems and conflict levels; whether dividing 
government structures into three categories, i.e. parliamentary, presidential, and 
semi-presidential systems, leads to different findings about the link between political 
systems and ethnic conflict; whether classifying some ambiguous cases as different 
government structures, or even excluding some of them from analysis changes my 
findings; whether excluding homogenous states from analysis results in different results; 
and whether treating ethnic conflict as an interval scale variable and ignoring my data’s 



















Chapter 5: Government Structures, Electoral Systems, and Ethnic Conflict— 
A Statistical Assessment 
 
 This chapter offers hypothesis tests about political systems’ impact. For the 
nonstationary rebellion data, I have performed a between effects and a hierarchical model. 
For the stationary protest data, the Beck and Katz approach has been applied. However, 
the problem of serial correlation still exists. A between-effects model has therefore 
replaced the Beck and Katz approach. A hierarchical model has also been performed to 
avoid the Type I error.112 
 The findings regarding the combined effects of government structures and electoral 
systems on the intensity of ethnic conflict are striking. Four findings stand out. First, 
presidential-PR systems generally provide a better preventive framework for addressing 
ethnic conflict for countries with two ethnic groups. Second, for countries with multiple 
ethnic groups, the only institutional configuration they need to avoid is a 
parliamentary-SMD system.113 These statistical findings are important because they 
counter the conventional wisdom that parliamentary-PR systems better handle inter-group 
relations, and better prevent the escalation of ethnic conflict than other systems. These 
findings prove that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to ethnic problems, and my 
dissertation helps provide institutional prescriptions that fit the needs of specific divided 
societies.  
 Third, institutions generally have similar but stronger effects on violent than on 
nonviolent ethnic conflicts. This finding suggests that ethnic conflicts, be it violent or 
                                                 
112 Please refer to Chapter 4 for details about why I perform these, instead of other, models, to test my 
hypotheses. 
113 Countries with multiple ethnic groups need to carefully design their presidential electoral systems if 
these countries want to use presidential-PR systems. Please refer to the discussion on the test result of 
Hypothesis 2a for details. 
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nonviolent, require the same preventive institutional arrangements. This implication 
provides good news to institutional designers whose countries have suffered from both 
types of ethnic conflict. Fourth, spatially concentrated groups become less combative 
when they have more say in policy-making. This finding contradicts many existing 
studies that assume a uniform conflict propensity of such groups, and highlights the 
importance of institutional engineering in ethnically divided societies. All of these four 
findings stand up to empirical analysis when using different models. 
 In this chapter, I first discuss the empirical evidence about the link between 
government structures, electoral systems, and violent ethnic conflict, i.e. anti-regime 
rebellion. I then discuss the statistical findings about a similar but weaker link between 
these political institutions and nonviolent ethnic conflict, i.e. anti-regime protest. I 
conclude this chapter with a section on robustness checks. 
 
5.1 Major Hypotheses 
 I reiterate the hypotheses about the institutional effects on violent rebellion to 
facilitate the discussion of my statistical findings. Institutions are expected to have similar, 
though weaker, effects on both violent and nonviolent ethnic conflict. I therefore do not 
repeat the hypotheses about the institutional impact on nonviolent protest. My theory 
expects the following hypotheses to be true. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: In cases involving a concentrated minority group facing only one 
opposition group, ceteris paribus, the expected level of violent rebellion is less 
intense in countries with presidential and PR systems than in countries with most, if 
not all, of the other institutional configurations. 
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 This hypothesis reflects the advantages of presidential-PR systems in such cases. 
This institutional configuration better prohibits one group from gaining total control of 
power because of checks and balances that its government structure promotes. 
Furthermore, the PR component of this institutional combination better guarantees a 
concentrated minority group higher proportionality of votes to seats. In sum, 
presidential-PR systems better maximize the sum of probabilities for ethnic minorities to 
influence policy-making than any other institutional configurations for cases which 
involve a concentrated minority group facing only one rival group. 
 
 Hypothesis 2a: In cases involving a concentrated minority group facing multiple  
 rival groups, ceteris paribus, the expected level of violent ethnic conflict is less 
 intense in countries with parliamentary-PR or with presidential-SMD systems than  
    in countries with the other institutional configurations. 
  
 In cases involving a concentrated minority group facing multiple ethnic others, 
parliamentary-PR and presidential-SMD systems are preferable because they increase the 
possibility that the groups in question either share both executive and legislative powers 
with other groups or check and balance one another. The other two types of systems, 
parliamentary-SMD and presidential-PR systems, have some flaws. Parliamentary-SMD 
systems are undesirable because these systems tend to favor only a few groups who join 
coalition cabinets at the expense of many others who do not. This tendency exists because 
the use of SMD systems in the presence of more than two groups in a state is likely to 
discourage proportionality of votes to seats. Fewer groups will have representatives in a 
parliament, and fewer parties will be needed for the formation and survival of a coalition 
 122 
 
cabinet. Consequently, fewer groups share both executive and legislative powers and feel 
secure in parliamentary-SMD systems. Presidential-PR systems are not preferable, either. 
Although PR systems ensure for concentrated groups fairer shares of seats, they tend to 
promote a fragmented parliament, which might cause a problem when presidential 
systems are in use. Specifically, ambitious presidents or semipresidents become dominant 
when they face such a weak, fragmented parliament. All the ethnic groups other than 
presidents’ coethnics feel powerless and insecure and, hence, are more likely to engage in 
more intense ethnic conflict. 
 Up to this point, the discussion has focused on cases involving concentrated groups. 
There are two possibilities for dispersed groups. First, what works best for concentrated 
groups also works best for dispersed groups, holding the number of ethnic others in a 
state and other relevant variables constant. Second, no particular institutions better 
furnish dispersed minorities with a sense of security, ceteris paribus. Dispersed minorities 
have neither legitimacy nor capability to fight for their rights; such groups are essentially 
more peaceful, and institutional design is simply irrelevant to them. The following two 
sets of competing hypotheses summarize these arguments. 
 
  Hypothesisalternative 3a: In cases involving a spatially dispersed minority group  
  facing only one opposition group, ceteris paribus, the expected level of violent  
  conflict is less intense in countries with presidential and PR systems than  
  in countries with most, if not all, of the other institutional configurations. 
Hypothesisnull 3a: In cases involving a spatially dispersed minority group facing only 
one opposition group, ceteris paribus, the expected level of violent conflict is neither 
less nor more intense in any countries. 
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Hypothesisalternative 4a: In cases involving a spatially dispersed minority group 
facing multiple rival groups, ceteris paribus, the expected level of violent conflict is 
less intense in countries with parliamentary-PR than in countries with 
presidential-PR or parliamentary-SMD systems. 
 Hypothesisnull 4a: In cases involving a spatially dispersed minority group facing 
multiple rival groups, ceteris paribus, the expected level of violent conflict is neither 
less nor more intense in any countries. 
 
Before testing these major hypotheses, I should reiterate briefly the effects of the 
control variables that I have discussed in Chapter 4. I expect that federalism reduces the 
intensity of ethnic conflict by providing segmental autonomy to ethnic groups, but some 
large-N studies fail to find supportive evidence. The estimate of federal system should 
therefore be negative or zero. Enduring Regime measures regime duration. This variable 
should negatively relate to the levels of ethnic strife because severe conflict is more likely 
when regimes experience transitions. First election should have a positive coefficient 
because the uncertainty regarding who will rule and the feeling of threat felt by ethnic 
groups are highest in first elections. Poor countries have less resources and lower 
capabilities to accommodate the demands of ethnic groups and to prevent insurgents from 
being able to survive and prosper. Furthermore, in periods of economic decline, people 
are more likely to blame other groups for their distress. Lower levels of GDP per capita 
and negative change in GDP per capita should therefore lead to higher levels of conflict. 
Finally, since more political, economic, and cultural differentials between dominant and 




Table 5.1: The Expected and Estimated Relations 
between Control Variables and Ethnic Conflict 










Federal system - or 0 -, -, + -,- +, +, + +, +, + 
Enduring regime - +*, +, + +*, + +, +, + +, +, + 
First election + +, +, + +, + -, -, - -, -, - 
Log GDP per capita - -**, -*, -* -***, -* -, -, - -, +, - 
Change in GDP per capita - +*, +, +* +*, + -, +, - +, +, + 
Politiacl differentials + +*, +*, +* +, + +, +, + +, +, + 
Economic differentials + -, -, - -, - +, -, + +, -, + 
Cultural differentials + +, +, + +, + +, +, + +*, +**, +** 
Note: BEM and HLM stand for between-effects and hierarchical linear models, respectively. 
Every variable in the between-effects model has three estimates because three indices of 
ethnic fractionalization have been used in turn in performing the analysis. The first, second, 
and third estimated signs associated with each variable are the ones that have been obtained 
when Alesina et al’s, Fearon’s, and Annett’s fractionalization variables were used, 
respectively. Every variable in the hierarchical models for the rebellion data has only two 
estimated signs, however. When Fearon’s fractionalization score is employed, there remains 
no meaningful variation in the state-level model and, hence, no need to specify additional 
random factor and perform a hierarchical model. Consequently, only the other two indices 
are useded in the analysis of hierarchical models. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed 
tests.  
 





5.2 The Results about Control Variables 
I discuss the multivariate estimates of these control variables briefly because they 
are not the focus of this dissertation. Table 5.1 summarizes the expected and estimated 
relations between theses variables and violent and nonviolent ethnic conflict. Exact 
coefficients can be found on Tables 5.2, 5.11, 5. 21, and 5.30. Table 5.1 shows that  
between-effects and hierarchical models generally produce similar results, suggesting that 
the type I error does not constitute a particular concern when estimating these control 
variables’ impact.  
Only a few control variables have significant effects on rebellion. These variables 
include enduring regime, log GDP per capita, change in GDP per capita, and political 
differentials. As anticipated, ethnic groups in richer countries engage in less intense 
rebellion. Ethnic minorities with more access to power and to civil service, recruitment 
and voting rights are also likely to conflict more severely against their regimes. This 
variable of Political differentials loses statistical significance after additional random 
factor is included in analysis, however. Contrary to my expectation, ethnic groups in 
short-lived regimes and in periods of economic decline tend to engage in less serious 
rebellion.114 These two variables are significant only when some indices of ethnic 
fractionalization are used, so there is no conclusive evidence of these factors’ impact. 
Almost no control variables significantly affect the intensity of protest. Only when 
performing a hierarchical model does the coefficient of cultural differentials become 
significant. Consistent with my expectation, the more culturally distinct minority groups 
are from dominant groups, the more intensely minorities protest against their regimes. 
                                                 
114 One reason may explain why enduring regimes experience more intense rebellion than young 
democracies. Because new democracies may represent ethnic groups’ peaceful settlement of disputes, less 
severe rebellion erupts in younger democracies. As a regime gets older, ethnic groups may become 
disenchanted with the systems and fight more intensely and violently against their regimes (Gurr 2000). 
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Table 5.2: Between-Effects Model: Rebellion, 1985-2003 
 
Variable 
Alesina et al. 
   b       SE 
Fearon 
b       SE 
Annett 
b      SE 
Single Term       
PAR -.07 .62 .14 .56 .01 .62 
PR -.17 .62 -.11 .59 -.07 .63 
Con .84 .57 .83 .54 .78 .57 
Interactive Term       
PAR*PR .11 .93 -.19 .85 -.11 .93 
PAR*Frac .29 .75 -.55 1.26 .23 .75 
PAR*Con -.50 .87 -.82 .73 -.39 .88 
PR*Frac -.26 .98 -.23 .94 -.47 .83 
PR*Con -.57 .74 -.53 .71 -.81 .77 
Frac*Con -1.06** .51 -.84* .49 -.38 .50 
PAR*PR*Frac -.02 1.45 .93 1.77 .32 1.36 
PAR*PR*Con 1.54 1.28 1.91* 1.13 1.79 1.30 
PAR*Frac*Con 2.11** 1.06 3.61** 1.43 1.49 1.06 
PR*Frac*Con 1.51 1.17 1.29 1.12 1.52 1.06 
PAR*PR*Frac*Con -3.43* 1.83 -5.31** 2.07 -3.62** 1.77 
Control Variable       
Federal system -.36 .29 -.14 .26 .27 .29 
Enduring regime .01* .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 
First election .69 .92 .59 .89 .25 .90 
Log GDP per capita -.29** .12 -.22* .12 -.23* .12 
Change in GDP per capita 8.43* 5.11 7.49 4.79 8.97* 5.12 
Political differentials  .17* .10 .17* .10 .18* .10 
Economic differentials -.02 .08 -.04 .08 -.04 .08 
Cultural differentials .10 .11 .07 .10 .14 .11 
Constant 1.79 1.17 1.31 1.14 1.15 1.20 
R-squared: Between 
N of Groups 
White, 2χ  
.31 
171 







Note: PAR, PR, Con, and Frac stand for parliamentary systems, proportional 
representation systems, group concentration, and ethnic fractionalization, respectively. 
White: White test for heteroskedasticity. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
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After discussing the coefficients of these control variables, I can now proceed to 
examine the empirical evidence about the link between government structures, electoral 
systems, and rebellion. 
 
5.3 The Results about Primary Variables 
 It has been known that when a statistical model includes interactive terms, the 
statistical significance of the lower-order coefficients is largely unimportant (Braumoeller 
2004). Table 5.2 presents the results of a between-effects model using the levels of 
rebellion as the dependent variable. The table shows that only a few of the primary 
variables of this paper (be it an interactive term or not) significantly affect the levels of 
rebellion. The important question, however, is whether the marginal effects of 
institutional configurations are significant given a certain ethnic context. 
 
5.3.1 The Impact of Political Systems on Rebellion 
5.3.1.1 Concentrated Groups Facing One Rival Group 
Table 5.3 presents the predicted rebellion levels of each political system in cases 
involving concentrated groups facing only one rival group. In this chapter, all the control 
variables are held at their sample means in the calculation of any predicted value. As 
expected, in cases involving concentrated groups facing only one rival group, states using 
presidential-PR systems generally have the lowest levels of rebellion. The only exception 
arises when using Fearon’s fractionalization scores. Presidential-PR systems become 
inferior to parliamentary-SMD systems by being associated with more intense conflict. 
The difference is only 5% and is statistically insignificant, however. 
Table 5.4 presents the test results of the marginal combined effects of government 
 128 
 
Table 5.3: Predicted Levels of Rebellion 
in Cases Involving Concentrated Groups Facing One Rival Group 
(Between-Effects Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Fearon Annett 
























Note: Types in gray areas represent appropriate institutions for this specific context. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Table 5.4: Marginal Combined Effects of Political Institutions  
in Cases Involving Concentrated Groups Facing One Rival Group 
 
Marginal Effects 
Alesina et al. 
   d       F 
Fearon 
   d       F 
Annett 
   d       F 
Type 2 vs. Type 1 -1.08 3.64** -1.03 3.80** -1.30 4.85** 
Type 2 vs. Type 3 -0.17 0.07 0.05 0.01 -0.49 0.54 
Type 2 vs. Type 4 -0.74 2.96** -0.64 2.35* -0.88 3.44** 
Note: d stands for the differences between Type 2 and the other types, and is calculated 
by subtracting the predicted rebellion levels of the other types, one by one, from that of 
Type 2. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 1-tailed tests. 
 
structures and electoral systems. All save one result are in accordance with the 
expectation of my theory. In cases involving concentrated groups facing only one rival 
group, presidential-PR systems uniformly outperform parliamentary-PR and 
presidential-SMD systems in managing ethnic conflict. Specifically, concentrated groups 
who face only one opposition group and whose countries change their institutions from 
parliamentary-PR to presidential-PR systems will be associated with 74%-97% lower 
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levels of rebellion, on average. The same groups will be connected with an average of 
63%-96% lower degrees of violent conflict if the pre-reform systems of their countries 
are presidential-SMD systems. The difference between presidential-PR and 
parliamentary-SMD systems is statistically insignificant, however, although numerically 
presidential-PR systems generally outperform parliamentary-SMD systems. In sum, these 
findings provide strong evidence for Hypothesis 1a. In cases involving a concentrated 
minority group facing only one opposition group, ceteris paribus, the expected level of 
violent rebellion is less intense in countries with presidential and PR systems than in 
countries with most, if not all, of the other institutional configurations. 
 
5.3.1.2 Concentrated Groups Facing Multiple Rival Groups 
Table 5.5 presents the predicted rebellion levels of each political system in cases 
involving concentrated groups coexisting with multiple ethnic others. Rebellion tends to 
be least severe either in parliamentary-PR systems (when using Annett’s data) or in 
presidential-SMD systems (when using Alesina et al.’s and Fearon’s variables). 
According to Hypothesis 2a, these two types are the ones which provide the highest level 
of power sharing to concentrated minority groups who compete for power with many 
other ethnic groups. 
Table 5.6 presents the test results of these political systems’ marginal effects in cases 
involving the ethnic groups in question. The results provide supportive evidence for 
Hypothesis 2a to a lesser extent. On the one hand, parliamentary-PR and 
presidential-SMD systems uniformly outperform parliamentary-SMD systems. 
Specifically, concentrated groups who face multiple rival groups and whose countries 
change their political institutions from parliamentary-SMD systems to parliamentary-PR 
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Table 5.5: Predicted Levels of Rebellion 
in Cases Involving Concentrated Groups Facing Multiple Rival Groups 
(Between-Effects Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Fearon Annett 
























Note: Types in gray areas represent appropriate institutions for this specific context. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Table 5.6: Marginal Combined Effects of Political Institutions  
in Cases Involving Concentrated Groups Facing Multiple Rival Groups 
 
Marginal Effects 
Alesina et al. 
   d       F 
Fearon 
   d       F 
Annett 
   d       F 
Type 5 vs. Type 6 0.02  0.00 -0.30 0.18 -0.29 0.20 
Type 5 vs. Type 7 -1.29  3.76** -2.26 9.57*** -1.45 4.64** 
Type 8 vs. Type 6 -0.52  0.99 -0.42 0.74 -0.19 0.15 
Type 8 vs. Type 7 -1.83 10.12*** -2.38 17.17*** -1.35 6.00*** 
Note: d is calculated by subtracting the predicted rebellion level of a theoretically 
undesirable system (i.e. Types 6 and 7) from that of a desirable one (i.e. Types 5 and 8). 
***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 1-tailed tests. 
 
systems will be associated with a 68%-89% decrease in their rebellion levels, on average. 
Changing from parliamentary-SMD systems to presidential-SMD systems corresponds to 
an even higher reduction, i.e. 71%-96%, in the intensity of these groups’ rebellion. On the 
other hand, these two desirable systems, parliamentary-PR and presidential-SMD systems, 
do not perform better than presidential-PR systems. On the contrary, presidential-PR 
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systems manage ethnic rebellion equally well as the two desirable systems and 
outperform parliamentary-SMD systems.115 
Examining the presidential electoral systems in states using presidential-PR systems 
helps unravel this unexpected no differences between parliamentary-PR and 
presidential-SMD systems on the one hand and presidential-PR systems on the other hand. 
Some countries, such as Kenya,116 require special distributions of presidential votes 
across regions for a candidate to win the presidency. Other countries, such as Philippine, 
hold separate elections for presidents and vice presidents. Still others with multiple ethnic 
groups elect their presidents by a run-off electoral system, which helps pick a majority 
winner instead of a mere plurality one. Examples include Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Ghana, Indonesia, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Peru, and Senegal.117  
Some may question the desirability of majority-run-off systems in that Horowitz 
recommends vote-pooling AV systems as better alternatives to facilitate moderate ethnic 
politics. Both systems generate similar practical effects, however (Fishburn 1986; Wright 
1986; Lijphart 2002).118 In fact, the two systems are virtually identical if only one 
candidate is to be elected and if there are only two or three viable candidates among the 
nominees (Fishburn 1986). These two conditions usually hold in presidential elections 
where the fact that only one candidate wins leads to the presence of only two or three 
                                                 
115 The difference between presidential-PR and parliamentary-SMD systems in terms of their effects is 
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level when Alesina et al’s and Fearon’s fractionalization 
variables are used. When Annett’s data is employed, the significance level is 95%.  
116 In addition to receiving the largest number of votes in absolute terms, Kenya’s presidential candidates 
must also win 25% or more of the votes in at least five of Kenya’s seven provinces and one area to avoid a 
run-off. 
117 The constitution of the republic of Senegal even stipulates that candidates may not campaign 
predominately on ethnic or regional groups. Arguably, this clause helps improve ethnic relations. 
118 Some might think that using a preferential AV system would give voter higher satisfaction by permitting 
parties with similar policies and voters to nominate or support their own candidates without risk assisting 
the election of candidates of rival parties. This turns out not to be the case, however. In the AV elections in 
Australia, for example, usually 40% and 50% of the total voters do not see the election of the candidates 
they support (Wright 1986). 
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viable competitors. Regardless, all these electoral rules employed in states using 
presidential systems and having multiple ethnic groups somehow constrain a president’s 
incentives to take care of only the needs of his group to the extent that hurts the interests 
of ethnic others, and encourage a president to propose more encompassing and 
accommodative platforms. 
One way to directly test this notion is to add presidential electoral systems and all 
the consequent multiplicative terms into the model, but this will cost about additional 7 
degrees of freedom. Worse yet is the fact that the presidential electoral systems in 
presidential regimes with multiple ethnic groups have almost no variations, making their 
impact hard to be estimated. 
In sum, as expected from Hypothesis 2a, Parliamentary-PR and presidential-SMD 
systems uniformly outperform parliamentary-SMD systems in cases involving 
concentrated groups facing multiple rival groups. Contrary to my expectation, 
presidential-PR systems perform equally well as the two desirable systems. The fact that 
heterogeneous states using presidential-PR systems employ presidential electoral systems 
which promote presidents’ incentives to be more encompassing and accommodative 
explains this unexpected finding. Parliamentary-SMD systems have proved to be the least 
desirable and the worst preventive institutional frameworks in the cases in question. 
 
5.3.1.3 Dispersed Groups 
Tables 5.7 and 5.9 show that in cases involving spatially dispersed ethnic groups, 
ethnic rebellion tends to be relatively mild, despite which political systems are in use. 
This empirical pattern is in accordance with Hypothesisnull 3a and Hypothesisnull 4a. 
These hypotheses are derived from the notion that dispersed groups are so essentially 
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peaceful that they will not fight severely against their regimes no matter which political 
systems their states adopt. 
Another pattern can be found in Tables 5.7 and 5.9, however. This pattern gives 
credence to Hypothesisalternative 3a and Hypothesisalternative 4a, i.e. what works best for 
concentrated groups seem to work best for dispersed groups as well, controlling for the 
number of rival groups they face. Specifically, countries using presidential-PR systems 
appear to experience lowest or second lowest levels of rebellion in cases involving 
dispersed groups facing only one rival group. Parliamentary-PR and presidential-PR 
systems generally outperform parliamentary-SMD systems in cases involving dispersed 
groups facing multiple other groups. In these cases, no states use presidential-SMD 
systems, so the effect of this theoretically desirable system cannot be evaluated. 
Which empirical pattern receives statistical significance? The test results of Tables 
5.8 and 5.10 lead to a sweeping conclusion that institutions do not affect the conflict 
propensity of spatially dispersed groups. This statistical evidence is consistent with 
Hypothesisnull 3a and Hypothesisnull 4a.  
These findings are important in two ways. First, my analysis confirms the need to 
control for the ethnic contexts when investigating the effects of political systems. If we 
ignore these crucial contextual factors, we will be very likely to obtain biased or even  
insignificant estimates about the effects of institutions. For example, if ethnic groups 
were not divided into two categories according to their spatial distributions, I might have 
mistakenly concluded that institutions do not matter at all. The no effects of institutions in 
cases involving dispersed groups might dilute the significant effects of institutions in 
cases involving concentrated groups, to the extent that the significant effects become 
insignificant. Second, although groups serve as the unit of analysis, my findings 
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Table 5.7: Predicted Levels of Rebellion 
in Cases Involving Dispersed Groups Facing One Rival Group 
(Between-Effects Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Fearon Annett 
























Note: Types in gray areas represent potentially appropriate institutions for this specific 
context. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Table 5.8: Marginal Combined Effects of Political Institutions 
in Cases Involving Dispersed Groups Facing One Rival Group 
 
Marginal Effects 
Alesina et al. 
   d       F 
Fearon 
   d       F 
Annett 
   d       F 
Type 10 vs. Type 9 -0.04 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.10 0.03 
Type 10 vs. Type 11 -0.10 0.04 -0.24 0.27 -0.08 0.02 
Type 10 vs. Type 12 -0.17 0.08 -0.11 0.03 -0.07 0.01 
Note: d stands for the differences between Type 10 and the other types, and is calculated 
by subtracting the predicted rebellion levels of the other types, one by one, from that of 
Type 10. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 1-tailed tests. 
 
provide implications for the institutional engineering of ethnically divided societies. 
Since different institutions do not make a difference in reducing spatially dispersed 
groups’ conflict propensity, ethnically divided countries can design institutions based on 





Table 5.9: Predicted Levels of Rebellion 
in Cases Involving Dispersed Groups Facing Multiple Rival Groups 
(Between-Effects Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Fearon Annett 


















Note: Types in gray areas represent potentially appropriate institutions for this specific 
context. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Table 5.10: Marginal Combined Effects of Political Institutions  
in Cases Involving Dispersed Groups Facing Multiple Rival Groups 
 
Marginal Effects 
Alesina et al. 
   d       F 
Fearon 
   d       F 
Annett 
   d       F 
Type 13 vs. Type 14 0.32 0.09 0.32 0.09 0.44 0.23 
Type 13 vs. Type 15 -0.33 0.15 0.40 0.08 -0.33 0.14 
* Note: d is calculated by subtracting the predicted rebellion level of a theoretically 
undesirable system (i.e. Type 13) from that of a desirable one (i.e. Types 14 and 15). 
***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 1-tailed tests. 
 
5.3.1.4 Robustness Check 1 
The dataset is essentially nested (with ethnic groups nested in countries), however. To 
avoid the inflation rate of rejecting a null hypothesis that is true, I test for robustness with 
respect to the presence of multiple random factors. Given that 18 out of 22 independent 
variables involve country-level factors (13 out of 18 are the primary variables of interest) 
and that there are only 70 countries, it can be expected that the estimates will not be very 
precise. 
Table 5.11 presents the estimates of the hierarchical model using rebellion as the 
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Table 5.11: Hierarchical Linear Model: Rebellion, 1985-2003 
 
Variable 
Alesina et al. 
b          SE 
Annett 
b          SE 
Fixed Effects:     
Single Term     
PAR -.10 .64 .05 .67 
PR -.22 .63 -.01 .65 
Con .92* .56 .85 .55 
Interactive Term     
PAR*PR .29 .95 -.01 .98 
PAR*Frac .38 .79 .45 .81 
PAR*Con -.17 .87 -.02 .87 
PR*Frac -.35 .98 -.71 .84 
PR*Con -.64 .73 -.88 .75 
Frac*Con -1.17** .56 -.20 .59 
PAR*PR*Frac -.25 1.48 .07 1.42 
PAR*PR*Con 1.04 1.27 1.22 1.28 
PAR*Frac*Con 1.58 1.09 .53 1.11 
PR*Frac*Con 1.75 1.18 1.65 1.10 
PAR*PR*Frac*Con -2.84 1.83 -2.71 1.78 
Control Variable     
Federal system -.31 .32 -.21 .34 
Enduring regime .01* .00 .01 .00 
First election .53 1.04 .04 1.11 
Log GDP per capita -.34*** .13 -.26* .14 
Change in GDP per capita 9.18* 5.61 9.49 5.91 
Political differentials  .15 .10 .15 .10 
Economic differentials -.03 .08 -.05 .08 
Cultural differentials .08 .11 .11 .11 
Constant 2.33* 1.23 1.51 1.32 
Variance Components: 
Country-Level ( 00τ ) 













Note: PAR, PR, Con, and Frac stand for parliamentary systems, proportional 
representation systems, group concentration, and ethnic fractionalization, respectively. 
Table entries are REML estimates. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
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Table 5.12: Predicted Levels of Rebellion 
in Cases Involving Concentrated Groups Facing One Rival Group 
(Hierarchical Linear Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Annett 
















Note: Types in gray areas represent appropriate institutions for this specific context. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Table 5.13: Marginal Combined Effects of Political Institutions 
in Cases Involving Concentrated Groups Facing One Rival Group 
 
Marginal Effects 
Alesina et al. 
     d           2χ  
Annett 
     d           2χ  
Type 2 vs. Type 1 -1.06 3.31** -1.23 4.07*** 
Type 2 vs. Type 3 -0.60 0.82 -0.92 1.82* 
Type 2 vs. Type 4 -0.86 3.69** -0.89 3.04** 
Note: d stands for the differences between Type 2 and the other types, and is calculated 
by subtracting the predicted rebellion levels of the other types, one by one, from that of 
Type 2. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 1-tailed tests. 
 
dependent variable. The coefficients obtained from using Fearon’s fractionalization index 
to perform the model are not shown. Because there remains no meaningful variation in 
the state-level model when Fearon’s variable is used, there is no need to specify 
additional random factor when such a variable is included in analysis. 
Table 5.12 presents the predicted rebellion levels of political systems in cases 
involving concentrated groups facing only one rival group. As Table 5.12 shows, 
 138 
 
presidential-PR systems still outperform all the other systems in reducing the intensity of 
ethnic conflict after the nested data structure is taken into consideration. 
The test results of Table 5.13 confirm mostly the statistical significance of this 
empirical pattern. The finding verifies the robustness of my conclusion that in cases 
involving a concentrated minority group facing only one rival group, ceteris paribus, 
presidential-PR systems better prevent the escalation of ethnic conflict than most of the 
other institutional configurations. Using Annett’s index of ethnic fractionalization reach 
an even stronger conclusion that presidential-PR systems outperform all the other 
systems in the cases in question, if one were willing to accept a result significant at a 90% 
confidence level in 1-tailed tests. 
 
5.3.1.5 Robustness Check 2 
Table 5.14 presents the predicted rebellion levels of political systems in cases 
involving concentrated groups facing multiple rival groups. Rebellion still tends to be 
most severe in parliamentary-SMD systems, after the nested data structure is taken into 
consideration. 
The test results of Table 5.15 again confirm the robustness of what I concluded:  
In accordance with my theory, Parliamentary-PR and presidential-SMD systems 
uniformly outperform parliamentary-SMD systems in cases involving concentrated 
groups facing multiple ethnic others. The unexpected, significant difference between 
presidential-PR systems and parliamentary-SMD systems is not shown on Table 5.15. 
This unexpected finding suggests that heterogeneous states using presidential-PR systems 
can prevent more severe rebellion from happening similarly well as the two desirable 
systems. States interested in using presidential-PR systems should design their 
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Table 5.14: Predicted Levels of Rebellion 
in Cases Involving Concentrated Groups Facing Multiple Rival Groups 
(Hierarchical Linear Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Annett 
















Note: Types in gray areas represent appropriate institutions for this specific context. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Table 5.15: Marginal Combined Effects of Political Institutions  
in Cases Involving Concentrated Groups Facing Multiple Rival Groups 
 
Marginal Effects 
Alesina et al. 
     d           2χ  
Annett 
     d           2χ  
Type 5 vs. Type 6 -0.06 0.01 -0.43 0.36 
Type 5 vs. Type 7 -1.22 2.82** -1.39 3.17** 
Type 8 vs. Type 6 -0.53 0.90 -0.05 0.01 
Type 8 vs. Type 7 -1.69 7.25*** -1.01 2.49* 
Note: d is calculated by subtracting the predicted rebellion level of a theoretically 
undesirable system (i.e. Types 6 and 7) from that of a desirable one (i.e. Types 5 and 8). 
***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 1-tailed tests. 
 
presidential electoral systems carefully in order to promote presidents’ incentives to take 
care of the interests of all the ethnic groups. 
 
5.3.1.6 Robustness Check 3 
Table 5.16 and Table 5.18 show that taking into consideration the presence of the 
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state-level random factor does not change the empirical patterns about the effects of 
political institutions, either. There are two patterns. First, in cases involving dispersed 
ethnic groups, ethnic rebellion tends to be less severe across-the-board. Second, 
presidential-PR systems better reduce the levels of dispersed groups’ rebellion if these 
groups face one rival group. In cases involving dispersed groups facing multiple ethnic 
others, ethnic rebellion tend to be more severe in parliamentary-SMD systems. 
These differences between the effects of political systems have been proved to be 
insignificant, however, as the test results of Table 5.17 and Table 5.19 show. I can 
therefore reach to the same conclusion: Ethnic contexts must be part of any studies which 
investigate the effects of institutions on ethnic conflict. Furthermore, since institutions do 
not affect dispersed groups’ conflict tendency, ethnically divided countries can design 
institutions based on only the needs of concentrated ethnic groups. 
In sum, the test results of hierarchical models show that the conclusions I made 
about the effects of political systems remain the same, confirming the robustness of my 
findings. In the following section, I discuss the statistical evidence about a similar but 














Table 5.16: Predicted Levels of Rebellion 
in Cases Involving Dispersed Groups Facing One Rival Group 
(Hierarchical Linear Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Annett 
















Note: Types in gray areas represent potentially appropriate institutions for this specific 
context. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Table 5.17: Marginal Combined Effects of Political Institutions 
in Cases Involving Dispersed Groups Facing One Rival Group 
 
Marginal Effects 
Alesina et al. 
     d           2χ  
Annett 
     d           2χ  
Type 10 vs. Type 9 -0.19 0.09 -0.04 0.00 
Type 10 vs. Type 11 -0.12 0.06 -0.06 0.01 
Type 10 vs. Type 12 -0.22 0.12 -0.01 0.00 
Note: d stands for the differences between Type 10 and the other types, and is calculated 
by subtracting the predicted rebellion levels of the other types, one by one, from that of 










Table 5.18: Predicted Levels of Rebellion 
in Cases Involving Dispersed Groups Facing Multiple Rival Groups 
(Hierarchical Linear Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Annett 












Note: Types in gray areas represent potentially appropriate institutions for this specific 
context. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Table 5.19: Marginal Combined Effects of Political Institutions  
in Cases Involving Dispersed Groups Facing Multiple Rival Groups 
 
Marginal Effects 
Alesina et al. 
     d           2χ  
Annett 
     d           2χ  
Type 13 vs. Type 14 0.33 0.10 0.56 0.34 
Type 13 vs. Type 15 -0.54 0.35 -0.66 0.51 
Note: d is calculated by subtracting the predicted rebellion level of a theoretically 
undesirable system (i.e. Type 13) from that of a desirable one (i.e. Types 14 and 15). 
***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 1-tailed tests. 
 
Table 5.20 displays the coefficients of pooled, time-series cross-sectional analysis of 
protest with panel-corrected standard errors, using ethnic protest at the dependent 
variable. The regression of the residuals on the lagged residuals indicates that my 
empirical results are not free of autocorrelation, making the estimates of Table 5.20 
suspicious. I therefore substitute a between-effects regression for time-series 





Table 5.20: Pooled, Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analyses of Protest, 1985-2003 
 
Variable 
Alesina et al. 
   b       SE 
Fearon 
b       SE 
Annett 
b      SE 
Primary Variable       
PAR -.06 .11 .05 .10 -.06 .11 
PR -.25** .10 -.24** .11 -.22** .10 
Con .12 .09 .12 .09 .10 .10 
PAR*PR .21 .13 .10 .14 .18 .16 
PAR*Frac .45*** .16 .58** .28 .45*** .61 
PAR*Con -.15 .18 -.14 .16 -.13 .18 
PR*Frac .14 .14 .10 .15 -.14 .26 
PR*Con .08 .14 .07 .14 .06 .14 
Frac*Con -.28* .16 -.24 .16 -.13 .15 
PAR*PR*Frac -.60* .31 -.69* .39 -.32 .40 
PAR*PR*Con .33 .27 .29 .25 .34 .27 
PAR*Frac*Con .07 .20 -.22 .30 -.07 .19 
PR*Frac*Con .23 .22 .25 .21 .35 .25 
PAR*PR*Frac*Con -.40 .45 -.19 .43 -.51 .43 
Control Variable       
Lagged Protest .62*** .06 .62*** .06 .62*** .06 
Federal system -.01 .10 .06 .08 -.02 .09 
Enduring regime .00** .00 .00 .00 .00** .00 
First election -.01 .14 -.02 .14 -.02 .13 
Log GDP per capita -.03 .02 -.02 .03 -.02 .02 
Change in GDP per capita -.99** .49 -.99** .49 -.95** .48 
Political differentials  .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 
Economic differentials .02 .02 .01 .02 .02 .02 
Cultural differentials .09*** .03 .10*** .03 .10*** .03 
Constant .47* .26 .39 .27 .43* .26 
R-squared 
N of Observations 










Note: PAR, PR, Con, and Frac stand for parliamentary systems, proportional 
representation systems, group concentration, and fractionalization, respectively. 
***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
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Table 5.21: Between-Effects Model: Protest, 1985-2003 
 
Variable 
Alesina et al. 
   b       SE 
Fearon 
b       SE 
Annett 
b      SE 
Single Term       
PAR -.02 .50 .20 .48 -.05 .50 
PR -.47 .50 -.44 .50 -.39 .51 
Con .41 .46 .38 .46 .38 .46 
Interactive Term       
PAR*PR .17 .75 -.00 .72 .13 .75 
PAR*Frac  1.04* .60 1.42 1.07 1.08* .61 
PAR*Con -.66 .70 -.48 .62 -.64 .71 
PR*Frac .23 .79 .13 .80 -.42 .67 
PR*Con -.01 .60 .01 .60 -.07 .62 
Frac*Con -.39 .41 -.34 .41 -.36 .40 
PAR*PR*Frac -1.30 1.17 -1.78 1.50 -.74 1.10 
PAR*PR*Con 1.49 1.03 1.13 .96 1.52 1.05 
PAR*Frac*Con -.15 .86 -1.15 1.21 -.18 .86 
PR*Frac*Con .82 .94 .86 .95 1.27 .86 
PAR*PR*Frac*Con -.73 1.48 .58 1.76 -1.10 1.43 
Control Variable       
Federal system .14 .23 .27 .22 .09 .23 
Enduring regime .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
First election -.62 .73 -.61 .74 -.60 .72 
Log GDP per capita -.02 .10 -.03 .10 -.03 .10 
Change in GDP per capita -1.08 4.13 .03 4.07 -1.00 4.15 
Political differentials  .09 .08 .11 .08 .08 .08 
Economic differentials .03 .07 -.01 .06 .02 .07 
Cultural differentials .13 .09 .13 .09 .14 .09 
Constant .96 .94 1.05 .97 1.07 .97 
R-squared: Between 
n. of Groups 
White, 2χ  
.21 
171 
138.02 (d.f.: 147) 
.19 
171 




Note: PAR, PR, Con, and Frac stand for parliamentary systems, proportional 
representation systems, group concentration, and ethnic fractionalization, respectively. 
White: White test for heteroskedasticity. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
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5.3.2 The Impact of Political Systems on Protest 
5.3.2.1 Concentrated Groups Facing One Rival Group 
Table 5.22 presents the predicted levels of protest in cases involving concentrated 
groups facing only one rival group. Presidential-PR systems outperform almost all the 
other systems. The test results of Table 5.23, however, show that presidential-PR systems 
significantly outperform only parliamentary-PR systems. Specifically, concentrated 
groups who face only one opposition group and whose countries change their institutions 
form parliamentary-PR to presidential-PR systems will be related to 38%-42% lower 
degrees of protest, on average. The facts that presidential-PR systems outperform only 
one institutional configuration, and that changing from the undesirable parliamentary-PR 
systems to the desirable presidential-PR systems results in a relatively low reduction rate 
of protest intensity are in accordance with Hypothesis 1b. Institutions play similar but 
weaker roles in managing protest than in managing rebellion.119 
It should be noted that presidential-PR systems also better prevent more intense 
protest than presidential-SMD systems if one were willing to accept a result significant at 
a 90% confidence level in 1-tailed tests. Furthermore, contrary to my expectation, 
parliamentary-SMD systems perform almost equally well as presidential-PR systems in 
preventing intense protest. After controlling for the nested structure of my dataset, this 





                                                 
119 Please refer to Chapter 3 for the hypotheses related to protest. 
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Table 5.22: Predicted Levels of Protest 
in Cases Involving Concentrated Groups Facing One Rival Group 
(Between-Effects Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Fearon Annett 
























Note: Types in gray areas represent appropriate institutions for this specific context. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Table 5.23: Marginal Combined Effects of Political Institutions 
in Cases Involving Concentrated Groups Facing One Rival Group 
 
Marginal Effects 
Alesina et al. 
   d       F 
Fearon 
   d       F 
Annett 
   d       F 
Type 2 vs. Type 1 -0.98 4.62** -0.84 3.53** -0.95 4.05** 
Type 2 vs. Type 3 0.20 0.14 -0.14 0.11 0.24 0.19 
Type 2 vs. Type 4 -0.48 1.93* -0.43 1.49 -0.46 1.47 
Note: d stands for the differences between Type 2 and the other types, and is calculated 
by subtracting the predicted rebellion levels of the other types, one by one, from that of 










5.3.2.2 Concentrated Groups Facing Multiple Rival Groups 
Table 5.24 shows that the differences between political systems in terms of their 
effects seem to be quite small in cases involving concentrated groups facing multiple 
ethnic others. The test results of Table 5.25 confirm this observation: institutions indeed 
have no impact on protest intensity in such cases. If one were willing to accept a 90% 
confidence level in 1-tailed tests, then as expected, presidential-SMD systems generally 
better prevent intense protest than presidential-PR systems. Specifically, concentrated 
groups who face multiple opposition groups and whose countries change their institutions 
form presidential-PR to presidential-SMD systems will be associated with 90%-94% 
lower levels of protest, on average. Many scholars would require more significant 
estimates to acknowledge the impact of institutions, however. Why institutions cannot 
mitigate the severity of protest in cases involving concentrated groups facing multiple 
rival groups? 
Some factors largely offset the differences between the effects of political systems in 
such cases, to the extent that the differences evaporate. As mentioned in Chapter 3, these 
factors include the common protection of individuals’ right in democracies to legally and 
nonviolently protest, and the positive effect of nonviolent conflict on the functioning and 
survival of a society. These factors also explain why ethnic protest behavior happens 








Table 5.24: Predicted Levels of Protest 
in Cases Involving Concentrated Groups Facing Multiple Rival Groups 
(Between-Effects Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Fearon Annett 
























Note: Types in gray areas represent appropriate institutions for this specific context. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Table 5.25: Marginal Combined Effects of Political Institutions  
in Cases Involving Concentrated Groups Facing Multiple Rival Groups 
 
Marginal Effects 
Alesina et al. 
   d       F 
Fearon 
   d       F 
Annett 
   d       F 
Type 5 vs. Type 6 -0.15 0.08 -0.09 0.02 0.03 0.00 
Type 5 vs. Type 7 0.20 0.15 0.48 0.61 0.31 0.15 
Type 8 vs. Type 6 -0.57 1.90* -0.56 1.83* -0.38 1.02 
Type 8 vs. Type 7 -0.22 0.22 0.01 0.00 -0.20 0.21 
Note: d is calculated by subtracting the predicted rebellion level of a theoretically 
undesirable system (i.e. Types 6 and 7) from that of a desirable one (i.e. Types 5 and 8). 
***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
5.3.2.3 Dispersed Groups 
Table 5.26 and Table 5.28 show that political systems which represent theoretically 
appropriate institutions in specific contexts are indeed empirically associated with lower 
levels of protest. However, the 1-tailed test results based on the 95% confidence level 
lead to the conclusion that institutions do not influence the magnitude of dispersed 
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Table 5.26: Predicted Levels of Protest 
in Cases Involving Dispersed Groups Facing One Rival Group 
(Between-Effects Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Fearon Annett 
























Note: Types in gray areas represent potentially appropriate institutions for this specific 
context. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Table 5.27: Marginal Combined Effects of Political Institutions  
in Cases Involving Dispersed Groups Facing One Rival Group 
 
Marginal Effects 
Alesina et al. 
   d       F 
Fearon 
   d       F 
Annett 
   d       F 
Type 10 vs. Type 9 -0.15 0.09 -0.20 0.15 -0.08 0.02 
Type 10 vs. Type 11 -0.45 1.20 -0.64 2.71* -0.34 0.63 
Type 10 vs. Type 12 -0.47 0.89 -0.45 0.78 -0.39 0.59 
Note: d stands for the differences between Type 10 and the other types, and is calculated 
by subtracting the predicted rebellion levels of the other types, one by one, from that of 
Type 10. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 1-tailed tests. 
 
groups’ protest activities in states with two major ethnic groups. This finding of Table 
5.27 confirms again the notion that institutions are simply irrelevant for essentially more 
peaceful dispersed groups and, hence, gives credence to Hypothesisnull 3b. 
Table 5.29 provides contradictory evidence against the notion. In cases involving 
dispersed groups facing multiple competing groups, parliamentary-SMD systems serve as 
the least desirable institutional arrangements. Although the estimates have not been  
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Table 5.28: Predicted Levels of Protest 
in Cases Involving Dispersed Groups Facing Multiple Rival Groups 
(Between-Effects Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Fearon Annett 


















Note: Types in gray areas represent potentially appropriate institutions for this specific 
context. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Table 5.29: Marginal Combined Effects of Political Institutions  
in Cases Involving Dispersed Groups Facing Multiple Rival Groups 
 
Marginal Effects 
Alesina et al. 
   d       F 
Fearon 
   d       F 
Annett 
   d       F 
Type 13 vs. Type 14 -0.10 0.01 -0.17 0.04 0.42 0.32 
Type 13 vs. Type 15 -1.36 3.86** -2.10 3.06 -1.41 4.11** 
Note: d is calculated by subtracting the predicted rebellion level of a theoretically 
undesirable system (i.e. Type 13) from that of a desirable one (i.e. Types 14 and 15). 
***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 1-tailed tests. 
 
shown on the table, the difference between presidential-PR systems (Type 14) and 
parliamentary-SMD systems (Type 15) generally reaches statistical significance at a 95% 
confidence level. These findings provide supportive evidence for Hypothesesalternative 4b, 
which acknowledges the impact of institutions on dispersed groups’ conflict propensity 
when such groups face multiple ethnic others. 
In sum, there are two general conclusions about the link between institutions and 
ethnic protest. First, in accordance with my expectation, in cases involving concentrated 
groups, institutions have similar but usually weaker or even no effects on nonviolent 
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protest. Second, in cases involving dispersed groups, the findings are mixed. On the one 
hand, when such groups face one rival group, political systems do not affect their conflict 
propensity. On the other hand, when such groups face multiple rival groups, institutions 
do have an impact. What works “theoretically” best for concentrated groups facing 
multiple groups works “practically” best for dispersed groups facing a similar number of 
ethnic others. These findings, though mixed, further highlight the importance of 
institutions because political systems have effects in some cases involving dispersed 
groups who are generally believed to be less combative. 
I have performed a hierarchical model and found that including additional random 
factor into analysis does not change my conclusions about the relations between political 
systems and ethnic protest. I will not discuss these results of robustness checks in detail. 
Interested readers can refer to Tables 5.30-5.38 in the end of this chapter. 
 Up to this point, the estimates of both between-effects and hierarchical models have 
provided strong support for my hypotheses. For example, given a certain context, 
political systems that maximize the sum of probabilities for ethnic power sharing have 
been proved to provide the best framework for addressing ethnic rebellion and protest. 
Minorities who presumably have motivation and capability to fight for control of the land 
they reside have become less combative in states using such preventive institutional 
arrangements. Furthermore, while different political systems have better prevented the 
escalation of ethnic conflict in different ethnic contexts, same political systems have been 
required to manage both violent and nonviolent conflict in a given divided society. This 
latter finding, which is consistent with my theory, largely reduces the complication of 
institutional engineering in a state. 
The hierarchical models have been used as a way to test the robustness of these 
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findings with respect to the presence of multiple random factors. There are other 
robustness checks that I promised to do. These checks constitute the topic of this 
chapter’s concluding section. 
 
5.4 Other Robustness Checks 
5.4.1 The Endogeneity between Political Systems and Conflict Levels 
The causal arrow of my theory runs from political systems to ethnic conflict 
intensity. Some may claim that the causal arrow also works in reverse. More peaceful 
ethnic relations may mean higher levels of inter-group trust, and foster the use of political 
systems which better take care of the interests of every group. Conversely, countries 
suffering from severe ethnic conflict may find difficulties in adopting such systems. The 
long-lasting inter-group antagonism and distrust may result in ethnic groups’ 
unwillingness to share power with rival ethnic others. 
These arguments have several flaws. Theoretically, countries with more serious 
ethnic problems may be more urgent in finding appropriate and mutually acceptable 
institutional solutions for ethnic groups. Conversely, countries with more harmonious 
ethnic relations may be too homogenous or simply too peaceful to worry about which 
political systems better manage ethnic conflict. Empirically, I did not find any supportive 
evidence for the competing notion that peaceful ethnic relations foster power-sharing 
systems, either. I have performed simple logit analysis, treating conflict levels as the 
determinant of government structures and electoral systems, and found that conflict levels 
generally do not significantly affect the choice of political systems. Because of these 




5.4.2 The Breakdown of Government Structures 
 In assessing the effects of government structures, I evaluate only the difference 
between parliamentary and non-parliamentary systems (which has been called 
presidential systems in this dissertation for simplicity) for two reasons. First, my theory 
predicts similar impact of presidential and semi-presidential systems, so I combine these 
two government structures into one category, i.e. presidential systems, in my analysis. 
Second, treating government structures as a dummy variable helps save many degrees of 
freedom in my statistical model. However, it is problematic not to test empirically 
whether presidential systems have similar impact as semi-presidential systems simply 
because of the concern of degrees of freedom and because of the presumably equal 
effects of the two systems. 
I have used a between-effects model to test whether dividing government structures 
into three types, i.e. presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary systems, changes 
my conclusion. The empirical patterns are generally in accordance with my expectation. 
The test results show that there is no significant difference between presidential and 
semi-presidential systems. Put differently, states choosing their government structures 
between these two systems will not find any significant change in the degrees of ethnic 
conflict. 
In cases involving concentrated ethnic groups facing multiple ethnic others, 
parliamentary-SMD systems still serve as the least desirable systems because all the other 
systems significantly outperform these systems. In cases involving concentrated groups 
facing only one rival group, as expected, presidential-PR systems outperform 
parliamentary-PR and presidential-SMD systems. The estimated signs for the differences 
between semi-presidential-PR systems and the two undesirable systems just mentioned 
 154 
 
are consistent with Hypothesis 1a, but their 90% confidence intervals in 2-tailed tests 
include the possibility of no effect. Furthermore, the differences between presidential-PR 
and semi-presidential-PR systems on the one hand and semi-presidential-SMD systems 
on the other hand also have expected signs, but are statistically insignificant. 
 These test results generally confirm the appropriateness of treating government 
structures as a dummy variable because of three reasons. First, presidential and 
semi-presidential systems have generally been associated with a similar degree of ethnic 
conflict. Second, in cases involving concentrated groups facing multiple ethnic others, I 
reach the same conclusion about the effects of political systems regardless of how I 
divide government structures. Having only two categories in this variable is thus 
preferable because doing so saves many degrees of freedom.  
Third, in cases involving concentrated groups facing one rival group, all the 
estimated signs of the differences between political systems are in accordance with 
Hypothesis 1a, but only some comparisons receive significant estimates. Even so, it is 
still too early to argue against the advantages of semi-presidential-PR systems in such 
cases. As mentioned in Chapter 2, models with interactive terms will be more difficult to 
obtain precise estimates. Given this fact, and given that the number of ethnic groups in 
my dataset is rather small,120 and that the number of independent variables in my model 
is quite large,121 it is not surprising to get the insignificant estimates in question. 
Regardless, the findings in cases involving concentrated groups facing one rival group do 
not essentially challenge Hypothesis 1a— in such cases, ceteris paribus, presidential-PR 
systems provide the best preventive framework for ethnic conflict—but with the 
                                                 
120 The total N of observations in the analysis of this chapter is 172. 
121 I have 30 independent variables when government structures have 3 categories. 
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qualification that by presidential-PR systems, I mean only “presidential”-PR systems in 
such cases. 
 
5.4.3 Ambiguous Government Structures 
 There are some countries whose government structures have been classified as one 
type by some scholars, but another type by other scholars. These countries in my dataset 
include: Switzerland, Taiwan during 1992-1996, and Yugoslavia during 2001-2002.122 In 
my dataset, I have coded Yugoslavia during the period as a parliamentary system and 
Switzerland and Taiwan during the particular years as presidential systems. However, 
some scholars may regard the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the period as a 
presidential system given that it had a popularly and directly elected president, although 
the then president, Vojislav Koštunica, held only little formal power. Using unique mixed 
systems, Switzerland and Israel have provided very difficult cases to classify as well. 
Furthermore, some scholars have also considered Taiwan during 1992-1996 a 
parliamentary system. 
I have done four sensitivity tests by categorizing Yugoslavia during 2001-2002 as a 
presidential system, by excluding Israel and Switzerland from analysis, and by classifying 
Taiwan during 1992-1996 as a parliamentary system in the analysis of a between-effects 
model. The results show that how to code the government structures of and whether 
including in analysis of these four states does not influence my conclusions. 
 
5.4.4 The Effects of Homogenous States 
 There are some considerably homogenous states in my sample, raising the concern 
                                                 
122 Please refer to Chapter 4 for more description about the government structures of these states. 
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that the presence of peace between ethnic groups in these cases does not result from the 
preventive effects of institutions on ethnic conflict. Instead, harmonious ethnic relations 
may be due to the overwhelming dominance of advantageous groups in terms of 
populations. Furthermore, in homogenous states, ethnic groups may be too small to have 
significant political relevance attractive to parties. Put differently, parties may not 
represent ethnic groups in such states. If so, then government structures and electoral 
systems do not matter for such groups as I have assumed. These concerns impel me to 
test whether my findings still hold when excluding homogenous societies from 
analysis.123 
 I have relied on the scores of ethnic fractionalization to determine whether a state is 
homogenous or not. I have used two values as thresholds, i.e. 10% and 20%. I excluded 
from analysis any state whose fractionalization score is below these two thresholds in 
turn, such as Albania, Bangladesh, Italy, Japan, South Korea, and several others. Test 
results again generally confirm the robustness of my conclusions. 
 I will do another robustness check in Chapter 7 to test whether treating ethnic 
conflict as an interval scale variable and ignoring my data’s probability mass at a single 
value of 0 have biased my findings. 
 
                                                 
123 Controlling for group population is not a good way to tackle these concerns. For one thing, minority 
groups do not need large population to fight against their states (Fearon and Laitin 2003), so we should not 
consider that variable a determinant of ethnic conflict. For another, the fact that harmonious ethnic relations 
may be due to the overwhelming dominance of advantageous groups in terms of populations suggests that a 
better control variable should be the population proportion of dominant groups. I do not have such data, so I 
rely on the aforementioned sensitivity test. Furthermore, the concern that in homogenous societies, minority 
groups may be too small to have significant political relevance attractive to parties is not about the “exact” 
proportion of minority groups per se. Instead, I worry about the validity of my assumption that parties 
represent ethnic groups. An appropriate robustness check will test whether my findings still hold when 
excluding homogenous societies from analysis. In such societies, minority groups tend to be so small that 
political parties or coalitions form along other rather than ethnic lines. Last but not least, controlling for 
group population does not change any conclusions I have made. The variable itself generated an 
insignificant coefficient as well. 
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Table 5.30: Hierarchical Linear Model: Protest, 1985-2003 
 
Variable 
Alesina et al. 
   b       SE 
Fearon 
b       SE 
Annett 
b      SE 
Fixed Effects:       
Single Term       
PAR -.05 .53 .16 .50 -.06 .54 
PR -.49 .51 -.47 .51 -.41 .52 
Con .51 .43 .50 .43 .50 .43 
Interactive Term       
PAR*PR .35 .78 .17 .74 .29 .79 
PAR*Frac .98 .66 1.34 1.05 1.03 .66 
PAR*Con -.50 .68 -.78 .59 -.50 .69 
PR*Frac -.01 .78 -.12 .78 -.45 .66 
PR*Con .01 .57 .01 .57 -.05 .59 
Frac*Con -.68 .49 -.65 .50 -.56 .49 
PAR*PR*Frac -1.26 1.19 -1.69 1.48 -.88 1.14 
PAR*PR*Con 1.10 .99 1.23 .90 1.15 1.00 
PAR*Frac*Con -.29 .88 -.61 1.15 -.42 .89 
PR*Frac*Con 1.26 .94 1.33 .95 1.38 .87 
PAR*PR*Frac*Con -.54 1.44 .05 1.66 -.62 1.41 
Control Variable       
Federal system .23 .28 .31 .26 .18 .28 
Enduring regime .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
First election -.40 .94 -.38 .95 -.44 .93 
Log GDP per capita -.00 .11 .00 .12 -.00 .12 
Change in GDP per capita .33 4.82 .57 4.80 .20 4.86 
Political differentials  .03 .08 .04 .08 .03 .08 
Economic differentials .02 .06 -.01 .06 .02 .06 
Cultural differentials .16* .08 .17** .08 .16** .08 
Constant .81 1.03 .76 1.07 .84 1.07 
Variance Components: 
Country-Level ( 00τ ) 























Table 5.31: Predicted Levels of Protest 
in Cases Involving Concentrated Groups Facing One Rival Group 
(Hierarchical Linear Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Fearon Annett 
























Note: Types in gray areas represent appropriate institutions for this specific context. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Table 5.32: Marginal Combined Effects of Political Institutions  
in Cases Involving Concentrated Groups Facing One Rival Group 
 
Marginal Effects 
Alesina et al. 
   d       2χ  
Fearon 
   d       2χ  
Annett 
   d       2χ  
Type 2 vs. Type 1 -0.90 3.58** -0.79 2.88** -0.88 3.15** 
Type 2 vs. Type 3 0.07 0.02 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.03 
Type 2 vs. Type 4 -0.48 1.63 -0.47 1.45 -0.47 1.25 
Note: d stands for the differences between Type 2 and the other types, and is calculated 
by subtracting the predicted rebellion levels of the other types, one by one, from that of 










Table 5.33: Predicted Levels of Protest 
in Cases Involving Concentrated Groups Facing Multiple Rival Groups 
(Hierarchical Linear Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Fearon Annett 
























Note: Types in gray areas represent appropriate institutions for this specific context. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Table 5.34: Marginal Combined Effects of Political Institutions  
in Cases Involving Concentrated Groups Facing Multiple Rival Groups 
 
Marginal Effects 
Alesina et al. 
   d       2χ  
Fearon 
   d       2χ  
Annett 
   d       2χ  
Type 5 vs. Type 6 -0.21 0.12 -0.13 0.04 -0.02 0.00 
Type 5 vs. Type 7 0.41 0.42 0.51 0.46 0.40 0.40 
Type 8 vs. Type 6 -0.76 2..42* -0.76 2.37* -0.47 1.11 
Type 8 vs. Type 7 -0.14 0.07 -0.12 0.04 -0.05 0.01 
Note: d is calculated by subtracting the predicted rebellion level of a theoretically 
undesirable system (i.e. Types 6 and 7) from that of a desirable one (i.e. Types 5 and 8). 











Table 5.35: Predicted Levels of Protest 
in Cases Involving Dispersed Groups Facing One Rival Group 
(Hierarchical Linear Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Fearon Annett 
























Note: Types in gray areas represent potentially appropriate institutions for this specific 
context. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Table 5.36: Marginal Combined Effects of Political Institutions  
in Cases Involving Dispersed Groups Facing One Rival Group 
 
Marginal Effects 
Alesina et al. 
   d       2χ  
Fearon 
   d       2χ  
Annett 
   d       2χ  
Type 10 vs. Type 9 -0.30 0.34 -0.34 0.43 -0.23 0.18 
Type 10 vs. Type 11 -0.44 0.99 -0.64 2.34* -0.35 0.57 
Type 10 vs. Type 12 -0.49 0.93 -0.14 0.85 -0.41 0.61 
Note: d stands for the differences between Type 10 and the other types, and is calculated 
by subtracting the predicted rebellion levels of the other types, one by one, from that of 












Table 5.37: Predicted Levels of Protest 
in Cases Involving Dispersed Groups Facing Multiple Rival Groups 
(Hierarchical Linear Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Fearon Annett 


















Note: Types in gray areas represent potentially appropriate institutions for this specific 
context. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Table 5.38: Marginal Combined Effects of Political Institutions  
in Cases Involving Dispersed Groups Facing Multiple Rival Groups 
 
Marginal Effects 
Alesina et al. 
   d       2χ  
Fearon 
   d       2χ  
Annett 
   d       2χ  
Type 13 vs. Type 14 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.37 0.23 
Type 13 vs. Type 15 -1.41 3.64** -2.12 3.16** -1.44 3.76** 
Note: d is calculated by subtracting the predicted rebellion level of a theoretically 
undesirable system (i.e. Type 13) from that of a desirable one (i.e. Types 14 and 15). 












Chapter 6: Ethnic Diversity, Ethnic Spatial Distributions, and Ethnic Conflict— 
A Statistical Investigation 
 
 This chapter discusses whether my theories about the effects of ethnic diversity and 
ethnic distributions have received empirical and statistical evidence. Because this chapter 
deals with this other side of my interactive models which I have performed and whose 
coefficients and standard errors I have presented in Chapter 5, I do not re-produce these 
estimates. Instead, only the predicted conflict levels in specific contexts and the marginal 
effects of the two contextual factors are presented. Furthermore, when discussing the 
sensitivity-test results of hierarchical models, only the marginal effects are shown. 
 Three findings about the effects of ethnic diversity on conflict levels stand out. First, 
there are conspicuous variations within more diverse and less diverse countries in terms 
of how severely spatially concentrated ethnic groups in these states fight against their 
regimes.124 This empirical pattern provides evidence that ethnic diversity alone cannot 
determine the degrees of ethnic conflict. 
Second, because of the following findings, whether more diverse or less diverse 
societies experience more intense conflict has been confirmed to be generally determined 
by whether their spatially concentrated groups have been largely prevented from having 
policy influence in a given political system. Specifically, in cases involving a 
concentrated ethnic group living in presidential-SMD systems, more diverse societies 
have been proved to better prevent severe ethnic conflict than states with only two 
groups125 The same, though less significant and robust, effect can be found in cases 
                                                 
124 More diverse and less diverse countries have been defined in this dissertation as states with multiple 
and states with two major ethnic groups, respectively. 
125 p=0.02 and <0.05 in 1-tailed tests when Alesina’s and Annett’s indices of ethnic fractionalization were 
used, respectively. P >0.10 when Fearon’s index of ethnic fractionalization was used, however. 
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involving concentrated groups living in parliamentary-PR systems.126 Conversely, in 
cases involving concentrated groups living in presidential-PR systems, states with two 
ethnic groups tend to better mitigate conflict intensity than states with multiple groups, 
albeit with weaker statistical evidence.127 Furthermore, in cases involving concentrated 
groups living in parliamentary-SMD systems, ethnic diversity generally does not affect 
concentrated groups’ conflict propensities. These findings are important because existing 
studies have overlooked how the impact of ethnic diversity is changed by the interaction 
between this factor and political institutions (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fish and 
Brooks 2004). These studies have therefore failed to appreciate the complicated effects of 
ethnic diversity and almost never found statistical evidence for the importance of such a 
factor. 
 Third, spatially dispersed minorities tend to engage in similarly low levels of ethnic 
strife, regardless of whether these groups live in more diverse or less diverse societies. 
This fact confirms again our general image of this type of group. Dispersed groups are 
indeed very peaceful even when the ethnic nature of their societies does not favor their 
power sharing in a specific political system. Many existing studies on the link between 
ethnic diversity and ethnic conflict have also ignored this noticeable contrast between 
dispersed and concentrated groups. If I made the same mistake in this dissertation, I may 
have found no effects of ethnic diversity, either. The nonresults of ethnic diversity in 
cases involving dispersed groups may dilute the significant effects of this factor in cases 
involving concentrated groups. Consequently, ethnic diversity becomes an insignificant 
factor in a model which does not divide ethnic groups according to their spatial 
                                                 
126 p=0.05 in an 1-tailed test when the Fearon data was used. P>0.10 when the Alesina and Annett data 
were used, however. 





 In Chapter 5, I have shown that concentrated groups become less combative when 
they have more say in policy-making compared to the case when they are largely 
prevented from having policy influence. In this chapter, I show that controlling for 
institutional configurations of government structures and electoral systems, spatially 
concentrated groups generally engage in more severe ethnic strife than dispersed groups. 
This pattern remains even when concentrated groups have had the institutional 
frameworks that best protect their shares of power, given the ethnic nature of their 
societies. These findings are important because past studies have usually made a loose 
distinction about the conflict propensity between concentrated and dispersed groups. 
Without controlling for the effects of political systems, there is no guarantee that spatially 
concentrated groups will be associated with the pursuance of independence or with more 
intense ethnic conflict, as existing literature frequently assumed (e.g. Ayres and Saideman 
2000; Saideman and Ayres 2001; Saideman et al. 2002; Toft 2003). Even if these studies 
provided supportive evidence, their estimates were very likely to be biased. 
 In this chapter, I first discuss the statistical findings about the relations between 
ethnic diversity and ethnic conflict. I then discuss the empirical evidence about the link 
between ethnic distributions and ethnic strife. I conclude this chapter with a brief 
discussion about the precision and unbiasedness of my estimates, and how I improve 
these two qualities and obtain more significant and unbiased findings in Chapter 7 by 
performing a recently developed zero-inflated ordered probit model. 
 
6.1 Major Hypotheses 
 I briefly reiterate related hypotheses to facilitate the discussion of this chapter’s 
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statistical findings. Ethnic diversity is expected to have similar impact on both violent 
and nonviolent ethnic strife. Hypotheses 5a, 7a, 9a, 11a refer to the hypotheses about the 
link between ethnic diversity and violent ethnic conflict, while Hypotheses 5b, 7b, 9b, 
and 11b connect ethnic diversity with nonviolent ethnic conflict. Hypotheses comparing 
dispersed groups’ conflict intensity in specific political systems—i.e. Hypothesesalternative 
6a, 6b, 8a, 8b, 10a, and 10b—are left out because these hypotheses are exactly the same 
as those contrasting concentrated groups’ conflict levels in certain political systems. 
There is, however, another competing hypothesis about dispersed groups’ conflict levels, 
i.e. dispersed groups are believed to be less motivated and less capable of engaging in 
(intense) conflict, regardless of how many rival groups they face in specific political 
systems. These competing hypotheses (i.e. Hypothesesnull 6a, 6b, 8a, 8b, 10a, and 10b) 
have also been omitted from this section, but should be kept in mind when discussing the 
estimates of ethnic diversity in cases involving dispersed groups. 
 
6.1.1 The Impact of Ethnic Diversity 
 My theory expects the following hypotheses to be true. 
 
Hypotheses 5a and 5b: In cases involving a concentrated ethnic group living in 
parliamentary-PR systems, ceteris paribus, the expected level of ethnic conflict is 
less intense in countries having more than two ethnic groups than in those with only 
two groups. 
 
In cases involving a concentrated ethnic group living in parliamentary-PR systems, 
states having more than two ethnic groups have advantages. The presence of multiple 
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ethnic groups in states using parliamentary-PR systems fosters the formation of coalition 
cabinets. For the members of a coalition, they share both executive and legislative power. 
For those outside coalition cabinets, they also find it easier to threaten the survival of 
these coalition cabinets and, hence, easier to compete for more rights and benefits. These 
groups therefore feel more secure, compared to the case in which they face a one-party 
majority cabinet, a likely outcome when parliamentary-PR systems are used in states 
with only two major ethnic groups. 
 
Hypotheses 7a and 7b: In cases involving a concentrated ethnic group living in 
presidential-PR systems, ceteris paribus, the expected level of ethnic conflict is less 
intense in countries having two major ethnic groups than in those with more than 
two groups. 
 
This hypothesis reflects the advantages of less diverse societies in cases involving 
concentrated ethnic groups living in presidential-PR systems. In such cases, since only 
when these groups face one major rival group will their presidents be less likely to face a 
fragmented parliament and dominate all the ethnic others, the expected level of conflict is 
less intense in less diverse societies. 
 
Hypotheses 9a and 9b: In cases involving a concentrated ethnic group living in 
parliamentary-SMD systems, ceteris paribus, the expected level of ethnic conflict is 
similar regardless of how many rival groups the ethnic group in question faces. 
 
Parliamentary-SMD systems tend to favor groups who form or join cabinets at the 
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expense of those who do not regardless of how many ethnic others these institutionally 
powerless groups face. Only one ethnic group is needed for the formation and survival of 
a single-party-majority cabinet when parliamentary-SMD systems are used in states 
having two major groups. Only a few more ethnic groups are required for the same 
purpose of a majority coalition cabinet when states with more than two groups employ 
these political systems. Consequently, in both types of societies, those prevented from 
having policy influence feel similarly insecure and, hence, engage in a similar level of 
ethnic strife. 
 
Hypotheses 11a and 11b: In cases involving a concentrated ethnic group living in 
presidential-SMD systems, ceteris paribus, the expected level of ethnic conflict is 
less intense in countries having more than two ethnic groups than in those with only 
two groups. 
  
 Presidential-SMD systems almost always produce divided governments in states 
having more than two ethnic groups and, hence, better ensure checks and balances 
between more, if not all, ethnic groups in such states. Conversely, when states have only 
two major groups, the occurrence of divided governments is much less frequent. The 
coethnic of the president is likely to exclusively control power. Powerless dominated 
groups thus cannot but engage in more intense ethnic conflict. 
 
6.1.2 The Impact of Ethnic Spatial Distributions 
 Ethnic distributions are expected to have similar impact on both violent and 
nonviolent ethnic strife as well. Hypothesis 12a refers to the hypotheses about the link 
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between ethnic distributions and violent ethnic conflict, while Hypothesis 12b connects 
ethnic distributions with nonviolent ethnic conflict. 
 
Hypothesis 12a and 12b: Given specific government structures and electoral systems 
and regardless of the number of ethnic groups, ceteris paribus, concentrated groups’ 
expected level of ethnic conflict is less intense than dispersed groups’. 
 
 As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, comparing the conflict propensities of 
concentrated and dispersed groups requires controlling for the impact of government 
structures and electoral systems. How many rival others that these ethnic groups face 
does not matter. One example explains the reason. In cases involving ethnic groups living 
in parliamentary-PR systems, concentrated ethnic groups are likely to be associated with 
a higher level of ethnic conflict than dispersed groups. This probability remains even 
when the concentrated groups in question face multiple ethnic others while the dispersed 
groups in question face only one rival group. Although minorities’ facing multiple ethnic 
others in parliamentary-PR systems better protects these groups’ shares of power than 
facing only one rival group—as Hypothesis 5 suggests, although this hypothesis applies 
mainly to cases involving concentrated groups—an uneven distribution of power between 
dominant and minority groups is more likely to persist in both types of societies. Under 
this condition, the concentrated groups in question are still more likely to engage in more 
intense ethnic strife than the dispersed groups in question because the former groups are 
essentially more combative and have higher capability to fight for power. 
 With these hypotheses briefly re-discussed, I can now proceed to examine the 




6.2.1 Ethnic Diversity 
Table 6.1 presents the predicted rebellion levels of each type of ethnic society in 
cases involving concentrated groups living in specific political systems. There are clear 
variations within more diverse and less diverse societies as the comparison between Type 
8 and Type 7 (predicted rebellion levels=0.07 and 1.90, respectively) and between Type 2 
and Type 1 (predicted rebellion levels=0.38 and 1.46, respectively) shows. Holding 
political systems constant is required in order to understand the variable effects of ethnic 
diversity. 
As expected, holding other factors at their sample means,128 concentrated groups 
living in parliamentary-PR systems engage in less intense rebellion when they face more 
than one, instead of only one, rival group (i.e. predicted rebellion levels=0.61 vs. 1.46). In 
cases involving concentrated groups living in presidential-PR systems, states with only 
two major groups have a predicted rebellion score of 0.38, compared to a score of 0.59 
for states with more than two groups. In cases involving concentrated groups living in 
presidential-SMD systems, more diverse states are associated with less severe rebellion 
than less diverse states. The only unexpected finding arises in cases involving 
concentrated groups living in parliamentary-SMD systems where states with two major 
ethnic groups outperform states with multiple groups in reducing the intensity of 
rebellion. Theoretically, both types of societies should be associated with a similar level 
of ethnic conflict. As Table 6.2 shows, the difference between the two types of  
societies becomes insignificant, however, after controlling for an additional random 
 
                                                 




Table 6.1: Predicted Rebellion Levels in Cases Involving Concentrated Groups Living 
under Specific Political Systems (Between-Effects Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Fearon Annett 
Parliamentary-PR Systems 













































































Note: Types in boldface represent societies that better promote their minority groups’ 
influence in policy making, given a specific political system. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
factor. This nonresult is consistent with Hypothesis 9a. 
Table 6.2 presents the test results of ethnic diversity’s marginal effects in other 
political systems. The upper and the lower panels refer to the estimates of the 
between-effects and the hierarchical models, respectively. The signs of ethnic diversity in 
specific political systems are as predicted, but only some of the estimates are significant. 
 171 
 
Table 6.2: Marginal Effects of Ethnic Diversity on Rebellion 




Alesina et al. 
d       F 
Fearon 
d       F 
Annett 
d         F 
Type 5 vs. Type 1 -0.85 1.42 -1.11 2.26* -0.90 1.56 
Type 2 vs. Type 6 -0.21 0.22 -0.22 0.27 -0.69 2.60* 
Type 3 vs. Type 7 -1.35 3.40** -2.23 15.46*** -1.36 3.37** 
Type 8 vs. Type 4 -1.05 4.28** -0.84 2.97** -0.38 0.56 
Hierarchical Linear Model 
 
Marginal Effects 
Alesina et al. 
d       2χ  
Fearon 
d       F 
Annett 
d         2χ  
Type 5 vs. Type 1 -0.90 1.42 -1.11 2.26* -0.92 1.36 
Type 2 vs. Type 6 -0.22 0.24 -0.22 0.27 -0.74 2.67* 
Type 3 vs. Type 7 -0.78 1.06 -2.23 15.46*** -0.78 0.96 
Type 8 vs. Type 4 -1.17 4.34** -0.84 2.97** -0.20 0.11 
Note: d is calculated by subtracting the predicted rebellion levels of the later type from 
that of the former type in each pair of comparison. In each pair, the later type should be 
associated with a higher degree of ethnic conflict than the former type. The only 
exception is the comparison between Type 3 and Type 7, where theory predicts similar 
intensity of ethnic strife. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 1-tailed tests. 
 
 The distinction between states with different numbers of ethnic groups is most 
significant in cases involving concentrated groups living in presidential-SMD systems (p 
<0.05 when two of the three indices of ethnic fractionalization were used in both the 
between-effects and hierarchical models). This finding provides supportive evidence for 
Hypothesis 11a. Specifically, concentrated groups who live in presidential-SMD systems 
will be associated with 83%-94% lower levels of rebellion if these groups face multiple 
ethnic others, instead of only one rival group.  
In cases involving concentrated groups living in parliamentary-PR and 
presidential-PR systems, there is also some, though weaker, evidence for Hypotheses 5a 
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and 7a. When Fearon’s index is used, consistent with Hypothesis 5a, states with multiple 
ethnic groups outperform states with only two groups in cases involving concentrated 
groups living in parliamentary-PR systems (p<0.07). Specifically, concentrated groups 
who live in presidential-SMD systems will be connected with 79% lower degrees of 
rebellion if these groups face more than one rival group. The difference between the two 
types of societies will reach statistical significance if one will accept results significant at 
an 86% confidence level in 2-tailed tests. 
 When Annett’s index is used, in accordance with Hypothesis 7a, concentrated groups 
living in presidential-PR systems engage in less intense rebellion when they face only one, 
instead of more than one, rival group (p=0.05). The effect in question corresponds to 95% 
lower degrees of rebellion. 
 Although the evidence is inconclusive in the sense that some indices of ethnic 
fractionalization do not produce significant results, the reason may be more about the 
number of observations than about the differences between the three highly correlated 
indices. As Table 6.2 shows, all the estimated differences between two types of societies  
have expected signs regardless of which indices have been used. It is likely that when N 
is larger, more significant results will be obtained. Regardless, there is strong evidence 
for Hypotheses 11a and some evidence for the other three hypotheses. 
 Table 6.3 presents the predicted rebellion levels of each type of ethnic society in 
cases involving dispersed groups living in specific political systems. It is impossible to 
test the impact of ethnic diversity in cases involving dispersed groups living in 
presidential-SMD systems because in my dataset, there is no observation of more diverse 
societies in such political systems. For the rest three pairs of comparison, contrary to my 
expectation, societies predicted to be associated with less intense rebellion  
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Table 6.3: Predicted Rebellion Levels in Cases Involving Dispersed Groups Living under 
Specific Political Systems (Between-Effects Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Fearon Annett 
Parliamentary-PR Systems 





































































Note: Types in boldface represent societies that better promote their minority groups’ 
influence in policy making, given a specific political system. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
are in fact more severe rebellion-prone. The difference between the two types of societies 
in any pair of comparison is insubstantial, however. 
Table 6.4 presents the test results of ethnic diversity’s marginal effects in cases 
involving dispersed groups in specific political systems. These results confirm that ethnic 
diversity does not significantly influence dispersed groups’ conflict intensity regardless of 
which political systems their states use. While the test results are not shown, controlling 
for the presence of multiple random factors does not change this conclusion. These  
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Table 6.4: Marginal Effects of Ethnic Diversity on Rebellion  
in Cases Involving Dispersed Groups Living under Specific Political Systems  
Marginal Effects 
(Between-Effects Model) 
Alesina et al. 
   d       F 
Fearon 
   d       F 
Annett 
   d       F 
Type 13 vs. Type 9 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.03 0.08 0.01 
Type 10 vs. Type 14 0.26 0.07 0.23 0.06 0.46 0.32 
Type 11 vs.Type 15 -0.29 0.15 0.55 0.19 -0.23 0.10 
Note: d is calculated by subtracting the predicted rebellion levels of the later type from 
that of the former type in each pair of comparison. The later type should be associated 
with a similar or a higher conflict level. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 1-tailed tests. 
 
findings are consistent with Hypothesesnull 6a, 8a, and 10a. 
 Table 6.5 presents the predicted protest levels of each type of ethnic society in cases 
involving concentrated groups living in specific political systems. Ethnic diversity is 
expected to have similar impact on both violent and nonviolent ethnic strife. In 
accordance with this expectation, societies predicted to be associated with more intense 
protest, i.e. societies in boldface in every pair of comparison, indeed seem to be more 
severe protest-prone. Societies expected to have similar levels of protest, i.e. Type 3 and 
Type 7, are also connected with relatively similar degrees of protest, especially after 
controlling for the effect of an additional random factor. This similarity has been 
confirmed in statistical tests as Table 6.6 shows, and has provided evidence for 
Hypothesis 9b. 
The other test results of Table 6.6 provide weak evidence for Hypotheses 7b and 11b. 
Although the three d-estimates (for Type 5 vs. Type 1, Type 2 vs. Type 6, and Type 8 vs. 
Type 4) have expected signs, only one is statistically significant in the between-effects 
model. In accordance with Hypothesis 7b, less diverse societies outperform more diverse 
societies in managing ethnic protest in cases involving concentrated groups 
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Table 6.5: Predicted Protest Levels in Cases Involving Concentrated Groups Living under 
Specific Political Systems (Between-Effects Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Fearon Annett 
Parliamentary-PR Systems 













































































Note: Types in boldface represent societies that better promote their minority groups’ 
influence in policy making, given a specific political system. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
living in presidential-PR systems. This finding is significant at 95% confidence level in 
1-tailed tests when Alesina’s and Fearon’s indices of ethnic fractionalization were used in 
performing between-effects models. Specifically, concentrated groups who live in 
presidential-PR systems will be connected with an average of 31%-32% lower levels of 
protest if these groups face only one, instead of more than one, rival group. This  
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Table 6.6: Marginal Effects of Ethnic Diversity on Protest 




Alesina et al. 
d        F 
Fearon 
d        F 
Annett 
d        F 
Type 5 vs. Type 1 -0.48 0.70 -0.29 0.21 -0.44 0.60 
Type 2 vs. Type 6 -0.65 3.43** -0.64 3.40** -0.48 2.00* 
Type 3 vs. Type 7 -0.50 0.70 0.07 0.02 -0.54 0.82 




Alesina et al. 
d        2χ  
Fearon 
d        2χ  
Annett 
d        2χ  
Type 5 vs. Type 1 -0.55 0.73 -0.35 0.26 -0.52 0.64 
Type 2 vs. Type 6 -0.56 2.03*  -0.57 2.14*  -0.38 1.01 
Type 3 vs. Type 7 -0.01 0.00 -0.08 0.02 -0.05 0.01 
Type 8 vs. Type 4 -0.68 1.91*  -0.65 1.66*  -0.56 1.32 
Note: d is calculated by subtracting the predicted protest levels of the later type from that 
of the former type in each pair of comparison. In each pair, the later type should be 
associated with a higher degree of ethnic conflict than the former type. The only 
exception is the comparison between Type 3 and Type 7, where theory predicts similar 
intensity of ethnic strife. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 1-tailed tests. 
 
effect evaporates in the hierarchical model (p=0.07 or 0.08 when these same 
fractionalization indices were used), however, unless one accepts results significant at a 
90% confidence level in 1-tailed tests. The hierarchical model also produces weak 
evidence supporting Hypothesis 11b—in cases involving concentrated groups living in 
presidential-SMD systems, more diverse states better handle ethnic protest than less 
diverse states—if the same 90% confidence level is accepted (p=0.08 or 0.10 when 
Alesina’s and Fearon’s indices of ethnic fractionalization were used).  
 Regardless, these test results suggest that the effect of ethnic diversity on protest is  
generally quite weak. The merits of protest for the functioning and survival of a society 
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Table 6.7: Predicted Protest Levels in Cases Involving Dispersed Groups Living under 
Specific Political Systems (Between-Effects Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Fearon Annett 
Parliamentary-PR Systems 





































































Note: Types in boldface represent societies that better promote their minority groups’ 
influence in policy making, given a specific political system. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
may offset the distinctions not only between political systems but also between different 
ethnic societies in terms of their effects on protest. 
 Table 6.7 presents the predicted protest levels of each type of ethnic society in cases 
involving dispersed groups living in specific political systems. The differences between 
Type 9 and Type 13 and between Type 10 and Type 14 are generally trivial, although 
most of them have expected signs. Contrary to my expectation, the difference between 
theoretically similar Types 11 and 15 is largest among the three pairs of comparison. 
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Table 6.8: Marginal Effects of Ethnic Diversity on Protest 




Alesina et al. 
d      F 
Fearon 
d         F 
Annett 
   d       F 
Type 13 vs. Type 9 -0.02 0.00 -0.24 0.13 -0.07 0.01 
Type 10 vs. Type 14 -0.23 0.09 -0.13 0.02 0.41 0.39 




Alesina et al. 
d      2χ  
Fearon 
d         2χ
Annett 
   d       2χ  
Type 13 vs. Type 9 -0.29 0.18 -0.48 0.44 -0.30 0.18 
Type 10 vs. Type 14 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.02 0.44 0.45 
Type 11 vs. Type 15 -0.98 2.24*  -1.34 1.62 -1.02 2.40*  
Note: d is calculated by subtracting the predicted protest levels of the later type from that 
of the former type in each pair of comparison. In each pair, the later type should be 
associated with a similar or a higher degree of ethnic conflict. ***p<.01; **p<.05; 
*p<.10; 1-tailed tests. 
 
 Table 6.8 confirms the nonresults of the first two pairs of comparison. Although less 
diverse societies have been proved to better reduce protest intensity than more diverse 
societies in cases involving dispersed groups living in parliamentary-SMD systems, this 
effect becomes insignificant at the 95% confidence level in 1-tailed tests when controlling 
for the state-level random factor. Ethnic diversity indeed does not affect dispersed groups’ 
conflict levels, in accordance with Hypothesesnull 6b, 8b, and 10b. 
 In sum, I have found some evidence for my hypotheses about the effects of ethnic 
diversity. My findings are important since more and more studies have mistakenly denied 
the effect of ethnic diversity (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fish and Brooks 2004). In the end 
of this chapter, I briefly discuss possible reasons to explain why between-effects and 
hierarchical models cannot provide more evidence for my hypotheses, and why a recently 
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developed zero-inflated ordered probit model serves as a better technique for my dataset. 
 
6.2.2 Ethnic Spatial Distributions 
 Tables 6.9-6.16 present information and test results that connect ethnic distributions 
with the level of rebellion. Comparing Type 6 in Table 6.11 and Type 15 in Table 6.13 
makes clear the point that contrasting the rebellion intensity of concentrated groups with 
that of dispersed groups requires controlling for political systems. Otherwise, 
concentrated groups do not necessarily engage in more intense rebellion than dispersed 
groups. As Tables 6.9-6.16 show, ceteris paribus, concentrated groups are generally 
associated with more intense rebellion than dispersed groups, given specific government 
structures and electoral systems and regardless of the number of their ethnic others.129 
Concentrated groups’ predicted rebellion level is at least 3.8 times greater,130 and can be 
as high as 70 times greater than dispersed groups’ predicted rebellion intensity in each 
pair of comparison.131 These significant differences provide some evidence for my 
theory about the impact of ethnic spatial distributions. Furthermore, the hierarchical 
model’s estimates confirm the robustness of my findings. 
 Tables 6.17-6.24 present information and test results that relate ethnic distributions 
with the level of protest. A similar conclusion can be reached. Ceteris paribus, 
concentrated groups generally protest more severely against their regimes than dispersed 
groups, given specific government structures and electoral systems and regardless of the 
number of their ethnic others. When this is not the case, the estimates are insignificant 
except in two pairs of comparison, i.e. Type 15 vs. Type 3 and Type 15 vs. Type 7. 
                                                 
129 There are only a few exceptions. All of those unexpected positive d-estimates are insignificant, 
however. 
130 Please refer to the difference between type 7 and type 15 when the Alesina data was used in analysis. 
131 Please refer to the difference between type 1 and type 9 when Fearon’s index was used in analysis. 
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However, as Table 6.22 shows, there is no short answer about which types of groups in 
question will be associated with a higher level of protest. Regardless of which index of 
ethnic fractionalization was used, between-effects and hierarchical models always 
provide different results. Consequently, my theory about ethnic distributions is not 
verified nor falsified by these two pairs of comparison. 
 
6.3 Conclusion and Discussion 
 I have found some evidence for the effects of ethnic diversity and groups’ spatial 
distributions on ethnic conflict. Ethnic diversity generally has a stronger effect on 
rebellion levels than on protest intensity, probably because the positive effect of protest 
on the functioning and survival of a society weakens the distinction between more diverse 
and less diverse societies. 
 The findings of this chapter may have some flaws. First, my analysis has relied on 
the cross-sectional dimension of the original TSCS dataset. Given that the N has 
consequently been largely shrunk, the estimates may not be very precise. This may 
explain why many estimates with expected signs are insignificant. Second, some 
estimates may be biased because the between-effects and hierarchical models I use ignore 
the consequence that my rebellion data’s probability mass at a single value of 0 may 
cause. I also mistakenly yet purposefully assume in the two models that ethnic conflict is 
an interval scale variable, as mentioned in Chapter 4.132 In Chapter 7, I will discuss 
potentially biased estimates. I will also use the original TSCS dataset to perform a 
recently developed zero-inflated ordered probit model to test whether the aforementioned 
potential flaws influence my findings. 
                                                 
132 Please refer to its footnote 4. 
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Table 6.9: Predicted Rebellion Levels in Cases Involving Groups Living under 
Parliamentary-PR Systems (Between-Effects Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Fearon Annett 
Type 1: Concentrated Groups 







Type 5: Concentrated Groups 







Type 9: Dispersed Groups 







Type 13: Dispersed Groups 







Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Table 6.10: Marginal Effects of Ethnic Distributions on Rebellion 




Alesina et al. 
d       F 
Fearon 
d       F 
Annett 
d         F 
Type 9 vs. Type 1 -1.31 3.53** -1.38 4.89** -1.38 3.89** 
Type 9 vs. Type 5 -0.46 0.35 -0.27 0.12 -0.48 0.38 
Type 13 vs. Type 1 -1.29 3.14** -1.23 2.92** -1.30 3.10** 




Alesina et al. 
d       2χ  
Fearon 
d       F 
Annett 
d         2χ  
Type 9 vs. Type 1 -1.15 2.79** -1.38 4.89** -1.16 2.87** 
Type 9 vs. Type 5 -0.25 0.09 -0.27 0.12 -0.24 0.08 
Type 13 vs. Type 1 -1.37 3.20** -1.23 2.92** -1.35 2.95** 
Type 13 vs. Type 5 -0.47 0.39 -0.12 0.03 -0.43 0.34 
Note: d is calculated by subtracting the predicted rebellion levels of the later type from 
that of the former type in each pair of comparison. In each pair, the later type should be 
associated with a higher degree of ethnic strife than the former type. ***p<.01; **p<.05; 





Table 6.11: Predicted Rebellion Levels in Cases Involving Groups Living under 
Presidential-PR Systems (Between-Effects Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Fearon Annett 
Type 2: Concentrated Groups 







Type 6: Concentrated Groups 







Type 10: Dispersed Groups 







Type 14: Dispersed Groups 







Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Table 6.12: Marginal Effects of Ethnic Distributions on Rebellion 




Alesina et al. 
d       F 
Fearon 
d       F 
Annett 
d         F 
Type 10 vs. Type 2 -0.27 0.37 -0.29 0.45 0.02 0.00 
Type 10 vs. Type 6 -0.48 0.95 -0.51 1.21 -0.67 1.91*  
Type 14 vs. Type 2 -0.53 0.29 -0.52 0.31 -0.44 0.30 




Alesina et al. 
d       2χ  
Fearon 
d       F 
Annett 
d         2χ  
Type 10 vs. Type 2 -0.28 0.39 -0.29 0.45 0.03 0.00 
Type 10 vs. Type 6 -0.50 0.95 -0.51 1.21 -0.71 1.92*  
Type 14 vs. Type 2 -0.64 0.42 -0.52 0.31 -0.68 0.69 
Type 14 vs. Type 6 -0.86 0.79 -0.74 0.61 -1.42 3.39** 
Note: d is calculated by subtracting the predicted rebellion levels of the later type from 
that of the former type in each pair of comparison. In each pair, the later type should be 
associated with a higher degree of ethnic strife than the former type. ***p<.01; **p<.05; 





Table 6.13: Predicted Rebellion Levels in Cases Involving Groups Living under 
Parliamentary-SMD Systems (Between-Effects Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Fearon Annett 
Type 3: Concentrated Groups 







Type 7: Concentrated Groups 







Type 11: Dispersed Groups 







Type 15: Dispersed Groups 







Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Table 6.14: Marginal Effects of Ethnic Distributions on Rebellion 




Alesina et al. 
d        F 
Fearon 
d        F 
Annett 
d        F 
Type 11 vs. Type 3 -0.34 0.24 0.00 0.00 -0.39 0.33 
Type 11 vs. Type 7 -1.69 8.13*** -2.23 16.88*** -1.75 8.57*** 
Type 15 vs. Type 3 -0.05 0.00 -0.55 0.19 -0.16 0.03 




Alesina et al. 
d        2χ  
Fearon 
d        F 
Annett 
d        2χ  
Type 11 vs. Type 3 -0.76 1.20 0.00 0.00 -0.83 1.42 
Type 11 vs. Type 7 -1.54 5.68*** -2.23 16.88*** -1.61 5.47*** 
Type 15 vs. Type 3 -0.37 0.17 -0.55 0.19 -0.38 0.17 
Type 15 vs. Type 7 -1.15 3.05** -2.78 5.04** -1.16 3.12** 
Note: d is calculated by subtracting the predicted rebellion levels of the later type from 
that of the former type in each pair of comparison. In each pair, the later type should be 
associated with a higher degree of ethnic strife than the former type. ***p<.01; **p<.05; 





Table 6.15: Predicted Rebellion Levels in Cases Involving Groups Living under 
Presidential-SMD Systems (Between-Effects Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Fearon Annett 
Type 4: Concentrated Groups 







Type 8: Concentrated Groups 







Type 12: Dispersed Groups 







Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Table 6.16: Marginal Effects of Ethnic Distributions on Rebellion 




Alesina et al. 
d       F 
Fearon 
d       F 
Annett 
d         F 
Type 12 vs. Type 4 -0.84 2.19*  -0.82 2.30* -0.79 1.87*  




Alesina et al. 
d     2χ  
Fearon 
d     F 
Annett 
d     2χ  
Type 12 vs. Type 4 -0.92 2.74** -0.82 2.30* -085 2.35* 
Type 12 vs. Type 8 0.25 0.12 0.02 0.00 -0.65 0.80 
Note: d is calculated by subtracting the predicted rebellion levels of the later type from 
that of the former type in each pair of comparison. In each pair, the later type should be 
associated with a higher degree of ethnic strife than the former type. ***p<.01; **p<.05; 











Table 6.17: Predicted Protest Levels in Cases Involving Groups Living under 
Parliamentary-PR Systems (Between-Effects Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Fearon Annett 
Type 1: Concentrated Groups 







Type 5: Concentrated Groups 







Type 9: Dispersed Groups 







Type 13: Dispersed Groups 







Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Table 6.18: Marginal Effects of Ethnic Distributions on Protest 




Alesina et al. 
d       F 
Fearon 
d       F 
Annett 
d         F 
Type 9 vs. Type 1 -1.23 4.80** -1.04 3.84** -1.18 4.38** 
Type 9 vs. Type 5 -0.75 1.42 -0.75 1.22 -0.74 1.34 
Type 13 vs. Type 1 -1.25 4.53** -1.28 4.35** -1.25 4.47** 




Alesina et al. 
d       2χ  
Fearon 
d       2χ  
Annett 
d         2χ  
Type 9 vs. Type 1 -1.12 4.32** -0.96 3.73** -1.09 4.14** 
Type 9 vs. Type 5 -0.57 0.68 -0.61 0.66 -0.57 0.69 
Type 13 vs. Type 1 -1.41 4.92** -1.44 4.67** -1.39 4.73** 
Type 13 vs. Type 5 -0.86 2.21* -1.09 2.87** -0.87 2.27* 
Note: d is calculated by subtracting the predicted protest levels of the later type from that 
of the former type in each pair of comparison. In each pair, the later type should be 
associated with a higher degree of ethnic strife than the former type. ***p<.01; **p<.05; 





Table 6.19: Predicted Protest Levels in Cases Involving Groups Living under 
Presidential-PR Systems (Between-Effects Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Fearon Annett 
Type 2: Concentrated Groups 







Type 6: Concentrated Groups 







Type 10: Dispersed Groups 







Type 14: Dispersed Groups 







Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Table 6.20: Marginal Effects of Ethnic Distributions on Protest 




Alesina et al. 
d       F 
Fearon 
d       F 
Annett 
d         F 
Type 10 vs. Type 2 -0.40 1.23 -0.40 1.13 -0.31 0.61 
Type 10 vs. Type 6 -1.05 7.08*** -1.04 7.08*** -0.79 4.17** 
Type 14 vs. Type 2 -0.17 0.05 -0.27 0.11 -0.72 1.21 




Alesina et al. 
d       2χ  
Fearon 
d       2χ  
Annett 
d         2χ  
Type 10 vs. Type 2 -0.52 2.19* -0.51 2.07* -0.44 1.37 
Type 10 vs. Type 6 -1.08 6.16*** -1.08 6.41*** -0.82 3.82** 
Type 14 vs. Type 2 -0.54 0.48 -0.63 0.67 -0.88 1.91* 
Type 14 vs. Type 6 -1.10 2.20* -1.20 2.63*  -1.26 4.40** 
Note: d is calculated by subtracting the predicted protest levels of the later type from that 
of the former type in each pair of comparison. In each pair, the later type should be 
associated with a higher degree of ethnic strife than the former type. ***p<.01; **p<.05; 





Table 6.21: Predicted Protest Levels in Cases Involving Groups Living under 
Parliamentary-SMD Systems (Between-Effects Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Fearon Annett 
Type 3: Concentrated Groups 







Type 7: Concentrated Groups 







Type 11: Dispersed Groups 







Type 15: Dispersed Groups 







Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Table 6.22: Marginal Effects of Ethnic Distributions on Protest 




Alesina et al. 
d        F 
Fearon 
d        F 
Annett 
d        F 
Type 11 vs. Type 3 0.25 0.20 0.10 0.06 0.27 0.23 
Type 11 vs. Type 7 -0.25 0.27 0.17 0.15 -0.27 0.32 
Type 15 vs. Type 3 1.29 3.28** 1.52 2.01* 1.35 3.59** 




Alesina et al. 
d        2χ  
Fearon 
d        2χ  
Annett 
d        2χ  
Type 11 vs. Type 3 -0.01 0.00 0.28 0.43 0.00 0.00 
Type 11 vs. Type 7 -0.02 0.00 0.20 0.12 -0.05 0.01 
Type 15 vs. Type 3 0.97 1.76* 1.62 2.28* 1.02 1.93* 
Type 15 vs. Type 7 0.96 3.57** 1.54 2.66* 0.97 3.65** 
Note: d is calculated by subtracting the predicted protest levels of the later type from that 
of the former type in each pair of comparison. In each pair, the later type should be 
associated with a higher degree of ethnic strife than the former type. ***p<.01; **p<.05; 





Table 6.23: Predicted Protest Levels in Cases Involving Groups Living under 
Presidential-SMD Systems (Between-Effects Model) 
Type Alesina et al. Fearon Annett 
Type 4: Concentrated Groups 







Type 8: Concentrated Groups 







Type 12: Dispersed Groups 







Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Table 6.24: Marginal Effects of Ethnic Distributions on Protest 




Alesina et al. 
d       F 
Fearon 
d       F 
Annett 
d         F 
Type 12 vs. Type 4 -0.41 0.81 -0.38 0.68 -0.38 0.67 




Alesina et al. 
d     2χ  
Fearon 
d     2χ  
Annett 
d     2χ  
Type 12 vs. Type 4 -0.51 1.42 -0.50 1.36 -0.50 1.33 
Type 12 vs. Type 8 0.17 0.08 0.15 0.06 0.06 0.01 
Note: d is calculated by subtracting the predicted protest levels of the later type from that 
of the former type in each pair of comparison. In each pair, the later type should be 
associated with a higher degree of ethnic strife than the former type. ***p<.01; **p<.05; 








Chapter 7: Modeling Rebellion Intensity with a Zero-Inflated Ordered Probit Model 
 
 This chapter tests whether ignoring my rebellion data’s probability mass at the single 
value of zero, and whether treating an essentially ordinal scale variable as an interval 
scale variable have biased this dissertation’s outcome in favor of my hypotheses.133 I do 
so with an emphasis on whether the effects of political systems and ethnic diversity 
remain the same when using states, instead of groups, as the unit of discussion. I perform 
a recently developed zero-inflated ordered probit (ZIOP) model (with robust standard 
errors to take care of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity). This model arguably serves 
as a more appropriate technique for my data structure and helps unravel the effects of the 
variables of interest on the probabilities of every rebellion level. Only the Alesina index 
of ethnic fractionalization is used in the analysis because Chapters 5-6 have shown that 
this index was the most representative data. This index always produced the same results 
as at least one of the other two indices. This chapter concludes that the ZIOP model 
generally better confirms my theories and the effects of control variable.134 
Before introducing the ZIOP model and discussing the test results of this chapter, I 
briefly review the state of “dual regime” models which have been designed to analyze 
data with excess zeros.135 
 
 
                                                 
133 Please refer to Table 4.1 and footnote 4 of Chapter 4 for details about why the rebellion data should be 
ordered. 
134 In Chapter 5, I showed that only a few control variables are significant and some of them even have 
unexpected signs. 
135 The first regime model usually involves a selection, a censuring, or a hurdle equation which determines 
whether an individual will (be observed to) participate in specific political activity, such as engaging in 
protest and making political contributions. The second regime model determines an individual’s level of 
political participation once s/he becomes a participant. 
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7.1 Dual-Regime Models for Interval, Ordered, and Event Count Data 
The development of zero-inflated models is not new. Since 1958 in which Tobin 
devised the Tobit model to analyze data with an interval scale and negative yet censored 
values at zero, many more dual regime models have been proposed. For example, the 
Heckit model invented by Heckman (1979) has emerged as the default alternative to Tobit 
when values cluster at zero because of selection bias rather than censoring (Sigelman and 
Zeng 1999),136 and when it is not obvious that a single set of coefficients would explain 
both regimes of models (Grier et al. 1994). 
 For other examples, hurdle Poisson models (Mullahy 1986; King 1989),137 
zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) models (Lambert 1992; Greene 1994),138 zero-inflated 
Binomial (ZIB) models with random effects (Hall 2000),139 zero-inflated Negative 
Binomial (ZINB) models (Lambert 1992; Green 1994, 2000; Long 1997) were developed 
for event count data with preponderant zero observations.140 There had been no 
techniques to address this same problem of ordinal scale variables until very recently 
when the ZIOP model was proposed by Harris and Zhao in 2004. 
 All these dual-regime models save the ZIOP model have been increasingly 
considered or used in the studies of the discipline. For example, Lubell et al. (2002) use a 
ZINB model to investigate the impact of watershed features on the benefits and 
                                                 
136 According to Sigelman and Zeng (1999), many studies have mistakenly used the Tobit model when the 
zeros of their data do not result from censoring mechanisms or when actual censoring is at other values than 
zero. Furthermore, the Heckit model has also been frequently and inappropriately used as an alternative to 
Tobit for analyzing exclusively nonnegative data. These misuses result in undesirable consequences, 
implying the importance of carefully selecting models. 
137 This model should be used for data with the absence of zero counts in the second stage of the model and 
with an asymmetrical probability distribution. Please refer to Zorn (1996) for the comparison of 
zero-inflated and hurdle Poisson specifications. 
138 This model is appropriate for data with the presence of zero counts in the second stage of the model and 
with a symmetrical probability distribution. 
139 This model works for upper bounded count data with excess zeros and with unit heterogeneity. 
140 ZINB models better deal with the overdispersion problem than ZIP models. 
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transaction costs on the emergence of watershed partnerships in the United States.141 
Clark (2003) performs a ZIP model to account for strategic interaction in world 
politics.142 Tobit and Heckit regression models have also been employed to analyze a 
wide range of political phenomena, such as “campaign contributions (Chappell 1982; 
Grier and Munger 1993; Grier et al. 1994; McCarty and Rothenberg 1996), PAC activities 
(Romer and Snyder 1994), vote choice (Herron 1998), the president’s use of military 
force (Morgan and Bickers 1992; Meernik 1994; Wang 1996), the occurrence of political 
protest (Walton and Ragin 1990; Roneck 1992), and the determinants of political violence 
(Jacobs and O’Brien 1998)” (Sigelman and Zeng 1999). The lately developed ZIOP 
model has never been used in any political science research except for in this study, to the 
best of my knowledge. This model should soon become popular since many political 
variables are inherently ordered and have excess zeros, such as many survey responses on 
opinions, ethnic conflict variables of the MAR dataset, reforms of electoral systems, 
corruption levels, and numerous others. 
 The burgeoning development and use of these zero-inflated models suggest the 
unwanted consequences resulting from misusing single regime models in the presence of 
dual regimes. For example, performing OLS regressions on interval scale variables with 
values censored at zero and with many zero observations would lead to biased and 
inconsistent estimates (Grier et al. 1994). For another example, performing poisson 
regression models in the presence of excess zeros would generate a huge gap between 
observed and predicted values for the percentage of counts (Hall 2000). For yet another 
example, using a conventional ordered probit model would not unravel the potentially 
                                                 
141 Burgoon (2006) and McKay et al. (2007) also consider using ZINB models. This consideration of many 
studies suggests that paying attention to the potential excess of zeros has increasingly become a must in 
political science research involving event count data. 
142 Please refer to Lubell et al. (2005) for another example. 
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opposing effects of any regressors that have been included in both regimes of the model 
(Harris and Zhao 2004). This consequence may constitute one source of biased estimates 
of my between-effects and hierarchical models. Before discussing this point and the other 
findings of this chapter in detail, I introduce my ZIOP model in the next section. 
 
7.2 The Zero-Inflated Ordered Probit Model 
 A ZIOP model involves two latent equations: a probit equation and an ordered probit 
equation (Harris and Zhao 2004). The first latent equation determines whether 
anti-regime ethnic rebellion will be recorded by coders of the dataset.143 I argue that the 
level of democracy and regime durability impact on the outcome. More liberal and 
enduring democracies should better protect freedom of the press and have more 
well-developed and independent media, which ensures the availability of news reports 
about rebellion on which coders of the dataset rely to construct the variable. The ordered 
probit equation determines, once violent conflict is coded, the probability that ethnic 
groups engage in a specific level of violent conflict (including very small conflict that is 
practically not different from no conflict from the perspectives of data coders). The 
original 14 variables of interest and 8 control factors constitute the covariates of this 
                                                 
143 Well-trained students who underwent a rigorous training period have served as the coders of the MAR 
dataset. I have tested whether adding other variables in this first equation changes my findings. These 
variables include political, economic, and cultural differentials between dominant and minority groups, 
which determine whether ethnic groups engage in rebellion. I expect that greater cultural differentials lead 
to higher likelihoods and higher levels of rebellion. Greater economic differentials lead to higher 
likelihoods yet lower levels of rebellion. Greater political differentials result in lower likelihoods yet higher 
levels of rebellion. All these expectations receive supportive evidence. More importantly, the effects of all 
the other variables remain unchanged. Since the major purpose of this chapter is to retest my theories, I 
present and discuss a simpler ZIOP model without these variables just mentioned. Please refer to Hines and 
Civettini (2005) for a Monte Carlo simulation testing the effects of two common types of misspecification 
in ZINB models. Their findings indicate that with the two types of misspecification, estimates on variables 
of interest are not biased towards finding significance, and, hence can be reported with confidence. While 
no similar simulation exists for the ZIOP model, my study shows that omitting important variables in the 
first regime of the model does not significantly change the effects of variables of interest. 
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second latent equation. 
 Let q denotes a binary variable specifying the split between the two regimes q = 0 
(meaning no records of ethnic conflict) and q = 1 (meaning having records of ethnic 
conflict). This variable is associated with the first latent variable, ,q * ε+′= βx  
where x  includes the variables of the level of democracy and regime durability that 
determine whether ethnic conflict will be recorded. β  is a vector of unknown 
parameters to be estimated. The probability of violent conflict being recorded is given by 
),(   )0Pr(q  )1 Pr(q * βxxx ′Φ=>==  
where (.)Φ  indicates the cumulative distribution function of the univariate standard 
normal distribution. 
 Given that q = 1, conflict levels are represented by J) ..., 1, 0,  y~( y~ = , which is 
connected to the second underlying latent variable, ,y~ * u+′= γw  
Where w  is a vector of the original 22 variables. γ  is a vector of unknown coefficients. 
As aforementioned, zero conflict is also allowed in this second stage of the model. 
Furthermore, while enduring regime appears in both equations, this variable has opposing 
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Where the s,µ are parameters to be estimated with γ . Assuming that u  is normally 
distributed, the ordered probit probabilities are given by Greene (2003): 
                                                 
144 As aforementioned, in terms of whether rebellion is marked down, enduring regime should have 
positive effects because that factor relates to the development of independent media as the fourth branch of 
government. In respect of the severity of ethnic conflict, however, enduring regime may have negative 
impact. Since ethnic conflict is more likely to be severe when regimes experience transitions, older regimes 
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To observe a specific level of rebellion thus requires 
1.y~qy >×=  
Put differently, a positive y  requires jointly that ethnic conflict is recorded and that the 
level of conflict is big enough for data coders ( 0y~ and 1q >= ). Conversely, no conflict 
( 0y = ) is observed either because no conflict is recorded ( 0q = ) or because the conflict 
level is so small that it is practically not different from no conflict from the perspectives 
of data coders ( 0y~ and 1q == ). Assuming that u and ε  have an identical and 
independent standard Gaussian distribution, the full probabilities of my ZIOP model are 
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The log-likelihood function is 
















 outcome chooses  individual if 1 ji
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    For the starting values of the ZIOP model, ordered probit parameter estimates have 




    Table 7.1 reports the coefficient estimates of the ZIOP model. One most striking 
difference distinguishing this table from the analogous tables of Chapters 5-6 is that all 
save three variables of Table 7.1 produce significant estimates. Only a few variables are 
significant in the previous chapters.145 
 
7.3.1 Control Variables 
Table 7.2 presents the expected and estimated relations between control variables 
and ethnic conflict. The ordered parameters’ signs and significance of both the 
between-effects and the ZIOP models are shown for the purpose of comparison. 
As expected, the two splitting parameters, level of democracy and enduring regime, 
positively affect whether rebellion is recorded. Looking at the results for enduring regime, 
the between-effects model treating all zeros as homogenous mistakenly indicates that 
older regimes are more likely to experience severe rebellion. With the two types of zeros 
separated, the ZIOP model shows that older regimes’ ethnic conflict is more likely to be 
recorded while there is no significant difference in the probabilities of observing a 
specific level of rebellion between more and less enduring regimes. Among the remaining 
seven ordered parameters, the ZIOP model produces five significant estimates with 
expected signs while the between-effects model generates only two, and one of them is 
barely significant at the 90% confidence level. Furthermore, change in GDP per capita 
produces a significant yet unexpectedly opposite estimate in the between-effects model. 
This estimate is likely to be biased due to the model’s treating rebellion as interval data,  
 
                                                 
145 Saideman et al.’s Prais-Winsten regression model with PCSE also provides only 3 significant estimates 
among the 8 control variables because of using an inappropriate model (Saideman et al. 2002). 
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Table 7.1: ZIOP Model: Rebellion, 1985-2003 
Splitting Parameters                          b                SE 
Level of democracy    .15*** .05 
Enduring regime    .03*** .00 
Constant  -1.64*** .36 
Ordered Parameters                           
Parliamentary   1.03*** .37 
PR system -.11 .41 
Concentration   2.68*** .35 
PAR*PR  -5.73*** .51 
PAR*Fractionalization -.70* .40 
PAR*Concentration  -3.40*** .49 
PR*Fractionalization  -6.02*** .45 
PR*Concentration  -1.96*** .45 
Fractionalization*Concentration  -2.09*** .31 
PAR*PR*Fractionalization 11.46*** .91 
PAR*PR*Concentration   9.85*** .73 
PAR*Fractionalization*Concentration   4.16*** .60 
PR*Fractionalization*Concentration   7.73*** .62 
PAR*PR*Fractionalization*Concentration -15.91*** 1.13 
Federal system  -.29** .14 
Enduring regime -.00 .00 
First election   .46** .22 
Log GDP per capita   -.49*** .06 
Change in GDP per capita .06 1.17 
Political differentials    .27*** .05 
Economic differentials   -.16*** .04 
Cultural differentials    .23*** .06 
Constant   2.31*** .66 
μ1    .73*** .07 
μ2   1.23*** .09 
μ3   1.44*** .10 
μ4   2.05*** .12 
μ5   2.66*** .15 
μ6   3.36*** .18 
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Table 7.2: The Expected and Estimated Relations between Control Variables and Rebellion 







Level of democracy + NA +*** 
Enduring regime + NA +*** 
Ordered Parameters 
Federal system - or 0 - -** 
Enduring regime - +* - 
First election + + +** 
Log GDP per capita - -** -*** 
Change in GDP per capita - +* + 
Politiacl differentials + +* +*** 
Economic differentials + - -*** 
Cultural differentials + + +*** 
Note: BEM stands for between-effects models. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
and ignoring the problem of excess zeros. Although the variable of economic differentials 
is surprisingly associated with a negative sign in the ZIOP model, one reason may explain 
this unexpected finding. According to Horowitz (1985), ethnic divisions of labor, which 
he finds foster mutually complementary economic roles between ethnic groups, usually 
mitigate rather than facilitate economic competition and political conflict between groups. 
In societies with greater economic distances between ethnic groups, arguably it is more 
likely to see ethnic divisions of labor, and hence, less severe ethnic conflict. 
In sum, the discussion of Table 7.2 concludes that the ZIOP model better confirms 
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Table 7.3: Full Probabilities of Each Level of Rebellion 
Type Prob[y=0] Prob[y=1] Prob[y=2] Prob[y=3] Prob[y=4] Prob[y=5] Prob[y=6] Prob[y=7] 
Concentrated Groups Facing One Rival Group         
Type 1: PAR-PR Systems 0.3909 0.1182 0.1219 0.0566 0.1483 0.0985 0.0502 0.0154 
Type 2: PRE-PR Systems 0.7698 0.1442 0.0516 0.0126 0.0171 0.0040 0.0007 0.0000 
Type 3: PAR-SMD Systems 0.8368 0.1117 0.0333 0.0073 0.0089 0.0018 0.0003 0.0000 
Type 4: PRE-SMD Systems 0.3650 0.0841 0.1036 0.0535 0.1587 0.1263 0.0780 0.0308 
Concentrated Groups Facing Multiple Rival Groups         
Type 5: PAR-PR Systems 0.6674 0.1786 0.0815 0.0232 0.0360 0.0107 0.0024 0.0002 
Type 6: PRE-PR Systems 0.8534 0.1025 0.0290 0.0062 0.0073 0.0014 0.0002 0.0000 
Type 7: PAR-SMD Systems 0.4977 0.1815 0.1255 0.0458 0.0922 0.0410 0.0138 0.0025 
Type 8: PRE-SMD Systems 0.7732 0.1427 0.0506 0.0123 0.0166 0.0039 0.0007 0.0000 
Dispersed Groups Facing One Rival Group         
Type 9: PAR-PR Systems 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Type10: PRE-PR Systems 0.9125 0.0662 0.0150 0.0028 0.0029 0.0005 0.0001 0.0000 
Type11: PAR-SMD Systems 0.6598 0.1803 0.0838 0.0240 0.0378 0.0114 0.0026 0.0003 
Type12: PRE-SMD Systems 0.8952 0.0775 0.0189 0.0037 0.0040 0.0007 0.0001 0.0000 
Dispersed Groups Facing Multiple Rival Groups         
Type13: PAR-PR Systems 0.9067 0.0700 0.0163 0.0031 0.0033 0.0005 0.0001 0.0000 
Type14: PRE-PR Systems 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Type15: PAR-SMD Systems 0.8334 0.1135 0.0342 0.0075 0.0092 0.0018 0.0003 0.0001 
Note: Rebellion was measured by a 8-point scale with 0=none reported, 1=political banditry, 2=campaigns of terrorism, 3= local 




Table 7.4: Conditional Probabilities of Each Level of Rebellion 
Type Prob[y=0] Prob[y=1] Prob[y=2] Prob[y=3] Prob[y=4] Prob[y=5] Prob[y=6] Prob[y=7] 
Concentrated Groups Facing One Rival Group         
Type 1: PAR-PR Systems 0.0860 0.1774 0.1829 0.0849 0.2225 0.1477 0.0754 0.0232 
Type 2: PRE-PR Systems 0.6546 0.2163 0.0774 0.0190 0.0256 0.0060 0.0010 0.0001 
Type 3: PAR-SMD Systems 0.7551 0.1676 0.0500 0.0110 0.0134 0.0026 0.0004 0.0000 
Type 4: PRE-SMD Systems 0.0471 0.1263 0.1555 0.0803 0.2382 0.1896 0.1171 0.0460 
Concentrated Groups Facing Multiple Rival Groups         
Type 5: PAR-PR Systems 0.5009 0.2680 0.1223 0.0347 0.0541 0.0160 0.0035 0.0004 
Type 6: PRE-PR Systems 0.7800 0.1538 0.0435 0.0093 0.0110 0.0021 0.0003 0.0000 
Type 7: PAR-SMD Systems 0.2462 0.2723 0.1883 0.0688 0.1383 0.0616 0.0207 0.0038 
Type 8: PRE-SMD Systems 0.6597 0.2141 0.0759 0.0185 0.0249 0.0058 0.0010 0.0001 
Dispersed Groups Facing One Rival Group         
Type 9: PAR-PR Systems 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Type10: PRE-PR Systems 0.8687 0.0994 0.0226 0.0042 0.0044 0.0007 0.0001 0.0000 
Type11: PAR-SMD Systems 0.4894 0.2706 0.1257 0.0361 0.0568 0.0171 0.0038 0.0004 
Type12: PRE-SMD Systems 0.8427 0.1163 0.0283 0.0055 0.0060 0.0010 0.0001 0.0000 
Dispersed Groups Facing Multiple Rival Groups         
Type13: PAR-PR Systems 0.8600 0.1051 0.0245 0.0046 0.0049 0.0008 0.0001 0.0000 
Type14: PRE-PR Systems 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Type15: PAR-SMD Systems 0.7500 0.1703 0.0513 0.0113 0.0139 0.0028 0.0004 0.0000 
Note: Rebellion was measured by a 8-point scale with 0=none reported, 1=political banditry, 2=campaigns of terrorism, 3= local 
rebellion, 4=small-scale guerrilla activity, 5=intermediate guerrilla activity, 6= large-scale guerrilla activity, and 7=protracted civil 
war. 
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the effects of these control variables than the between-effects and hierarchical models. In 
order to make sense of the coefficient magnitudes of the variables of interest, I calculate 
the full probabilities of my ZIOP model by holding the institutional and contextual factors 
at their two different values in turn and the other variables at their sample means. I report 
these full probabilities on Table 7.3. The marginal effects of political systems and ethnic 
contexts can be derived by comparing these probabilities. I do not present the marginal 
effects of control variables since these effects are not the focus of this study. 
Table 7.3 provides strong support for my hypotheses about the effect of power 
















to better summarize the findings. 1≥Y  represents the event of “having recorded and 
nontrivial violent conflict ( 0y~ and 1q >= )”. cx denotes control variables whose values 
are held at their sample means. 
If S<0, then ) A, Type1Pr() B, Type1Pr(
cc
YY xx ≥<≥ . That is, changing from 
Type A to Type B decreases the probability of having violent conflict, and S is the 
proportion decrease under Type B using Type A as a baseline. Conversely, if S>0, then 
changing from Type A to Type B increases the probability of having rebellion, and S is 
the proportion increase. 
Together with the S statistic in the following tables is the standard 2χ  statistic, 
which compares the coefficient magnitudes of each political system and ethnic context. 
While we cannot make sense of these coefficients, their 2χ tests provide information 
about the significance of the differences between these coefficients. 
Drawing histograms is another way of summarizing the effects of these variables of  
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interest. The following figures present the conditional (i.e. the ordered probit) 
probabilities of each level of rebellion in cases involving different political systems and 
ethnic contexts. The empirical patterns about the effects of the institutional and ethnic 
factors remain the same regardless of looking at the full or the conditional probabilities. 
However, the conditional probabilities better capture the focus of my theories, i.e. the 
effects of political systems and ethnic contexts, once rebellion is recorded. Table 7.4 
reports these conditional probabilities which have been used to draw histograms. It can 
be found that while conditional probabilities are lower than full probabilities for y=0, 
the reduction associated with theoretically worse political systems (e.g. Type 1) or 
ethnic contexts (e.g. Type 4) is greater than theoretically better political systems (e.g. 
Type 2) or ethnic contexts (e.g. Type 12). Put differently, the effects of the institutional 
and contextual factors become larger once we focus on conditional probabilities. 
Histograms made from Table 7.4 thus better highlight the impact of these political and 
contextual factors. 
 
7.3.2 Political Institutions 
7.3.2.1 States with Two Ethnic Groups 
Table 7.5 presents the S and 2χ  statistics, which have been calculated from the full 
probabilities of Table 7.3, for cases involving states with two ethnic groups. The test 
results of Table 7.5 are consistent with my expectations. Presidential-PR systems (Type 
2) have been proved to better prevent rebellion and severe violent conflict than most of 
the other political systems in cases involving concentrated groups facing one rival group 
(Types 1, 3, and 4). Specifically, in these cases, changing from parliamentary-PR and 
presidential-SMD systems to presidential-PR 
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Table 7.5: Proportion Change of Rebellion and Marginal Effects of Political Systems  
in Cases Involving States with Two Ethnic Groups 
 S 2χ  
Concentrated Groups   
PRE-PR (Type 2) vs. PAR-PR (Type 1) -0.62 41.93*** 
PRE-PR (Type 2) vs. PAR-SMD (Type 3) 0.44 1.26 
PRE-PR (Type 2) vs. PRE-SMD (Type 4) -0.63 85.71*** 
Dispersed Groups   
PRE-PR (Type 10)vs. PAR-PR (Type 9) NA# 210.68*** 
PRE-PR (Type 10) vs. PAR-SMD (Type 11) -0.74 13.33*** 
PRE-PR (Type 10)vs. PRE-SMD (Type 12) -0.10 0.08 
# S is unavailable because Type 9 has a zero probability of having recorded rebellion. 
Type 10 has a 9% probability. 
Note: S is calculated by first dividing the former type (a theoretically desirable system) of 
each pair of comparison by the latter type (a theoretically undesirable system), and then 
subtracting one from the result. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
systems are associated with a 62% and a 63% proportion decrease in the probability of 
experiencing rebellion (Pr(y≧1), respectively. Or equivalently, presidential-PR systems 
have a 38% and a 40% lower probability to experience rebellion than parliamentary-PR 
and presidential-SMD systems, respectively. Furthermore, Table 7.3 shows that while 
ethnic groups under presidential-PR systems have a little higher probability to 
participate in political banditry (y=1), these groups have lower probabilities to engage in 
more severe rebellion (y>1) than their counterparts under most of the other systems. 
While theoretically undesirable parliamentary-SMD systems seem to outperform 
presidential-PR systems (Pr(y=0) = 84% and 77%, respectively), as suggested in the 
positive S statistic, the difference is both statistically and substantively insignificant. 
In cases involving dispersed groups facing one rival group (Types 9-12), while some 
institutions have significant effects on these groups’ conflict behavior, these effects have 
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been proved to be relatively small. All these groups in question have rarely engaged in 
conflict (Pr(y=0)≧90% for three out of the four types) and acted as heavy 
combatants.146 The groups living in states with parliamentary-SMD systems constitute 
the only exception. The significant difference between this type of group (Type 11) and 
dispersed groups living in states with presidential-PR systems (Type 10) confirms the 
superiority of presidential-PR systems (Pr(y=0)=91%) over parliamentary-SMD systems 
(Pr(y=0)=66%) in states with two ethnic groups. An analogous hypothesis has been 
rejected in cases involving concentrated groups. Because of this finding in cases 
involving dispersed groups and the aforementioned findings in cases involving 
concentrated groups, presidential-PR systems have been proved to provide the best 
institutional design for states with two major ethnic groups than all the other political 
systems. This strong conclusion will not hold if states with two ethnic groups do not 
(and will never) have spatially dispersed groups. According to the MAR dataset, this 
was rarely the case. Both the between-effects and hierarchical models of this dissertation 
have failed to find that presidential-PR systems outperform parliamentary-SMD systems 
in less divided societies, suggesting again the advantage of the ZIOP model in analyzing 
my dataset. 
Figures 7.1-2 based on the conditional probabilities of Table 7.4 provide graphical 
display of my findings. 
                                                 
146 Although parliamentary-PR systems in Type 9 significantly and unexpectedly outperform 
presidential-PR systems in Type 10, the difference in Pr(y=0) is very small (9%) and much smaller than 
that between these two systems in cases involving concentrated groups facing one rival group (38%). When 
considering institutional engineering, a less diverse state with both concentrated and dispersed groups 
should therefore choose presidential-PR systems. 
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Figure 7.1: The Propensity of Concentrated Groups for Conflict
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Figure 7.2: The Propensity of Dispersed Groups for Conflict
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Table 7.6: Proportion Change of Rebellion and Marginal Effects of Political Systems 
in Cases Involving States with Multiple Ethnic Groups 
 S 2χ  
Concentrated Groups   
PAR-PR (Type 5) vs. PAR-SMD (Type 7) -0.34 6.17** 
PRE-PR (Type 6) vs. PAR-SMD (Type 7) -0.70 35.72*** 
PRE-SMD (Type 8) vs. PAR-SMD (Type 7) -0.54 14.02*** 
Dispersed Groups   
PAR-PR (Type 13) vs. PAR-SMD (Type 15) -0.47 0.63 
PRE-PR (Type 14) vs. PAR-SMD (Type 15) NA# 260.34*** 
# S is unavailable because Type 14 has a zero probability of having recorded rebellion. 
Type 15 has a 17% probability. 
Note: S is calculated by first dividing the former type (a theoretically desirable system) of 
each pair of comparison by the latter type (a theoretically undesirable system), and then 
subtracting one from the result. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
7.3.2.2 States with Multiple Ethnic Groups 
In cases involving concentrated groups facing multiple ethnic others (Types 5-7), in 
accordance with the previous findings of Chapter 5, parliamentary-SMD systems (Type 7) 
perform uniformly worse than all the other systems (Types 5, 6, and 8) as shown in Type 
7’s being associated with a much higher probability to fight violently against their 
regimes (Pr(y>0)=50%, compared to Type 5’s 33%, Type 6’s 15%, and Type 8’s 23%). 
Table 7.6 reports the significance levels of these differences between parliamentary-SMD 
and all the other systems, as well as the proportion decrease when changing from 
parliamentary-SMD systems to all the other political systems in the cases in question. 
In cases involving dispersed groups facing multiple ethnic others (Types 13-15), the  
effects of institutions are generally smaller because all these dispersed groups have a  
low probability to have recorded rebellion as Tables 7.3 shows (Pr(y>0)=0~17%). 
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Table 7.7: Proportion Change of Rebellion and Marginal Effects of Ethnic Diversity in 
Cases Involving States with Parliamentary-PR Systems 
 S 2χ  
Concentrated Groups   
Multiple Ethnic Others (Type 5) vs. One Rival Group (Type 1) -0.46 16.41*** 
Dispersed Groups   
Multiple Ethnic Others (Type 13) vs. One Rival Group (Type 9) NA# 99.60*** 
# S is unavailable because Type 9 has a zero probability of having recorded rebellion. 
Type 13 has a 9% probability. 
Note: S is calculated by dividing the former type (a theoretically desirable ethnic context) 
of each pair of comparison by the latter type (a theoretically undesirable ethnic context, 
and then subtracting one from the result. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
Regardless, parliamentary-SMD systems perform uniformly worse than all the other 
systems, and the difference between these undesirable systems and presidential-PR 
systems is statistically significant. The conclusion I made in Chapter 5 remains the same, 
i.e. for countries with multiple ethnic groups, the only institutional configuration they 
need to avoid is a parliamentary-SMD system. 
Figures 7.3-4 based on the conditional probabilities of Table 7.4 provide graphical 
evidence of this conclusion. 
In sum, the ZIOP model provides three findings about the impact of political 
systems. First, the conclusion I made about the best institutional design for concentrated 
groups remain the same. Second, contrary to my previous findings, some institutions 
significantly impact on the probability that dispersed groups engage in heavy rebellion 
(Pr (y≧1)). Theoretically desirable institutions have been proved to better reduce the 
likelihood of these groups’ engagement in severe rebellion, compared to some 
theoretically undesirable systems (i.e. Type 10 vs. Type 11 and Type 14 vs. Type 15). 
These unique findings that the ZIOP model provides further highlight the importance of 
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institutional engineering. Although dispersed groups are more likely to co-exist 
peacefully with other ethnic groups, institutions are not completely irrelevant to 
dispersed groups. Third, more often than not, what better meets the needs of 
concentrated groups also better serves the interests of dispersed groups, controlling for 
ethnic diversity. This finding, though contrary to that of Chapter 5 which refuses the 
effects of political systems in cases involving dispersed groups, provides good news to 
institutional designers. Institutional designers do not need to worry about the divergent 
preferences of concentrated and dispersed ethnic groups. When political systems 
perform differently in cases involving these two types of ethnic groups, political systems 
have much stronger effects on preventing severe conflict in cases involving concentrated 
groups than in cases involving dispersed groups. Put differently, the attitude of 
concentrated groups should dominate that of dispersed groups in institutional design in 
order to achieve greater political stability. 
 
7.3.3 Ethnic Diversity 
7.3.3.1 States with Parliamentary-PR Systems 
Table 7.7 presents the S and 2χ  statistics for cases involving states with 
parliamentary-PR systems. In the analysis of Chapter 6, the effect of ethnic diversity in 
these states is consistent with the expectation of my theory, but is statistically 
insignificant. The ZIOP model provides better results. Parliamentary-PR systems in 
cases involving concentrated groups facing multiple rival groups (Type 5) have a much 
higher probability of observing zero rebellion (Pr(y=0)=67%) and a significantly lower 
probability of observing heavy rebellion (Pr(y>1)=15%) than their counterparts in 
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Figure 7.3: The Propensity of Concentrated Groups for Conflict
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Figure 7.4: The Propensity of Dispersed Groups for Conflict
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Table 7.8: Proportion Change of Rebellion and Marginal Effects of Ethnic Diversity in 
Cases Involving States with Presidential-PR Systems 
 S 2χ  
Concentrated Groups   
Multiple Ethnic Others (Type 2) vs. One Rival Group (Type 6) 0.53 3.75* 
Dispersed Groups   
Multiple Ethnic Others (Type 10) vs. One Rival Group (Type 14) NA# 176.53***
# S is unavailable because Type 14 has a zero probability of having recorded rebellion. 
Type 10 has a 9% probability. 
Note: S is calculated by dividing the former type (a theoretically desirable ethnic context) 
of each pair of comparison by the latter type (a theoretically undesirable ethnic context), 
and then subtracting one from the result. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
cases involving concentrated groups facing only one rival group (Type 1 with 
Pr(y=0)=39% and Pr(y>1)=49%). The analogous comparison in cases involving 
dispersed groups (Type 9 vs. Type 13) find opposite results, but their differences in 
Pr(y=0) and Pr (y>1) are only 9% and only 3%, respectively. While I have not had an 
explanation for these mixed results, these findings lead to a conclusion that is largely 
consistent with my expectation: in cases involving ethnic groups living in 
parliamentary-PR systems, heavy rebellion is less likely in states with more than two 
ethnic groups than in those with only two groups. Two points explain the reasons. First, 
the difference between Type 9 and Type 13 is substantively much less substantial than 
that between Type 1 and Type 5. Second, ethnically divided societies with multiple 
groups rarely have only concentrated or dispersed groups. Given these reasons, 
parliamentary-PR systems in states with multiple ethnic groups are less likely to 
experience (severe) rebellion than their counterparts in states with only two ethnic 
groups, unless heterogeneous states have much more dispersed groups than concentrated 
groups. 
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Figures 7.5-6 based on the conditional probabilities of Table 7.4 provide graphical  
display of these findings. 
 
7.3.3.2 States with Presidential-PR Systems 
Table 7.8 presents the S and 2χ  statistics for cases involving states with 
presidential-PR systems. In these cases, concentrated groups facing multiple rival 
groups (Type 6) have a significantly higher and lower probability of observing zero 
rebellion (Pr(y=0)=85%) and heavy rebellion (Pr(y>1)=5%), respectively, than their 
counterparts facing only one rival group (Type 2 with Pr(y=0)=77% and Pr(y>1)=9%). 
The analogous comparison in cases involving dispersed groups (Type 10 vs. Type 14) 
finds a similar result. Specifically, Pr(y=0)=91% and Pr(y>1)=2% for Type 10, and 
Pr(y=0)=100% and Pr(y>1)=0% for Type 14. Though contrary to my theory, it is not 
surprising that presidential-PR systems in states with multiple groups (Types 6 and 14) 
better prevent rebellion and severe conflict than their counterparts in states with only 
two major groups (Type 2 and 10). As explained in Chapter 5, all the electoral systems 
used in Types 6 and 14 somehow constrain a president’s incentives to take care of only 
the needs of his group to the extent that hurts the interest of his ethnic others. Because of 
this inherent desirable feature of Types 6 and 14 in my dataset, presidential-PR systems 
perform similarly well in both types of societies, although more diverse societies 
perform a little better than less diverse societies. This finding implies that a smaller 
number of veto players in Types 6 and 14 does not necessarily lead to a lower level of 
power sharing and, hence, a higher level of ethnic  
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Figure 7.5: The Propensity of Concentrated Groups for Conflict
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Figure 7.6: The Propensity of Dispersed Groups for Conflict
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Figure 7.7: The Propensity of Concentrated Groups for Conflict
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Figure 7.8: The Propensity of Dispersed Groups for Conflict
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Table 7.9: Proportion Change of Rebellion and Marginal Effects of Ethnic Diversity in 
Cases Involving States with Parliamentary-SMD Systems 
 S 2χ  
Concentrated Groups   
Multiple Ethnic Others (Type 3) vs. One Rival Group (Type 7) -0.68 25.19***
Dispersed Groups   
Multiple Ethnic Others (Type 11) vs. One Rival Group (Type 15) 1.00 3.01* 
Note: S is calculated by dividing Type 3 by Types 7 and 15, respectively, and then 
subtracting one from the result. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
conflict.147 It is also noteworthy that the between-effects and the hierarchical models of 
Chapter 6 provided no significant findings at the 95% confidence level about the effect 
of ethnic diversity in states with these presidential-PR systems. 
Figures 7.7-8 based on the conditional probabilities of Table 7.4 provide graphical 
evidence of this conclusion. 
 
7.3.3.3 States with Parliamentary-SMD Systems 
Table 7.9 presents the S and 2χ  statistics for cases involving states with 
parliamentary-SMD systems. While previous analysis found no consistently significant 
difference between more diverse and less diverse societies in these cases, the S and 2χ  
statistics suggest mixed findings concerning the effect of ethnic diversity. In cases 
involving concentrated groups, less diverse societies (Type 3) better prevent rebellion 
than more diverse societies (Type 7). In cses involving dispersed groups, the opposite is 
true. The probability differences for Pr(y=0) and for Pr (y>1) are 34% and 27%, 
                                                 
147 According to Tsebelis (1995), the combination of presidential and multiparty systems results in a small 
number of veto players, compared to presidential-biparty systems. Arguably, semi-presidential and 
presidential systems should have similar numbers of veto players given that states with these government 
structures use the same electoral systems. Please refer to Chapter 3 for details. Among the states of Types 6 
and 14, most, if not all, of them should have presidential-multiparty systems. Among the states of Types 2 
and 10, most, if not all, of them should have presidential-biparty systems.  
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respectively, in cases involving concentrated groups. The two probability differences, 
which are also large, equal 17% and 6% in cases involving dispersed groups. It remains 
unclear why more diverse and less diverse states with parliamentary-SMD systems do 
not have a similar probability to experience every level of rebellion as my theory 
predicts. This is one of the very few examples which show that the ZIOP model does not 
provide supportive evidence for my theory. I will discuss possible reasons in the 
concluding chapter. 
Figures 7.9-10 based on the conditional probabilities of Table 7.4 provide graphical 
display for these mixed findings. 
 
7.3.3.4 States with Presidential-SMD Systems 
Table 7.10 presents the S and 2χ  statistics for cases involving states with 
presidential-SMD systems. In accordance with my theory, heterogeneous states better 
prevent (severe) rebellion in these cases as shown in their 46% lower probability of 
experiencing intense rebellion (y>1). Figure 7.11 based on the conditional probabilities 
of Table 7.4 provide graphical evidence of this finding. 
In sum, while the between-effects and hierarchical models confirm the effect of 
ethnic diversity only in states with presidential-SMD systems, the ZIOP model provides 
evidence of that effect in every political system save parliamentary-SMD systems. 
Furthermore, our general image of dispersed groups evaporates in the ZIOP estimates. 
When the ethnic nature of these groups’ societies does not favor their power sharing in a 
specific political system, dispersed groups may fight violently against their regimes as 
well. Finally, the ZIOP model fails to find consistent impact of ethnic diversity in states 
with parliamentary-PR and parliamentary-SMD systems. 
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Figure 7.9: The Propensity of Concentrated Groups for Conflict
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Figure 7.10: The Propensity of Dispersed Groups for Conflct
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Table 7.10: Proportion Change of Rebellion and Marginal Effects of Ethnic Diversity in 
Cases Involving States with Presidential-SMD Systems 
 S 2χ  
Concentrated Groups   
Multiple Ethnic Others (Type 8) vs. One Rival Group (Type 4) -0.63 44.02***
Note: S is calculated by dividing Type 8 (a theoretically desirable ethnic context) by 
Type 4 (a theoretically undesirable ethnic context), and then subtracting one from the 
result. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
 
 
Figure 7.11: The Propensity of Concentrated Groups for Conflict
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Why ethnic diversity in these states has opposite effects on dispersed and concentrated 




Table 7.11: Proportion Change of Rebellion and Marginal Effects of Ethnic Distributions 
 S 2χ  
PAR-PR Systems 
Dispersed Groups Facing One Rival Group (Type 9)  







Dispersed Groups Facing One Rival Group (Type 9)  





Dispersed Groups Facing Multiple Ethnic Others (Type 13)  





Dispersed Groups Facing Multiple Ethnic Others (Type 13)  





PRE-PR Systems  
Dispersed Groups Facing One Rival Group (Type 0)  





Dispersed Groups Facing One Rival Group (Type 10)  





Dispersed Groups Facing Multiple Ethnic Others (Type 14)  





Dispersed Groups Facing Multiple Ethnic Others (Type 14)  





PAR-SMD Systems   
Dispersed Groups Facing One Rival Group (Type 11)  





Dispersed Groups Facing One Rival Group (Type 11)  





Dispersed Groups Facing Multiple Ethnic Others (Type 15)  





Dispersed Groups Facing Multiple Ethnic Others (Type 15)  





PRE-SMD Systems   
Dispersed Groups Facing One Rival Group (Type 12)  





Dispersed Groups Facing One Rival Group (Type 12)  





Note: S is calculated in the same way as aforementioned. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; 2-tailed tests. 
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7.3.4 Ethnic Spatial Distributions 
As Table 7.11 shows, with a few exceptions,148 controlling for institutional 
configurations of government structures and electoral systems and regardless of the 
number of ethnic others, concentrated groups have been confirmed to have significantly 
higher probabilities to engage in rebellion and fight more severely than dispersed groups. 
For example, according to Table 7.4, in cases involving parliamentary-PR systems, 
concentrated groups facing one rival group (Type 1) are associated with a 91% higher 
probability of acting as ethnic combatants than their dispersed counterparts (Type 9), 
once their conflict behavior is recorded. Similar patterns can be found in almost all the 
other controlled comparisons. Table 7.11 thus provides strong evidence for my 
hypotheses about the effect of ethnic distributions. Only a few controlled comparisons 
were significant in the previous analysis of Chapter 6. 
Figures 7.12-15 based on the conditional probabilities of Table 7.4 provide graphical 









                                                 
148 Among these unexpected findings, only one is statistically significant, i.e. the difference between Type 
3 and Type 11. It remains unclear why in cases involving ethnic groups facing one rival group and living in 
states with parliamentary-SMD systems, dispersed groups fight against their regimes more severely than 
concentrated groups. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
“The choice between presidential and parliamentary systems is an easy one from the 
consociational point of view: parliamentary government is clearly superior” (Lijphart 
2002: 49-50). This statement of Lijphart is both provocative and bold given that there 
have been no convincing, generalizable analyses which confirm the advantages of 
parliamentary systems over presidential systems in preventing the occurrence and 
escalation of ethnic conflict.149 
Instead of arguing for a one-size-fits-all solution to widespread ethnic tensions and 
conflicts across the world, this dissertation claims that appropriate institutional solutions 
are ultimately contextual and rest on the nuances of the number and spatial distributions 
of ethnic groups in a country. The effects of these contextual factors on ethnic clashes 
should also bear on the choice of political systems. 
This concluding chapter contains four sections. The first summarizes the main 
elements of my theories regarding how political systems and ethnic contexts affect ethnic 
conflict. The second section highlights the main findings of the zero-inflated ordered 
probit model and the methodological contributions of this dissertation. The third section 
discusses my theories’ key theoretical and policy implications. I conclude this chapter 
with the final section on the limitations of this study and suggestions for future work. 
 
8.1 The Theories of this Dissertation 
 My theories about the link between political systems and ethnic diversity on the one 
hand and ethnic conflict against states on the other hand started with a simple point. 
                                                 
149 Please refer to Chapter 2 for details. 
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Assuming–for the purpose of theory building—that ethnic minorities compete for more 
control of the government in order to better secure their identity, interests, and rights,150 
how likely these groups are to influence policy-making determines whether and how 
severely they engage in conflict. The best preventive institutional configurations are 
therefore those that maximize such probabilities in a specific ethnic context. Whether 
states with multiple or with two groups experience more conflicts and more severe 
clashes is also determined by whether minority groups of these societies have been 
largely prevented from having influence in policy-making in a specific institutional 
arrangement. States with more than two groups and only two groups have been called 
“more diverse countries” and “less diverse countries”, respectively, in this dissertation. I 
first briefly expand on the links between political systems, ethnic diversity, and ethnic 
conflict, before summarizing how ethnic distributions affect ethnic strife in the end of this 
section. 
 Different institutions are required in different ethnic contexts. For spatially 
concentrated minorities facing only one rival group in a state, presidential-PR systems 
should be more desirable than most of the other systems. The parliamentary element of 
this institutional configuration better prohibits one group from gaining total control of 
power without any checks and balances. The PR component of this institutional 
combination better guarantees a concentrated minority group higher proportionality of 
votes to seats. 
 For concentrated groups facing multiple ethnic others, parliamentary-PR and 
presidential-SMD systems constitute preferable institutional frameworks. 
                                                 
150 A government is arguably the greatest potential threat to any group in a state. Please refer to Chapter 3 
for details. 
 223
Parliamentary-PR and presidential-SMD systems better maximize these groups’ policy 
influence by promoting more power sharing and by encouraging checks and balances 
between these groups, respectively. These merits of parliamentary-PR and 
presidential-SMD systems become clearer when discussing the disadvantages of 
parliamentary-SMD and presidential-PR systems. Compared to parliamentary-PR 
systems, parliamentary-SMD systems are undesirable because these systems tend to favor 
only a few groups who join coalition cabinets at the expense of many others who do not 
in states with multiple ethnic groups. This tendency exists because fewer groups will 
have representatives in a parliament due to the use of SMD systems, and fewer parties 
will be needed for the formation and survival of a coalition cabinet. Consequently, fewer 
groups share power and feel secure in parliamentary-SMD systems. Presidential-PR 
systems are not preferable, either, when compared to presidential-SMD systems. 
Although PR systems ensure for concentrated groups fairer shares of seats, these systmes 
tend to promote a fragmented parliament in the presence of multiple ethnic groups. This 
type of parliament may cause a problem when presidential systems are in use. In these 
government structures, ambitious presidents or semipresidents would become dominant 
when they face such a weak, fragmented parliament. All the concentrated groups save 
presidents’ concentrated coethnics feel powerless and insecure and, hence, are more 
likely to engage in more intense ethnic conflict. 
 In contrast to concentrated groups, dispersed groups are essentially more peaceful 
and have lower capabilities to fight for power. For these groups, institutions should be 
relatively irrelevant. However, it is likely that institutions still play a role, however 
weaker it is, in making some dispersed groups become even more peaceful than other 
dispersed groups. If so, what woks best for the interests of concentrated groups should 
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works best for the needs of dispersed groups, holding the number of ethnic groups in a 
state and other relevant variables constant. In sum, there are two likely scenarios in cases 
involving dispersed groups. One is that institutions do not matter. The other is that what 
better prevents or mitigates concentrated groups’ ethnic conflict also better reduces 
dispersed groups’ propensity to fight against states. 
 Different levels of ethnic diversity are preferable in different political systems as 
well. Ethnic groups living in states with parliamentary-PR systems will have a larger 
probability to influence policy if they face more than one rival group. The presence of 
multiple ethnic groups in states using parliamentary-PR systems fosters the formation of 
coalition cabinets. For the members of a coalition, they share both executive and 
legislative power. For those outside coalition cabinets, they also find it easier to threaten 
the survival of these coalition cabinets and, hence, easier to compete for more rights and 
benefits. Conversely, living in states with only one rival group and with these 
parliamentary-PR systems, ethnic minorities have a smaller probability to influence 
policy because dominant rival groups are more capable of forming a stable one-party 
majority cabinet in these institutional and ethnic contexts. 
 In cases involving ethnic groups living in states with presidential-PR systems, more 
diverse societies have disadvantages. PR systems tend to operate in favor of the 
formation of fragmented parliaments when there are multiple ethnic groups. Facing 
fragmented parliaments, ambitious presidents or semi-presidents find it very easy to 
dominate all the ethnic others as aforementioned. When presidential-PR systems are in 
use, ethnic minorities are therefore more likely to feel powerless and insecure in states 
with multiple ethnic groups than in states with only two groups. 
 Parliamentary-SMD systems tend to favor groups who form or join cabinets at the 
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expense of those who do not. This tendency exists in both types of states. Only one ethnic 
group is needed for the formation and survival of a single-party-majority cabinet when 
parliamentary-SMD systems are used in states with two major groups. Only a few more 
ethnic groups are required for the same purpose of a majority coalition cabinet when 
states with more than two groups employ these political systems. Consequently, in both 
types of societies, ethnic groups excluded from cabinets are less likely to threaten the 
survival of ruling alliances. In both societies, these groups are largely prevented from 
having policy influence, so they feel similarly insecure, and have a comparable 
probability to engage in (severe) ethnic strife.  
 Presidential-SMD systems used in states with more than two ethnic groups almost 
always produce divided governments because no single ethnic groups are likely to control 
a majority of seats in a parliament. Divided governments better ensure checks and 
balances between more, if not all, ethnic groups in such states. Conversely, when 
presidential-SMD systems are employed in states with only two major groups, the 
occurrence of divided governments is less frequent, and the exclusive control of power by 
the coethnic of a president is more likely. When presidential-SMD systems are in use, 
ethnic minorities are therefore more likely to rebel and to severely clash with states in 
less diverse societies than in more diverse societies. 
 Ethnic diversity should have similar impact on dispersed and concentrated groups’ 
engagement in rebellion, although this impact may be too weak to be significant in cases 
involving dispersed groups. Dispersed groups may be so peace-prone that they will not 
fight against states even when the ethnic fractionalization levels of their societies do not 
promote their policy influence in a specific political system. 
 In sum, concentrated groups differ from dispersed groups in the extent to which they 
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react to their institutional and ethnic conditions. Concentrated groups become less 
combative when they have more say in policy-making while dispersed groups tend to 
coexist with ethnic others peacefully regardless of whether they live in more empowering 
societies. To investigate the impact of ethnic groups’ spatial distributions on ethnic 
conflict thus requires controlling for the effects of political systems. Ethnic diversity does 
not matter in this investigation, and one example explains why. When parliamentary-PR 
systems are used, concentrated groups are likely to be associated with a higher 
probability of violent conflict than dispersed groups. This likelihood remains unchanged 
even when these concentrated and dispersed groups live in more diverse and less diverse 
countries, respectively. More diverse countries better promote ethnic power sharing than 
less diverse countries when parliamentary-PR systems are used, as aforementioned. An 
uneven distribution of power between dominant and minority groups is more likely to 
persist in both types of societies, however. Given this condition, capable concentrated 
groups living in more empowering countries are still more likely to fight for fairer 
treatments than less capable dispersed groups living in less empowering countries. In sum, 
given a certain political system, capable concentrated groups are more likely to rebel and 
intensely clash with states than dispersed groups regardless of how many ethnic others 
these groups face. 
The dependent variables of this dissertation include nonviolent ethnic protest and 
violent ethnic rebellion. Nonviolent protest serves as a major means people need and use 
to make their voice heard in a democracy. A democracy also requires constant input from 
its society to sustain its functioning and survival, so most democracies protect 
individuals’ right to legally and nonviolently protest. These merits and features of protest 
offset or even eliminate the distinctions between political systems and between ethnic 
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contexts in terms of their effects. Political systems and ethnic contexts should therefore 
have stronger impact on rebellion than on protest. 
 
8.2 Data Analysis and Methodological Contributions 
 These theories were subjected to three statistical tests. The between-effects model 
was used as a better technique—compared to the Beck and Katz approach—due to the 
presence of unit roots and serial autocorrelation problems in my dataset.151 The 
hierarchical model was employed to test whether controlling for multiple random factors 
changes the conclusions that the between-effects model provide. I also performed a 
recently developed zero-inflated ordered probit (ZIOP) model with robust standard errors 
to deal with the excess zeros of my rebellion variable which is essentially ordered data.152 
My theories received strong support, especially when looking at the ZIOP estimates. 
In this section, I summarize the main findings of the ZIOP model which is the best 
model for the data structure of my rebellion variable,153 and then discuss the 
methodological contributions of this dissertation. Before doing so, it should be noted that 
the institutional and ethnic variables of interest have been proved to have expected but 
weaker or even no effects on protest in Chapters 5-6. These findings suggest two things. 
First, ethnic conflicts, be it violent or nonviolent, require the same preventive institutional 
arrangements. Second, because the variables of interest have similar but stronger effects 
on rebellion, it is desirable to highlight only the test results about rebellion in this 
                                                 
151 Please refer to Chapter 4 for details. I argued in Chapter 3 that while relatively stable institutions may 
not explain such fluctuating phenomenon as protest within a polity, institutions can explain the average 
cross-sectional differences. Performing a between-effects model to investigate the institutional sources of 
protest is thus desirable from this theoretical point of view.  
152 Protest should also be regarded as an ordinal scale variable although many scholars consider the data an 
interval scale one. Whether performing an ordered probit model on the protest data will change the 
conclusion about the link between the variables of interest and protest warrants future research. 
153 Please refer to Chapter 7 for details. 
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concluding chapter. 
To test my theories, in addition to the key explanatory variables, I control for eight 
variables, including federal systems, regime duration, first election, log GDP per capita, 
change in GDP per capita, and three indices of political, economic, and cultural 
differentials. Overall, the tests confirmed the expected links between political systems, 
ethnic diversity, and ethnic distributions on the one hand, and ethnic rebellion on the 
other hand. I briefly summarize these findings in turn. 
 Presidential-PR systems predicted a smallest probability of ethnic conflict and 
severe violence in states with two major ethnic groups. More often than not, these 
political systems better met the needs of both concentrated and dispersed groups 
compared to any other political systems in less diverse states. When presidential-PR 
systems worked only for the interests of concentrated or dispersed groups, the 
performance of other political systems which better met the needs of groups with 
different settlement patterns did not differ substantially from that of presidential-PR 
systems. Presidential-PR systems thus constituted the best institutional choice for states 
with two major ethnic groups. 
Parliamentary-SMD systems forecasted a larger probability of ethnic rebellions and 
severe clashes in states with more than two ethnic groups. These political systems largely 
prevented both concentrated and dispersed groups from having policy influence in more 
diverse states. Furthermore, presidential-PR systems performed unexpectedly well 
because such systems were employed together with presidential electoral systems which 
constrained their presidents’ incentives to take care of only the needs of their coethnics.154 
These findings suggested that the only political systems that states with more than two 
                                                 
154 Please refer to Chapter 5 for details. 
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ethnic groups need to avoid are parliamentary-SMD systems. 
Two hypotheses about ethnic diversity were also confirmed. Concentrated groups 
living in states with parliamentary-PR and presidential-SMD systems had a smaller 
probability to rebel if these groups faced more than one rival group. Dispersed groups 
living in states with parliamentary-PR systems had a slightly lower probability to engage 
in rebellion if such groups face only one rival group, however.155 While ethnic diversity 
in states using parliamentary-PR systems had opposite effects on dispersed and 
concentrated groups’ propensities to engage in rebellion, the effect was much stronger in 
cases involving concentrated groups. This distinction implied that when 
parliamentary-PR systems were used, states with multiple groups are less likely to 
experience rebellions and severe clashes than states with two groups. This implication 
holds unless dispersed groups extremely outnumbered concentrated groups in states with 
multiple groups. 
There are two unexpected findings. First, more diverse states were associated with a 
slightly lower probability to experience rebellion than less diverse states when 
presidential-PR systems were in use. The aforementioned merit of the presidential 
electoral systems used in more diverse states with presidential-PR systems helps explain 
this unexpected finding.  
Second, when parliamentary-SMD systems were adopted, concentrated groups in 
more diverse and less diverse states did not have a similar likelihood to experience 
rebellions and heavy clashes as my theory predicts.156 This unanticipated finding should 
                                                 
155 In my dataset, there are no observations of dispersed groups living in states with multiple ethnic groups 
and with presidential-SMD systems. The effect of ethnic diversity on dispersed groups’ propensity to 
engage in rebellion thus cannot be tested in such states 
156 Given these political systems, dispersed groups in more diverse and less diverse states had a similar 
likelihood to experience rebellions and heavy clashes at the 95% confidence level. 
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be explained by the nuance of these societies’ ethnic fractionalization levels. In this 
dissertation, I divided societies into two types: states with more than two ethnic groups 
(i.e. more diverse states) and states with only two groups (i.e. less diverse states). States 
with only two groups can be further divided into highly homogenous and relatively less 
homogenous states. Less diverse states with parliamentary-SMD systems in my dataset 
were closer to highly homogenous states on average.157 Minority groups tended to be so 
small in these states that every political system meant the same to them. Put differently, 
these groups were less likely to win elections no matter which political systems were 
employed. It was thus not surprising to find that when parliamentary-SMD systems were 
adopted, concentrated groups in less diverse states had a smaller likelihood to experience 
rebellions and heavy clashes. Whether this notion stands up to statistical testing warrants 
future research. 
The hypothesis, that concentrated groups were more likely to rebel against states 
than dispersed groups in every political system, also received strong evidence from ten 
out of the fourteen controlled comparisons.158 Only three paired comparisons provided 
insignificant results while the remaining one provided a significant yet unexpected 
finding. In states with parliamentary-SMD systems and with only two ethnic groups, 
concentrated groups were less likely to engage in rebellion than dispersed groups. What 
reason explains this unexpected finding also warrants future research. 
In sum, the data analysis of this dissertation has largely confirmed my theories, 
although there were a few unexpected findings. The data analysis of this dissertation has 
made several methodological contributions. First, large-N, quantitative analysis is 
                                                 
157 Less diverse states with all the other political systems were closer to relatively less homogenous states 
on average. 
158 Please refer to Table 7.11 for the test results. 
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desirable given that in a regression context, the small number of observations in some 
types of societies will not constitute a particular concern.159 Only a few past studies used 
this type of analysis to investigate the relations between political systems, ethnic contexts, 
and ethnic conflict, however. This dissertation not only contributes to this literature, but 
also takes the problems associated with time-series cross-section analysis more seriously 
than past studies. This dissertation hence better avoids obtaining spurious and biased 
relations between variables of interest. Second, this dissertation specifies an interactive 
model to test the interactive hypotheses of this dissertation. Many existing studies 
wrongly used additive models or an arbitrarily constructed composite variable to test their 
interactive hypotheses. This dissertation thus better unravels the true effects of political 
systems. Third, this dissertation is the first and the only research that uses and introduces 
the zero-inflated ordered probit model to the discipline. Given that many political 
variables are ordinal scale variables and have excess zero observations, this introduction 
is important and desirable. The use of the ZIOP model in this dissertation also better 
ensures unbiased estimates. 
 
8.3 Theoretical and Policy Implications 
 The theories and findings of this dissertation have a number of important theoretical 
implications. First, political systems contribute to a complementary understanding about 
the multi-faceted phenomena of ethnic violence. While economic (such as log GDP per 
capita and economic differentials), ethnic (such as cultural differentials and ethnic 
diversity), and territorial factors (such as spatial distributions of ethnic groups) have 
significant impact on ethnic conflict, political systems also matter. 
                                                 
159 Please refer to Appendix C for the number of observations in each type of society (i.e. Types 1-15). 
 232
 Second, the synthetic approach of this dissertation better unravels the true effects of 
political systems, ethnic diversity, and ethnic distributions. Past studies failed to find 
significant effects of government structures and ethnic diversity because they ignored the 
important interactions between these factors. Furthermore, spatially concentrated groups 
save urbanites are not predestined to be more combative, as the theory of indivisible 
territory suggests (Toft 2003). Political systems have been confirmed to affect whether 
concentrated groups have an incentive to fight against their regimes. Elites of 
concentrated groups may be capable, and yet unwilling to play the ethnic card when 
institutions guarantee them a reasonable share of power. Masses of these groups feel 
more empowered and become more willing to trust and coexist peacefully with other 
ethnic groups when appropriate institutions are in use. 
 Third, the interactive effects of government structures and electoral systems have 
been seriously overlooked to the extent that the importance of government structures has 
been widely and mistakenly forgotten or questioned.160 This neglect and doubt about 
government structures’ importance is not new. Ever since Weaver and Rockman 
published their edited book: Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the 
United States and Abroad in 1993, many scholars have had reservations about the effects 
of government structures. Compared to the burgeoning studies of electoral systems, 
research on government structures has been stagnating. This stagnation is unfortunate and 
unwarranted. Only when taking electoral systems and other contextual factors seriously 
can the effects of government structures be correctly evaluated. Otherwise, any denial of 
the impact of government structures is theoretically groundless and substantively 
                                                 
160 Depending on research questions, the interactive effects in question may involve the impact of other 
variables, such as the contextual factors of this dissertation. 
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dangerous. Using wrong government structures may lead to undesirable political 
outcomes, such as more severe violent conflict, greater political instability, or even a 
higher likelihood of democratic breakdown. 
  Fourth, a smaller number of veto players in states with presidential-PR systems and 
with multiple ethnic groups do not necessarily lead to a lower level of power sharing. The 
interactive models I use in this dissertation better detect this fact than a veto player model. 
This finding implies the inadequacy of using a composite variable, such as the number of 
veto players, to test the interactive effects of the political and ethnic variables of this 
dissertation. This finding may also give pause to researchers using the veto player model. 
 This dissertation also has a number of critical policy implications. First, 
parliamentary-PR systems do not serve as the one-size-fits-all solutions to ethnic conflict 
as many scholars and constitution designers believe. Instead, different ethnic societies 
require different preventive political systems. According to the estimates of the ZIOP 
model, when parliamentary-PR systems are desirable, they outperform only 
parliamentary-SMD systems. Blindly using parliamentary-PR systems will only lead to 
disastrous ethnic relations. This dissertation helps provides a set of solutions that fit the 
needs of specific divided societies. 
 Second, dispersed groups tend to be more peace-prone than concentrated groups in 
every political system. This tendency implies that ethnically divided societies can design 
institutions based more on the needs of concentrated ethnic groups. Furthermore, 
institutions generally have similar but stronger effects on violent than on nonviolent 
ethnic conflicts. This finding suggests that ethnic conflicts, be it violent or nonviolent, 
require the same preventive institutional arrangements. This implication provides good 
news to institutional designers whose countries have suffered from both types of ethnic 
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conflict. In sum, these findings reduce the burden of institutional designers since 
institutional engineers do not need to worry about different groups’ preferences and 
solutions to different types of ethnic conflict. 
 Third, as the results of this dissertation show, ethnic diversity does hurt democracy if 
using ethnic conflict as an indicator of democratic instability. Since ethnic 
fractionalization levels change very slowly over time, the best and probably the only way 
to mitigate the harmful effect of ethnic diversity is to use political systems that allow 
ethnic groups a great deal of power sharing given a certain level of ethnic diversity. 
 Fourth, economic decline and ethnic tensions may coexist in a state. Since these 
problems require different institutional prescriptions as this dissertation and Bernhard et 
al. (2001) jointly suggest, societies facing both challenges are less likely to consolidate 
their democracies. Knowing this gloomy consequence, international societies should 
work together to promote the economic development of these states in a quandary by 
providing subsidies, grants, low interest loans, or other financial support. This financial 
assistance would help such trapped societies escape from their difficult choice between 
different institutional solutions to their socioeconomic problems, and concentrate on 
promoting their inter-group peace. 
 
8.4 Avenues for Future Research 
 While this dissertation has a number of methodological contributions, future 
research should incorporate case studies to investigate causation or what explain the 
correlation between the proposed variable and the probability of violent conflict. 
Furthermore, while scholars regularly exclude non-democratic states in order to explore 
the impact of political systems, non-democratic states usually experience more severe 
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ethnic conflict than democratic states. Future work should explore how to deal with these 
more difficult cases. Moreover, the indices of ethnic fractionalization I used in this 
dissertation probably suffer from the same potential mismatch between the measure and 
the mechanism of behavior that researchers usually use these indices to investigate. 
Specifically, all the authors of these indices, including Fearon who encode socially 
relevant ethnic groups, over-count politically irrelevant groups as ethnic. This flaw is 
insurmountable so far given that there is still no better index of ethnic diversity. Future 
studies should use more appropriate data when that is available. Last but not least, I have 
treated ethnic diversity as a dichotomous variable because of the purpose of this 
dissertation. Ethnic diversity is essentially a continuous variable, however. Future work 
can investigate its effect by regarding it as a continuous variable or by dividing this 














Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variables N Mean Standard 
Deviation
Min. Max. 
Rebellion 2074 0.67 1.49 0 7 
Protest 2079 1.74 1.37 0 6 
PAR 2095 0.45 0.50 0 1 
PR 2095 0.53 0.50 0 1 



















PAR * PR 2095 0.18 0.38 0 1 
PAR * Frac (Alesina) 
PAR * Frac (Fearon) 
















PAR * Con 2095 0.25 0.43 0 1 
PR * Frac (Alesina) 
PR * Frac (Fearon) 
















PR * Con 2095 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Frac * Con (Alesina) 
Frac * Con (Fearon) 
















PAR * PR* Frac (Alesina) 
PAR * PR* Frac (Fearon) 
















PAR * PR *Con 2095 0.10 0.30 0 1 
PAR * Frac * Con (Alesina) 
PAR * Frac * Con (Fearon) 
















PR * Frac * Con (Alesina) 
PR * Frac * Con (Fearon) 
















PAR * PR * Frac * Con (Annett) 2095 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Federal system 2095 0.34 0.47 0 1 
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Enduring regime 2095 32.01 45.22 0 194 
First election 2095 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Variables N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max. 
Log GDP per capita 2095 7.97 1.46   5.06 10.54 
Change in GDP per capita 2095 0.02 0.04   -0.38  0.21 
Political differentials  2078 1.57 1.46 -2 4 
Economic differentials 2056 2.28 1.83 -2 4 
Cultural differentials  2092 2.99 1.05 0 4 
Note: Min., Max., PAR, PR, Con, and Frac stand for minimum, maximum, parliamentary systems, 


























Appendix B: Ethnic Groups in States with Specific Institutions 
Concentrated Groups Facing One Rival Group 
Type 1: PAR-PR 
Greeks in Albania (2002-2003) 
Slovaks in Czech Republic (1993-2003) 
Russians in Estonia (1991-2003) 
Muslims in Greece (1985-2003) 
Arabs in Israel (1985-91; 2001-03) 
Palestinians in Israel (1985-91; 2001-03) 
Sardinians in Italy (1985-1992) 
South Tyroleans in Italy (1985-1992) 
Gagauz in Moldova (2000-2003) 
Slavs in Moldova (2000-2003) 
Hungarians in Slovakia (1993-1998) 
Basques in Spain (1985-2003) 
Catalans in Spain (1985-2003) 
Kurds in Turkey (1985-2003) 
 
Type 2: PRE-PR 
Indigenous Peoples in Argentina (1985-2003) 
Afro-Brazilians in Brazil (1985-2003) 
Amazonian Indians in Brazil (1985-2003) 
Turks in Bulgaria (1991-2003) 
Afro-Americans in Colombia (1985-2003) 
Indigenous Peoples in Colombia (1985-2003) 
Antillean Blacks in Costa Rica (1985-2003) 
Serbs in Croatia (2000-2003) 
Afro-Americans in Dominican Republic (1985-2003) 
Indigenous Peoples in El Salvador (1985-2003) 
Basques in France (1986-1987) 
Corsicans in France (1986-1987) 
Indigenous Peoples in Guatemala (1996-2003) 
Black Karibs in Honduras (1989-2003) 
Indigenous Peoples in Honduras (1989-2003) 
Arabs in Israel (1992-2000) 
Palestinians in Israel (1992-2000) 
Albanians in Macedonia (2001-2003) 
Roma in Macedonia (2001-2003) 
Serbs in Macedonia (2001-2003) 
Gagauz in Moldova (1993-1999) 
Slavs in Moldova (1993-1999) 
Indigenous Peoples in Nicaragua (1990-2003) 
Indigenous Peoples in Panama (1989-2003) 
Hungarians in Slovakia (1999-2003) 
Sri Lankan Tamils in Sri Lanka (2001-2003) 
Jurassiens in Switzerland (1985-2003) 
Aboriginal Taiwanese in Taiwan (1992-2003) 
Afro-Americans in Venezuela (1985-2003) 
Indigenous Peoples in Venezuela (1985-2003) 
Type 3: PAR-SMD 
Chittagong Hill Tribes in Bangladesh (1991-2003) 
Type 4: PRE-SMD 
Turks in Bulgaria (1990) 
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Type 3: PAR-SMD 
Poles in Belarus (1991-1994) 
San Bushmen in Botswana (1985-2003) 
Sardinians in Italy (1993-2003) 
South Tyroleans in Italy (1993-2003) 
Bougainvilleans in Papua New Guinea (1985-2003) 
Type 4: PRE-SMD 
Basques in France (1985; 1988-2003) 
Corsicans in France (1985; 1988-2003) 
Poles in Lithuania (1991-2003) 
Albanians in Macedonia (1993-2000) 
Roma in Macedonia(1993-2000) 
Serbs in Macedonia(1993-2000) 
Mayans in Mexico (1997-2003) 
Zapotecs in Mexico (1997-2003) 
Igorots in Philippines (1987-2003) 
Moros in Philippines (1987-2003) 
Avars in Russia (1992; 2000-2003) 
Buryat in Russia (1992; 2000-2003) 
Chechens in Russia (1992; 2000-2003) 
Ingushes in Russia (1992; 2000-2003) 
Karachays in Russia (1992; 2000-2003) 
Kumyks in Russia (1992; 2000-2003) 
Lezghins in Russia (1992; 2000-2003) 
Tatars in Russia (1992; 2000-2003) 
Tuvinians in Russia (1992; 2000-2003) 
Yakut in Russia (1992; 2000-2003) 
Honamese in South Korea (1988-2003) 
Crimean Russians in Ukraine (1991-2003) 
Crimean Tatars in Ukraine (1991-2003) 
Russians in Ukraine (1991-2003) 
Hispanics in USA (1985-2003) 
Indigenous Peoples in USA (1985-2003) 
Concentrated Groups Facing Multiple Ethnic Others 
Type 5: PAR-PR 
Coloreds in South Africa (1994-2003) 
Xhosa in South Africa (1994-2003) 
Zulus in South Africa (1994-2003) 
Malay-Muslims in Thailand (1992-1996) 
Northern Hill Tribes in Thailand (1992-1996) 
Croats in Yugoslavia (2001-2003) 
Type 6: PRE-PR 
Indigenous Highland Peoples in Bolivia (1985-2003) 
Indigenous Lowland Peoples in Bolivia (1985-2003) 
Afro-Americans in Ecuador (1985-2003) 
Indigenous Highland Peoples in Ecuador (1985-2003) 
Indigenous Lowland Peoples in Ecuador (1985-2003) 
Acehnese in Indonesia (1999-2003) 
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Type 5: PAR-PR 
Hungarians in Yugoslavia (2001-2003) 
Kosovo Albanians in Yugoslavia (2001-2003) 





Type 6: PRE-PR 
East Timorese in Indonesia (1999-2003) 
Papuans in Indonesia (1999-2003) 
Merina in Madagascar (1992-1997) 
Basters in Namibia (1990-2003) 
East Caprivians in Namibia (1990-2003) 
San Bushmen in Namibia (1990-2003) 
Tuareg in Niger (1992-1995) 
Afro-Americans in Peru (1985-91; 2001-03) 
Indigenous Highland Peoples in Peru (1985-91;2001-03) 
Indigenous Lowland Peoples in Peru (1985-91;2001-03) 
Type 7: PAR-SMD 
Quebecois in Canada (1985-2003) 
Assamese in India (1985-2003) 
Bodos in India (1985-2003) 
Kashmiris in India (1985-2003) 
Mizos in India (1985-2003) 
Nagas in India (1985-2003) 
Scheduled Tribes in India (1985-2003) 
Sikhs in India (1985-2003) 
Tripuras in India (1985-2003) 
Baluchis in Pakistan (1988-1998) 
Hindus in Pakistan (1988-1998) 
Pashtuns in Pakistan (1988-1998) 
Sindhis in Pakistan (1988-1998) 
Coloreds in South Africa (1992-1993) 
Xhosa in South Africa (1992-1993) 
Zulus in South Africa (1992-1993) 
Darfur Black Muslims in Sudan (1986-1988) 
Nuba in Sudan (1986-1988) 
Type 7: PAR-SMD 
Southerners in Sudan (1986-1988) 
Malay-Muslims in Thailand (1997-2003) 
Northern Hill Tribes in Thailand (1997-2003) 
Type 8: PRE-SMD 
Ashanti in Ghana (2001-2003) 
Ewe in Ghana (2001-2003) 
Mossi-Dagomba in Ghana (2001-2003) 
Kalenjins in Kenya (2002-2003) 
Kikuyu in Kenya (2002-2003) 
Kisii in Kenya (2002-2003) 
Luhya in Kenya (2002-2003) 
Luo in Kenya (2002-2003) 
Maasais in Kenya (2002-2003) 
Somalis in Kenya (2002-2003) 
Merina in Madagascar (1998-2003) 
Tuareg in Mali (1992-2003) 
Diolas in Casamance, Senegal (2000-2003) 
Bemebe in Zambia (1991-1995) 










Dispersed Groups Facing One Rival Group 
Type 9: PAR-PR 
Roma in Czech Republic (1993-2003) 
Turks in Germany (1990-2003) 
Roma in Greece (1985-2003) 
Roma in Italy (1985-1992) 
Koreans in Japan (1985-1993) 
Russians in Latvia (1991-2003) 
Maori in New Zealand (1993-2003) 
Roma in Slovakia (1993-1998) 
Type 9: PAR-PR 
Roma in Spain (1985-2003) 
 
 
Type 10: PRE-PR 
Jews in Argentina (1985-2003) 
Roma in Bulgaria (1991-2003) 
Indigenous Peoples in Chile (1989-2003) 
Roma in Croatia (2000-2003) 
Muslims in France (1986-1987) 
Roma in France (1986-1987) 
Afro-Caribbeans in Panama (1989-2003) 
Chinese in Panama (1989-2003) 
Type 10: PRE-PR 
Indigenous Peoples in Paraguay (1992-2003) 
Magyars in Romania (1996-2003) 
Roma in Romania (1996-2003) 
Roma in Slovakia (1999-2003) 
Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka (2001-2003) 
Foreign Workers in Switzerland (1985-2003) 
Mainland Chinese in Taiwan (1992-2003) 
Taiwanese in Taiwan (1992-2003) 
Type 11: PAR-SMD 
Aborigines in Australia (1985-2003) 
Biharis in Bangladesh (1991-2003) 
Hindus in Bangladesh (1991-2003) 
Russians in Belarus (1991-1994) 
East Indians in Fiji (1985-86; 1999) 
Fijians in Fiji (1985-86; 1999) 
Roma in Hungary (1990-2003) 
Roma in Italy (1993-2003) 
Koreans in Japan (1994-2003) 
Maori in New Zealand (1985-1992) 
Afro-Caribbeans in UK (1985-2003) 
Asians in UK (1985-2003) 
Catholics in UK (1985-2003) 
Scots in UK (1985-2003) 
Type 12: PRE-SMD 
Roma in Bulgaria (1990) 
Muslims in France (1985; 1988-2003) 
Roma in France (1985; 1988-2003) 
Russians in Lithuania (1991-2003) 
Other Indigenous Peoples in Mexico (1997-2003) 
Roma in Russia (1992; 2000-2003) 
African-Americans in USA (1985-2003) 









Dispersed Groups Facing Multiple Ethnic Others 
Type 13: PAR-PR 
Africans in Guyana (1992-2003) 
East Indians in Guyana (1992-2003) 
Asians in South Africa (1994-2003) 
Europeans in South Africa (1994-2003) 
Chinese in Thailand (1992-1996) 
Roma in Yugoslavia (2001-2003) 
Type 14: PRE-PR 
Chinese in Indonesia (1999-2003) 
Europeans in Namibia (1990-2003) 
 
Type 15: PAR-SMD 
French Canadians in Canada (1985-2003) 
Indigenous Peoples in Canada (1985-2003) 
Muslims in India (1985-2003) 
Ahmadis in Pakistan (1988-1998) 
Mohajirs in Pakistan (1988-1998) 
Asians in South Africa (1992-1993) 
Europeans in South Africa (1992-1993) 
Chinese in Thailand (1997-2003) 







Note: PAR, PRE, PR, and SMD stand for parliamentary systems, presidential systems, 
proportional representation systems, and single-member-district systems, respectively. The 
category of presidential systems includes both presidential and semi-presidential systems while 












Appendix C: Cases and Key Variables 





1 2 3 
Albania Greeks 2002-2003 Parliamentary PR Concentrated (3) .22 .10 .10 
Argentina Indigenous Peoples 1985-2003 Presidential PR Concentrated (3) .26 .26 .41 
Argentina Jews 1985-2003 Presidential PR Dispersed (1) .26 .26 .41 
Australia Aborigines 1985-2003 Parliamentary SMD Dispersed (0) .09 .15 .32 
Bangladesh Biharis 1991-2003 Parliamentary SMD Dispersed (1) .05 .22 .07 
Bangladesh Chittagong Hill Tribes 1991-2003 Parliamentary SMD Concentrated (3) .05 .22 .07 
Bangladesh Hindus 1991-2003 Parliamentary SMD Dispersed (0) .05 .22 .07 
Belarus Poles 1991-1994 Parliamentary SMD Concentrated (2) .32 .37 .37 
Belarus Russians 1991-1994 Parliamentary SMD Dispersed (0) .32 .37 .37 
Bolivia Indigenous Highland Peoples 1985-2003 Presidential PR Concentrated (3) .74 .74 .71 
Bolivia Indigenous Lowland Peoples 1985-2003 Presidential PR Concentrated (3) .74 .74 .71 
Botswana San Bushmen 1985-2003 Parliamentary SMD Concentrated (3) .41 .35 .48 
Brazil Afro-Brazilians 1985-2003 Presidential PR Concentrated (3) .54 .55 .64 
Brazil Amazonian Indians 
 (Indigenous Lowland Peoples) 
1985-2003 Presidential PR Concentrated (3) .54 .55 .64 






Dispersed (0) .42 .30 .31 






Concentrated (2) .42 .30 .31 
Canada French Canadians 1985-2003 Parliamentary SMD Dispersed (0) .71 .60 .77 
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Canada Indigenous Peoples 1985-2003 Parliamentary SMD Dispersed (0) .71 .60 .77 
Canada Quebecois 1985-2003 Parliamentary SMD Concentrated (3) .71 .60 .77 
Chile Indigenous Peoples 1989-2003 Presidential PR Dispersed (1) .19 .50 .43 
Colombia Afro-Americans 1985-2003 Presidential PR Concentrated (3) .60 .66 .67 
Colombia Indigenous Peoples 1985-2003 Presidential PR Concentrated (3) .60 .66 .67 
Costa Rica Antillean Blacks 1985-2003 Presidential PR Concentrated (3) .24 .24 .24 
Croatia Roma 2000-2003 Semipresidential PR Dispersed (0) .37 .38 .38 
Croatia Serbs 2000-2003 Semipresidential PR Concentrated (3) .37 .38 .38 
Czech Republic Roma 1993-2003 Parliamentary PR Dispersed (0) .32 .32 .32 
Czech Republic Slovaks 1993-2003 Parliamentary PR Concentrated (3) .32 .32 .32 
Dominican Republic Afro-Americans 1985-2003 Presidential PR Concentrated (3) .43 .39 .46 
Ecuador Afro-Americans 1985-2003 Presidential PR Concentrated (3) .66 .66 .66 
Ecuador Indigenous Highland Peoples 1985-2003 Presidential PR Concentrated (3) .66 .66 .66 
Ecuador Indigenous Lowland Peoples 1985-2003 Presidential PR Concentrated (3) .66 .66 .66 
El Salvador Indigenous Peoples 1985-2003 Presidential PR Concentrated (3) .20 .20 .16 
Estonia Russians 1991-2003 Parliamentary PR Concentrated (2) .51 .51 .51 
Fiji East Indians 1985-1986 
and 1999 
Parliamentary SMD Dispersed (0) .55 .57 .56 
Fiji Fijians 1985-1986 
and 1999 
Parliamentary SMD Dispersed (0) .55 .57 .56 
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Concentrated (3) .10 .27 .33 








Concentrated (2) .10 .27 .33 








Dispersed (1) .10 .27 .33 








Dispersed (0) .10 .27 .33 
Germany Turks 1990-2003 Parliamentary PR Dispersed (1) .17 .10 .12 
Ghana Ashanti 2001-2003 Presidential SMD Concentrated (3) .67 .85 .73 
Ghana Ewe 2001-2003 Presidential SMD Concentrated (3) .67 .85 .73 
Ghana Mossi-Dagomba 2001-2003 Presidential SMD Concentrated (3) .67 .85 .73 
Greece Muslims (Turks) 1985-2003 Parliamentary PR Concentrated (3) .16 .06 .10 
Greece Roma 1985-2003 Parliamentary PR Dispersed (0) .16 .06 .10 
Guatemala Indigenous Peoples 1996-2003 Presidential PR Concentrated (2) .51 .49 .52 
Guyana Africans 1992-2003 Parliamentary PR Dispersed (1) .62 .62 .63 
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Guyana East Indians 1992-2003 Parliamentary PR Dispersed (0) .62 .62 .63 
Honduras Black Karibs (Garifuna) 1989-2003 Presidential PR Concentrated (3) .19 .19 .25 
Honduras Indigenous Peoples 1989-2003 Presidential PR Concentrated (3) .19 .19 .25 
Hungary Roma 1990-2003 Parliamentary SMD Dispersed (0) .15 .19 .17 
India Assamese 1985-2003 Parliamentary SMD Concentrated (3) .70 .81 .90 
India Bodos 1985-2003 Parliamentary SMD Concentrated (2) .70 .81 .90 
India Kashmiris 1985-2003 Parliamentary SMD Concentrated (3) .70 .81 .90 
India Mizos 1985-2003 Parliamentary SMD Concentrated (3) .70 .81 .90 
India Muslims 1985-2003 Parliamentary SMD Dispersed (0) .70 .81 .90 
India Nagas 1985-2003 Parliamentary SMD Concentrated (3) .70 .81 .90 
India Scheduled Tribes 1985-2003 Parliamentary SMD Concentrated (2) .70 .81 .90 
India Sikhs 1985-2003 Parliamentary SMD Concentrated (2) .70 .81 .90 
India Tripuras 1985-2003 Parliamentary SMD Concentrated (3) .70 .81 .90 
Indonesia Acehnese 1999-2003 Presidential PR Concentrated (3) .74 .77 .79 
Indonesia Chinese 1999-2003 Presidential PR Dispersed (1) .74 .77 .79 
Indonesia East Timorese 1999-2003 Presidential PR Concentrated (3) .74 .77 .79 
Indonesia Papuans 1999-2003 Presidential PR Concentrated (3) .74 .77 .79 








Concentrated (2) .34 .53 .29 
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Concentrated (3) .34 .53 .29 






Dispersed (0) .11 .04 .08 






Concentrated (3) .11 .04 .08 






Concentrated (3) .11 .04 .08 






Dispersed (1) .01 .01 .03 
Kenya Kalenjins 2002-2003 presidential SMD Concentrated (3) .86 .85 .90 
Kenya Kikuyu 2002-2003 presidential SMD Concentrated (3) .86 .85 .90 
Kenya Kisii 2002-2003 presidential SMD Concentrated (3) .86 .85 .90 
Kenya Luhya 2002-2003 presidential SMD Concentrated (3) .86 .85 .90 
Kenya Luo 2002-2003 presidential SMD Concentrated (3) .86 .85 .90 
Kenya Maasais 2002-2003 presidential SMD Concentrated (2) .86 .85 .90 
Kenya Somalis 2002-2003 presidential SMD Concentrated (3) .86 .85 .90 
Latvia Russians 1991-2003 Parliamentary PR Dispersed (0) .59 .59 .59 
Lithuania Poles 1991-2003 Semipresidential SMD Concentrated (2) .32 .32 .34 
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Lithuania Russians 1991-2003 Semipresidential SMD Dispersed (0) .32 .32 .34 






Concentrated (2) .50 .54 .54 






Concentrated (2) .50 .54 .54 






Concentrated (2) .50 .54 .54 






Concentrated (2) .88 .86 .87 
Mali Tuareg 1992-2003 Semipresidential SMD Concentrated (3) .69 .75 .86 
Mexico Mayans 1997-2003 Presidential SMD Concentrated (2) .54 .59 .59 
Mexico Other Indigenous Peoples 1997-2003 Presidential SMD Dispersed (0) .54 .54 .59 
Mexico Zapotecs 1997-2003 Presidential SMD Concentrated (2) .54 .54 .59 






Concentrated (3) .55 .51 .51 






Concentrated (2) .55 .51 .51 
Namibia Basters 1990-2003 Semipresidential PR Concentrated (3) .63 .72 .78 
Namibia East Caprivians 1990-2003 Semipresidential PR Concentrated (3) .63 .72 .78 
Namibia Europeans 1990-2003 Semipresidential PR Dispersed (1) .63 .72 .78 
Namibia San Bushmen 1990-2003 Semipresidential PR Concentrated (3) .63 .72 .78 
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Dispersed (1) .40 .36 .20 
Nicaragua Indigenous Peoples 1990-2003 Presidential PR Concentrated (3) .48 .40 .50 
Niger Tuareg 1992-1995 Semipresidential PR Concentrated (2) .65 .64 .72 
Pakistan Ahmadis 1988-1998 Parliamentary SMD Dispersed (0) .71 .53 .61 
Pakistan Baluchis 1988-1998 Parliamentary SMD Concentrated (2) .71 .53 .61 
Pakistan Hindus 1988-1998 Parliamentary SMD Concentrated (3) .71 .53 .61 
Pakistan Mohajirs 1988-1998 Parliamentary SMD Dispersed (1) .71 .53 .61 
Pakistan Pashtuns 1988-1998 Parliamentary SMD Concentrated (3) .71 .53 .61 
Pakistan Sindhis 1988-1998 Parliamentary SMD Concentrated (3) .71 .53 .61 
Panama Afro-Caribbeans 1989-2003 Presidential PR Dispersed (1) .55 .51 .60 
Panama Chinese 1989-2003 Presidential PR Dispersed (1) .55 .51 .60 
Panama Indigenous Peoples 1989-2003 Presidential PR Concentrated (3) .55 .51 .60 
Papua New Guinea Bougainvilleans 1985-2003 Parliamentary SMD Concentrated (3) .27 1.0 .35 
Paraguay Indigenous Peoples 1992-2003 Presidential PR Dispersed (0) .17 .13 .17 
Peru Afro-Americans 1985-1991 
and 
2001-2003 
Semipresidential PR Concentrated (3) .66 .64 .66 
Peru Indigenous Highland Peoples 1985-1991 
and 
2001-2003 
Semipresidential PR Concentrated (2) .66 .64 .66 
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Peru Indigenous Lowland Peoples 1985-1991 
and 
2001-2003 
Semipresidential PR Concentrated (3) .66 .64 .66 
Philippine Igorots (Cordillera Peoples) 1987-2003 Presidential SMD Concentrated (3) .24 .16 .84 
Philippine Moros (Muslims) 1987-2003 Presidential SMD Concentrated (2) .24 .16 .84 
Romania Magyars (Hungarians) 1996-2003 Semipresidential PR Dispersed (1) .31 .30 .29 
Romania Roma 1996-2003 Semipresidential PR Dispersed (0) .31 .30 .29 
Russia Avars 1992 and 
2000-2003 
Semipresidential SMD Concentrated (2) .25 .33 .33 
Russia Buryat 1992 and 
2000-2003 
Semipresidential SMD Concentrated (2) .25 .33 .33 
Russia Chechens 1992 and 
2000-2003 
Semipresidential SMD Concentrated (3) .25 .33 .33 
Russia Ingushes 1992 and 
2000-2003 
Semipresidential SMD Concentrated (3) .25 .33 .33 
Russia Karachays 1992 and 
2000-2003 
Semipresidential SMD Concentrated (2) .25 .33 .33 
Russia Kumyks 1992 and 
2000-2003 
Semipresidential SMD Concentrated (3) .25 .33 .33 
Russia Lezghins 1992 and 
2000-2003 
Semipresidential SMD Concentrated (3) .25 .33 .33 
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Russia Roma 1992 and 
2000-2003 
Semipresidential SMD Dispersed (0) .25 .33 .33 
Russia Tatars 1992 and 
2000-2003 
Semipresidential SMD Concentrated (2) .25 .33 .33 
Russia Tuvinians 1992 and 
2000-2003 
Semipresidential SMD Concentrated (3) .25 .33 .33 
Russia Yakut 1992 and 
2000-2003 
Semipresidential SMD Concentrated (3) .25 .33 .33 
Senegal Diolas in Casamance 2000-2003 Semipresidential SMD Concentrated (3) .69 .73 .81 




PR Concentrated (3) .25 .33 .33 




PR Dispersed (0) .25 .33 .33 






Dispersed (1) .75 .88 .88 






Concentrated (3) .75 .88 .88 






Dispersed (0) .75 .88 .88 






Concentrated (2) .75 .88 .88 
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Concentrated (2) .75 .88 .88 
South Korea Honamese 1988-2003 Presidential SMD Concentrated (2) .00 .00 .00 
Spain Basques 1985-2003 Parliamentary PR Concentrated (3) .42 .50 .44 
Spain Catalans 1985-2003 Parliamentary PR Concentrated (3) .42 .50 .44 
Spain Roma 1985-2003 Parliamentary PR Dispersed (0) .42 .50 .44 
Sri Lanka Indian Tamils 2001-2003 Semipresidential PR Dispersed (1) .42 .43 .71 
Sri Lanka Sri Lankan Tamils 2001-2003 Semipresidential PR Concentrated (3) .42 .43 .71 
Sudan Nuba 1986-1988 Parliamentary SMD Concentrated (3) .71 .71 .71 
Sudan Southerners 1986-1988 Parliamentary SMD Concentrated (3) .71 .71 .71 
Switzerland Foreign Workers 1985-2003 Presidential PR Dispersed (0) .53 .58 .56 
Switzerland Jurasiens 1985-2003 Presidential PR Concentrated (3) .53 .58 .56 






Concentrated (2) .27 .27 .27 






Dispersed (1) .27 .27 .27 






Dispersed (0) .27 .27 .27 






Dispersed (1) .63 .43 .63 
Thailand Malay-Muslims 1992-1996 Parliamentary PR Concentrated (3) .63 .43 .63 
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1997-2003  SMD 






Concentrated (2) .63 .43 .63 
Turkey Kurds 1985-2003 Parliamentary PR Concentrated (3) .32 .30 .19 
Ukraine Crimean Russians 1991-2003 Semipresidential SMD Concentrated (3) .47 .42 .42 
Ukraine Crimean Tatars 1991-2003 Semipresidential SMD Concentrated (3) .47 .42 .42 
Ukraine Russians 1991-2003 Semipresidential SMD Concentrated (2) .47 .42 .42 
United Kingdom Afro-Caribbeans 1985-2003 Parliamentary SMD Dispersed (1) .12 .32 .39 
United Kingdom Asians 1985-2003 Parliamentary SMD Dispersed (1) .12 .32 .39 
United Kingdom Catholics 1985-2003 Parliamentary SMD Dispersed (1) .12 .32 .39 
United Kingdom Scots 1985-2003 Parliamentary SMD Dispersed (1) .12 .32 .39 
United States African-Americans 1985-2003 Presidential SMD Dispersed (0) .49 .49 .58 
United States Hispanics 1985-2003 Presidential SMD Concentrated (2) .49 .49 .58 
United States Indigenous Peoples 1985-2003 Presidential SMD Concentrated (3) .49 .49 .58 
United States Native Hawaiians 1985-2003 Presidential SMD Dispersed (0) .49 .49 .58 
Venezuela Afro-Americans 1985-2003 Presidential PR Concentrated (2) .50 .48 .54 
Venezuela Indigenous Peoples 1985-2003 Presidential PR Concentrated (3) .50 .48 .54 
Yugoslavia Croats 2001-2003 Parliamentary PR Concentrated (2) .81 .80 .78 
Yugoslavia Hungarians 2001-2003 Parliamentary PR Concentrated (3) .81 .80 .78 
Yugoslavia Kosovo Albanians 2001-2003 Parliamentary PR Concentrated (2) .81 .80 .78 
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Yugoslavia Roma 2001-2003 Parliamentary PR Dispersed (0) .81 .80 .78 
Yugoslavia Sandzak Muslims 2001-2003 Parliamentary PR Concentrated (3) .81 .80 .78 
Zambia Bemebe 1991-1995 Presidential SMD Concentrated (2) .78 .73 .91 
Zambia Lozi (Barotse) 1991-1995 Presidential SMD Concentrated (3) .78 .73 .91 
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